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Abstract 
 
Neuroaesthetics, as a locus of research on art and cognition, has tended to privilege 
neuroscientific understandings of the art experience that elide centuries of art historical 
research on perception and culture. Instead, this dissertation proposes that neuroaesthetic 
research can be extended to understanding the specific social, sensorial and perceptual 
processes occurring as artworks are encountered in exhibition contexts. How does 
neuroaesthetic perception operate in contemporary artworks? What modes of cognitive 
address are involved? How can neuroaesthetic engagement facilitate embodied 
knowledges?  
 This dissertation first inquires into the neuroaesthetic literature in order to 
establish its neuroscientific foundations, and then advances a perceptual standpoint 
stemming from art and art history. Drawing from feminist theories of experiential and 
cognitive embodiment, I reposition neuroaesthetics to incorporate art historical inquiries 
into body and mind through direct engagement with art. I argue that such a revised 
neuroaesthic perception must take into account post-humanist troublings of nature/culture 
dichotomies. I also suggest that the paradigm for embodied perception that has emerged 
from both cognitive neuroscience and affect theory can expand neuroaesthetic 
understanding. My investigation has led me to first-hand experience as a research subject 
of neuroscience experiments, which show that current fMRI contexts in fact delimit the 
perception of art and inhibit possible neuroaesthetic significance. Instead, I undertake 
neuroaesthetic research in exhibition contexts where self-reflexive awareness developed 
in practiced art apprehension facilitates insights into perception and cognition that are 
inaccessible within the epistemological conditions of neuroscience labs.  
 The first case study examines how an installation by the FASTWÜRMS 
collective reveals cognitive processes of abduction by inviting navigation through an 
infinitely complex web of objects and images. Turning from association to visual 
cognition, I then consider how Olafur Eliasson’s immersive light installations manipulate 
colour perception thereby facilitating critical awareness of techno-mediated environments 
on the human visual system. Third, my analysis of a conceptual work by Kristin Lucas 
explores how the performance of digital and legal technology invites imaginative yet 
embodied transformations. Finally, my study explores how the affective tensions 
produced in a video by Omer Fast activate an awareness of intersubjective 
communication that corresponds with recent neuroscientific developments in mirror-
neuron theory. By taking contemporary artworks as its focus, the dissertation extends 
neuroaesthetic inquiry to demonstrate contextual understandings of how the cognitive 
processes of art constitute physiological engagements between body, brain and world. 
 
Key Words: neuroaesthetics, art and the brain, art and neuroscience, art and science, 
nature and culture, abduction, visual cognition, mimesis, mirror neurons, aesthetics, 
embodied mind, art history, contemporary art, FASTWÜRMS, Olafur Eliasson, Kristin 
Lucas, Omer Fast 
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Introduction 
  
I have never felt more disembodied than during the time I spent in a Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) scanner. There was a small window inches above my face, equipped with 
a periscope, so that although I was lying on my back staring straight up toward the 
ceiling, I was looking at my own feet, seemingly very far away. I experienced an eerie 
floating sensation, as if I my body had been removed from the world and set adrift in zero 
gravity. The technicians had instructed me to relax and lie perfectly still for the two hours 
it would take the scanner to record my neural anatomy. Unfortunately, the aesthetics 
inside the machine were more conducive to stress than they were to relaxation. On top of 
the claustrophobic confinement, the operations of the scanner itself created an abrasive 
audio environment. In the background, I could hear a steady, rhythmic chugging sound, 
like a distant washing machine. At the same time, I was bombarded with a relentless, 
loud and grating series of arrhythmic grinding noises. I struggled to control my breathing 
and calm myself. In an effort to accept the confinement of my situation, I tried to 
mentally conjure positive physical encounters – petting my cats, snuggling with my 
partner, walking in the forest. I concluded that my life was pretty good and I should be 
able to endure this temporary state of confinement. I eventually began to distinguish odd 
harmonics and interesting dissonances in the ongoing audio, and, after about thirty 
minutes, I fell asleep.  
 My second session in the scanner was more challenging. This time I was 
performing a task designed to produce specific neural activations for the scanner to 
record. The task involved staring through the periscope at crosshairs in the centre of a 
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screen, where graphic shapes popped up and disappeared. I held a key pad in my hands 
which I had to click to indicate whether each target shape had popped up on the left or on 
the right. A high pitched audio cue told me to click on the opposite side of the target and 
a low pitched cue told me to click on the same side. I have always had trouble 
distinguishing left from right and I quickly became befuddled and a little panicky. 
Despite understanding, rationally, that my personal ability to perform the task correctly 
was irrelevant to the research, I badly wanted to please the technicians by trying to do 
well. The space was confining, I was not supposed to move my head at all, and the 
anxiety caused by the task itself made it much harder for me to relax. After awhile, 
however, my thoughts began to wander while my eyes and hands remained engaged in 
the task. I pondered my state as a confined animal organism, my perceptions narrowed 
and circumscribed by the apparatus of technoscience. I thought about Animal Farm, 
1984, The Matrix, Clockwork Orange, Josef Mengele’s experiments on human captives, 
and Stockholm Syndrome. I thought about similarities between objectification and death. 
How, I wondered, would the Italian Futurists feel about this technoscientific construct? I 
decided they would probably be enthusiastic if they were the ones operating the machine. 
All the while, I remained passive and compliant as the great machine around me chugged 
and ground, producing powerful magnetic fields to alter the subatomic configurations of 
my grey matter, parsing the flows of blood to my active brain cells in fine detail. 
 The scenario had distinctly dystopic qualities, and yet I was free to leave at any 
time. If I chose to abort the test, all I had to do was say so and I would be released. I 
stayed because I wanted to be there. I had volunteered on this experiment in order to 
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learn first-hand what it would feel like to perform as a scientific subject in a neuro-
imaging experiment. As a curator, artist, art theorist and art historian, the artworks I study 
operate in the social contexts of galleries and museums, producing embodied experiences 
within discursive paradigms and the localized conditions of display. Thus, when I 
embarked on my neuroaesthetic research for this dissertation, I wanted to establish my 
own first-hand, subjective basis of comparison between ways that art can facilitate 
situated awareness of cognitive process, and the ways that knowledge about the workings 
of brain is produced in the neuroscience lab.  
 In both contexts – inside the art gallery and inside the MRI scanner – embodied 
knowledge emerges, in part, through the situated standpoint of participants and observers.  
Despite the seeming passivity of art audiences and scientific subjects, one does not 
perform either role as a blank slate or empty vessel, but as an alert and active entity 
primed and conditioned by personal past experience and collective cultural knowledge. 
My critical standpoint has been informed by Donna Haraway’s epistemological work on 
“situated knowledges.”1 As a philosopher of science and technology, Haraway has 
activated a feminist account of embodied experience; the situated bodies she posited were 
specific, historically and spatially located entities – thinking bodies, culturally 
conditioned and socially engaged.2 Haraway’s work informs interdisciplinary research at 
the intersections of art and science because she acknowledged the bio-physical 
dimensions of human perception, yet she simultaneously imbricated the senses within the 
cultural contingencies of an individual’s lived experience. I take from Haraway the 
impossibility of detached and omniscient points of view. Situated knowledge is 
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necessarily partial, and the feminist challenge for researchers of art and science alike is to 
remain alert and open to the unknowable alterities embedded in any knowledge claim. 
 In this dissertation I will adopt a standpoint epistemology to conduct 
neuroaesthetic inquiries into contemporary art, theorizing how certain artworks can 
facilitate embodied knowledge about perceptual cognition. Since the 1990s, art historians 
such as Barbara Maria Stafford and John Onians, and neuroscientists such as Semir Zeki, 
V.S. Ramachandran, Martin Skov and Oshin Vartanian, have been studying art and the 
brain under the name of “neuroaesthetics.”3 Yet, the practices of art history and 
neuroscience are methodologically and epistemologically distinct. Art historians conduct 
their primary research in galleries and museums, seeking to understand artworks in the 
cultural contexts of the eras in which they were created, while neuroscientists do primary 
research in labs, seeking to understand the workings of the brain. Both art history and 
neuroscience, however, produce detailed observations and analysis of material objects, 
and both inquire into interconnections between sense perception and cultural knowledge. 
Under the interdisciplinary umbrella of neuroaesthetics, the two disciplines rub up against 
one another; each provoking critical questions about the other’s findings while 
simultaneously addressing lacunae produced by the other’s methodological constraints.  
In contemporary Western society, however, neuroscientific research holds a vaunted 
position of authority and much of the neuroaesthetic literature to date privileges 
neuroscience as having greater access to fundamental truths about material reality than art 
history and art theory, including some art historical contributions that appropriate the 
authority of neuroscience to underwrite or explain aesthetic experience. Furthermore, an 
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ideology of biological determinism occasionally invoked by both neuroscientists and art 
historians under the name of neuroaesthetics threatens to relegate aesthetic experience 
exclusively to the non-conscious level. I will address this tendency of neuroaesthetics to 
privilege the non-conscious, or cognitive processes of which the subject is unaware, by 
drawing on art historical methods of analysis to consider how artworks can facilitate 
conscious awareness of perception itself. Thus, in this dissertation I aim to demonstrate 
that the specific modes of neuroaesthetic address that certain artworks make to their 
audiences can provoke a critical challenge to deterministic and reductive assumptions 
about the causal role of cellular activity in the brain prevailing in much of the existing 
neuroaesthetic research.  
 At the time of this writing, neuroaesthetic researchers have largely positioned 
neuroaesthetic theory a-historically, as a novel endeavour to explain how art functions 
according to the “laws of the brain.”4 Some art historians and art theorists have rejected 
the determinist implications of this reductive formulation, a discourse that I will elucidate 
in Chapter One. Nevertheless, what remains largely missing from cross-disciplinary 
neuroaesthetic debates is an understanding that neither art theory nor neuroscience 
comprises a monolithic enterprise;5 researchers practice different methodologies within 
different epistemological frameworks and those differences inspire the critical discourse 
inherent to each discipline. A neuroscientist may be unaware, understandably, of the 
critical debates about aesthetics that take place in art historical discourse as well as the 
epistemological conditions of the art context or gallery itself. Likewise, an art historian 
can be forgiven for neglecting to parse technical debates in neuroscience about 
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appropriate experiment design and the ways that the procedures and apparatus of the 
neuroscience lab condition the types of knowledge produced. The tendency is for 
researchers to reach across disciplines to cite one another as external authorities. But such 
critical understanding falls short in acknowledging the constraints that condition the 
other's disciplinary knowledge claims. As in any act of translation lacking the 
complexities of cultural context, this can lead to over-simplification, misunderstanding 
and stereotyping behaviour. The interdisciplinary challenge for neuroaesthetic 
researchers working in both neuroscience and art history is to engage in more 
comprehensive analysis of the critical scope of both disciplinary practices.   
 
Embodiment 
The inquiries I will conduct in this dissertation take as a starting point the neuroscientific 
premise that mind emerges from physiological process.6 The notion of “embodiment,” in 
this sense, serves as an important reminder of critical shifts underway in neuro- and 
cognitive science that reject epistemological constructions of the brain as a mechanism 
operating in isolation. In 1993, cognitive scientist Francisco J. Varela, philosopher Evan 
Thompson and psychologist Eleanor Rosch teamed up to publish a book titled The 
Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.7 This book addresses 
fundamental problems in the empirical study of consciousness by drawing connections 
between Western and Eastern philosophical traditions as they inform cognitive science. 
The authors set out to redress a contemporary Western cultural condition in which 
scientific explanations of consciousness are ascribed with more authority than immediate 
  
7 
experience. Scientists studying consciousness face a problematic paradox because an 
observer has no means of empirically verifying another human being’s conscious 
experience. The solution, according to the authors, is not to bracket off experience from 
observable behaviour, but to embrace an understanding that “cognition is not a 
representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a 
world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the 
world performs.”8 In other words, cognition is an active, rather than a passive, process, 
and cannot be reified in isolation from other ongoing processes of interaction and 
engagement. In cognitive science and philosophy of mind, the term “embodied” has come 
to invoke not just the entangled associations of the brain with the rest of the body, but 
also its cognitive relationship with the external world.  
 As I will argue, embodied experience situates the brain and body as co-
constitutive elements that are further entailed as co-constitutive with the world. As a 
biological organ, the human brain inheres in nature, but the deeply social nature of the 
human organism demands consideration of the ways that the brain and culture are 
mutually engaged. Thus, the term “embodied” in my formulation, resonates with both 
Susan Buck-Morss’ concept of the “synaesthetic system,” which situates the brain as part 
of a nervous system that, in her words, “begins and ends in the world”9 and with Donna 
Haraway’s idea of “situated knowledges,” her formulation that all modes of knowing are 
always partial and subjective, localized to the specific conditions of life experience.10 In 
my consideration of aesthetic art engagements, the term embodied experience refers to 
the ongoing entanglement of collective cultural knowledge within individual acts of 
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perception. My use of the term “embodied” also pertains to my assertion that experience 
of art in art contexts produces particular forms of knowledge, capable of illuminating 
neuroaesthetic research to the same extent as neuro-imaging studies conducted in science 
labs.  
 While contemporary cognitive neuroscience strives to contend with the social 
implications of the physiological functions of the brain, recent aesthetic theory emerging 
in the humanities likewise embraces an integration of physiological and social modes of 
engagement. This contemporary aesthetic turn builds on feminist theory about embodied 
experience developed in the 1990s. In 1992, for example, Buck-Morss argued for an 
understanding of aesthetics that incorporates the brain/body/environment as an integrated 
system.11 While Buck-Morss critically explored the social dimensions of aesthetic 
engagement, art historian Rosalind Krauss situated the cerebral dimensions of aesthetic 
experience firmly in the body, insisting that, “the cerebral cortex is not above the body in 
an ideal or ideated remove, it is, instead, of the body, such that the reflex arc of which it 
is a part connects it to a whole field of stimuli between which it cannot distinguish.”12 In 
Krauss’ aesthetic formulation, even works by such a cerebral artist as Marcel Duchamp 
reveal the co-constitution of the brain with the rest of the body. In their aesthetic 
formulations, neither Krauss nor Buck-Morss consider the brain in isolation, but 
importantly situate it in dynamic engagement within larger systems. Departing from 
Buck-Morss, Krauss, and Haraway as well as Merlin Donald, Jerry Fodor, Nancey 
Murphy and Warren S. Brown (among others), I will examine how contemporary 
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artworks and their audiences perform as neuroaesthetic assemblages of brain, body and 
world, co-constitutive elements operating in social spheres.  
 
Counter-arguments  
I would like to begin by addressing three counter-arguments that could be levelled 
against neuroaesthetic research in general, or my neuroaesthetic practice in particular. 
One refutation to neuroaesthetics that I have heard expressed by artist colleagues can be 
summarized as follows, “art does not need neuroscience,” meaning that artists do not 
need science for external validation. In this sense, I do find it troubling that art advocates 
occasionally enlist neuroscientists as authoritative voices to legitimate art experience. For 
example, in 2011, The Art Fund, a British national arts organisation, posted a YouTube 
video in which neuroscientist Semir Zeki, a key exponent of early neuroaesthetics in the 
1990s, suggests that, “We have recently found that when we look at things which we 
consider to be beautiful the activity in the pleasure-reward centres in the brain goes up.”13 
The narrator puts a particular spin on Zeki’s statement, “[a]rt lovers have long thought 
that art is important to our well-being, but they had no proof – until now.”14 This video, 
which circulated on social media networks, generated artworld concern about the field of 
neuroaesthetics. Art makes valid, vital and necessary contributions on its own terms, and 
the video’s implication that art requires a social stamp of approval from the realm of 
science raised the hackles of many artists, art theorists and art historians. While invoking 
neuroscience in aid of arts advocacy, the Art Fund had inadvertently de-legitimated art 
discourse.  
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 James Croft, researching neuroaesthetics towards a PhD in Human Development 
and Education at Harvard, has coined the term “neuro-advocacy” to describe the 
phenomenon of using neuroscience to justify arts in education, based on the “beneficial 
effect [the arts] have on the brains of those who pursue them.”15 As Croft demonstrates, 
neuroscience on the arts is still very speculative, and while promoting arts education is 
certainly a worthwhile undertaking, the neuroscientific study cited – which found a 
correlation between taking music lessons and improvements in overall scholastic 
performance – did not actually support the claims of neuro-advocates, who as Croft 
explains, assume “correlation” to imply “causation,” and therefore assert that music 
“boosts performance.”16 As often happens when advocates enlist findings from science to 
support their cause, they elided important qualifying facts from the study. Specifically, in 
this instance, advocates failed to note that the scientists who produced the study 
themselves suggested the correlations they found were inconclusive and that many 
additional factors enhancing brain activity might be contributing to their results.17 
Likewise in the case of the Art Fund YouTube video citing Zeki, which also enlists 
neuroscience in the advocacy of art, Zeki’s research paper on the neural correlates of 
beauty did not suggest that art contributes to public health, nor did he design his 
experiment to validate art in any way. Furthermore, as Zeki makes clear in his paper, 
beauty comprises only one of many ways that art can be appreciated, and he explains 
that, “[t]his leads us to divorce beauty from art in this discussion and focus on beauty 
alone.”18 Thus, the research, which the Art Fund claimed was justification for supporting 
the arts, did not even address art directly, but rather set out to better understand specific 
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aspects of neural anatomy. In both instances, art advocates applied neuroaesthetics 
unscientifically in their appropriation of scientific research, glossing over the conditional 
qualifications clearly expressed in the neuroscientific studies they invoked. 
 While I support national arts funding and art education, in these instances I 
believe neuroscience has been misappropriated, enlisted merely on the basis of its 
authoritative position in society rather than on actual conclusions drawn by scientists 
from their research. Such misrepresentations demean and diminish the validity of art as a 
worthy practice in and of itself, while simultaneously glossing over any valid claims of 
neuroscientists in favour of a deterministic spin. Unfortunately, the elevated social 
position of neuroscience is currently so powerful, that anyone practicing neuroaesthetics, 
myself included, can easily be implicated as trying to garner validation from 
neuroscience for one’s own claims about art. One of the stakes of this dissertation is to 
inquire into this interdisciplinary pitfall from the standpoint of art theory, while at the 
same time taking concrete steps to engage critically with neuroscience on its own terms. 
 A second counter argument to neuroaesthetics, cogently raised by philosopher 
Alva Noë (among others such as Ernst Gombrich19 and Amy Ione20), suggests that the 
disciplinary goals and constraints of art theory, art history and neuroscience are simply 
too different to result in productive dialogue. Neuroscience studies the brain, first and 
foremost, and for neuroscientists such as Zeki this can result in hyperbolically reducing 
all of human experience to brain function alone. Noë objects to the neuroscientific 
proposition that “you are your brain” on the grounds that it propagates the Cartesian 
notion that there is “something inside us that thinks and feels.”21 Instead, he suggests that 
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many things besides brains are also required for mental life, such as bodies, the 
environment, and other people. Noë reminds his readers that, “it is the normally 
embodied, environmentally- and socially-situated human animal that thinks, feels, 
decides and is conscious,” and asserts that, “[i]t is people, not their brains, that make and 
enjoy art.”22 Furthermore, he goes on to note that neuroscience cannot offer much of 
value to art theory because it can’t distinguish between modes of perception that take 
place in engagements with art from those that take place in engagement with anything 
else that has sensorial dimensions. In this, Noë expresses a view widely held among art 
theorists that the findings of neuroscience only take on meaningful resonance within the 
disciplinary context of neuroscience itself. 
 Like Noë, I will argue that brains are only part of the complex assemblage that 
makes up an aesthetic experience. To date, the neuroscience undertaken in the name of 
neuroaesthetics largely entails bottom-up models of mind that privilege the brain as an 
isolated entity with deterministic powers of causation. But Noë neither takes up the vast 
body of neuroscientific research into the embodied and socially embedded aspects of 
neural development, nor does he mention art historian Barbara Stafford’s comprehensive 
book on neuroaesthetics, Echo Objects, The Cognitive Work of Images which takes this 
broad range of neuroscientific practice into account. Stafford makes important 
interventions into neuroaesthetic discourse by acknowledging that neuroscientists do not 
present a united front in their aesthetic investigations and by advocating for the role of 
conscious attention in aesthetic engagement, thus challenging reductive, bottom-up 
models of mind.23 Part of my project is to build on Stafford’s work to extend the scope of 
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neuroaesthetic research to engage critically with neuroscience as a negotiated discourse. 
Furthermore, while neuroscience may not yet be able to fully discriminate between art 
experience and other forms of aesthetic encounter, perhaps it does not have to. If 
neuroaesthetics is to be an interdisciplinary inquiry, input from art theorists like myself, 
and philosophers like Noë, can help articulate the range of art experience. The problems 
that Noë raises only inhere if art is situated in sycophantic relation to neuroscience. 
Neuroscientists don't have fixed and final answers to questions about aesthetics, but 
neither do art theorists and philosophers. Rigorous interdisciplinarity, where all parties 
commit to taking one another’s epistemological paradigms seriously, provides the best 
medicine for reductive, atomistic determinism. What is required is a more robust, 
interdisciplinary neuroaesthetic methodology, capable of contributing productively to 
ongoing conversations that arise at the conjunctions of art and science.  
 While the previous two rejoinders are levelled at neuroaesthetic research in 
general, a third counter-argument, stemming from revisionary aesthetics, could be 
addressed to my research in particular. My exploration of neuroaesthetics through the 
specificity of art experience promises to be fruitful in part because art critically 
challenges the limits of neuroscientific method. As neuroscientists struggle to develop 
empirical models of consciousness, this dissertation contributes neuroaesthetic 
consideration of the specificity of art contexts in order to provide new understandings of 
perception as a socially entangled process. My approach, however, could be criticized as 
bringing nothing new to the table for art theorists and art historians. Indeed, the 
humanities have already processed the duality of aesthetics as both a physiological and a 
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social mode of engagement. As art historians Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen and Tony 
O’Connor point out in the introduction to their 2009 anthology, Rediscovering Aesthetics, 
art historians, theorists and curators are reconfiguring aesthetics as a socio-political 
domain. The authors explain that, “[a]s a consequence of the social character of human 
identity, aesthetic judgments (or experiences) are never politically neutral, but they are 
utterly implicated in structures of social power and division, without however – and this 
is important – being reduced to narrowly political or social concerns.”24 Aesthetics, they 
propose, can be considered as a liminal zone, where culture and the senses intertwine. 
While art historians already embrace the embodied nature of aesthetics, I believe that I 
can contribute something new to the discourse by drawing on neuroscience, not as a form 
of validation, but as an epistemological framework that accounts for thoughts as 
physiological phenomena. My neuroaesthetic investigation will explore two key claims: 
first, that the aesthetic engagement of artworks manifests as a sensorial mode of knowing 
the world; and second, that the physiological dimensions of social engagements constitute 
embodied perceptual processes in and of themselves. Thus, I will argue that the 
neuroaesthetic awareness of cognition facilitated by certain artworks reveals the co-
constitution of social conditions and physiological response.   
  
Aesthetics 
I will now briefly situate my neuroaesthetic methodology in relation to the discourse on 
aesthetics, a theoretical framework that already takes into account the dual nature of 
aesthetics as both a sensorial and a social mode of engagement. Within Western 
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philosophy, aesthetics has been associated with sensory experience – as Terry Eagleton 
puts it, “[a]esthetics is born as a discourse of the body.”25 The word “aesthetics” derives 
from the ancient Greek word aisthesis, meaning sense perception. It wasn’t until the mid-
18th century that aesthetics came to be particularly connected with culture, when German 
philosopher Alexander Baumgarten identified the sensual appreciation of art as an 
activity distinct from the exercise of reason. In Eagleton’s analysis, Baumgarten’s 
dichotomy sustains, and aesthetics and reason have remained entangled for centuries as 
twin modes of bourgeois culture. The aesthetic, for Eagleton, has been essential to sustain 
hegemony in modern society because it acknowledges and accommodates the 
irrationality of sensory experiences, while at the same time containing and subsuming 
them within ordered, rational and elitist conventions such as taste and judgment. 
Nevertheless, hegemony never completely subsumes the aesthetic, which remains 
potentially disruptive as a site of resistance and compassion for the suffering of others.26 
For Eagleton, the physiological dimension of the aesthetic establishes a zone of political 
potential, while notions of the aesthetic as a refined mode of cultural engagement 
continue to contain and suppress that potential. 
  Buck-Morss shares Eagleton’s position on the dual nature of aesthetics. Quoting 
Marxist critic Frederick Jameson she situates the Enlightenment conception of aesthetics 
as “a kind of safety valve for irrational impulses.”27 However, like Eagleton, she shares 
the conviction that while the aesthetic can serve to stabilize social power structures it can 
also provide a site of resistance. She suggests that at times “cultural meanings can be 
sensed bodily as being wrong. Just plain wrong. How else are people capable of social 
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protest?”28 For Buck-Morss, the political potential of aesthetics lies in its formulation as a 
physiological process. In an interview with art historian Grant H. Kester, Buck-Morss 
advocates for a less esoteric meaning of aesthetic as a “biological” process by which “the 
body senses reality.”29 The aesthetic, she argues, reveals universal aspects of human 
physiological experience as the basis for solidarity and compassion across difference. The 
provisional universalism that she extends to the body, “is true of the brain as well,” 
which, she says, she likes to “think of as a body part and not as some decorporealized 
Seele or Geist.”30 In situating the brain as biological organ rather than a spirit or soul, 
Buck-Morss’ position aligns with the anti-Cartesian materialism of neuroscience. Her 
strategic universalism, however, is neither deterministic nor reductive and she 
emphasizes the contingent entanglement between perceptual capacities and the particular 
environments in which they develop.31 For this reason, Buck-Morss’ assertion that 
cultural conditions can resonate as “wrong” in the body does not imply that the body 
operates independently from culture, providing some kind of underlying, essentialist truth 
factor, but rather that embodied processes make a key contribution to cultural processes 
of political change.   
 The notion of aesthetics, formalized by Kant as a judgment of artistic taste, makes 
a universal value claim about sensory perceptions which, as Eagleton explains, “raises 
and elaborates such supposedly natural, spontaneous expression to the status of an 
intricate intellectual discipline.”32 It is precisely the disciplinary nature of aesthetics that 
Buck-Morss rejects, suggesting that, “if aesthetics were freed from ‘art’ as its object, it 
could come into its own as a form of cognition – not a discipline, not just another way of 
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doing ‘cultural studies,’ but as a self-reflective, cognitive practice.”33 By firmly situating 
aesthetics as a material process, Buck-Morss makes an important contribution to 
contemporary considerations of the term. The problem, she explains, is that “a great deal 
of what passes for ‘aesthetic’ experience veils material reality rather than opening it up 
for our critical perception.”34 When matters of taste commodify art experience, they 
obscure art’s aesthetic capacities as Buck-Morss wants to define them.  
 It is striking then, that neuroscientists Skov and Vartanian, in their (2009) 
anthology on neuroaesthetics, also advocate for a definition of aesthetics that exceeds the 
notion of art. They describe aesthetic functions as “phenomena that characterize our 
interactions with a wide array of objects,”35 and they go on to suggest that “ultimately we 
will need models that can account for our aesthetic experience with all objects rather than 
just artworks, although the field’s current focus on the latter is a justifiable starting 
point.”36 For Skov and Vartanian, neuroaesthetic research promises a better 
understanding of human sense perception, rather than the particulars of art experience. As 
neuroscientists struggle to arrive at a working definition of aesthetics within the 
constraints of neuroscientific experimentation, they make the observation (similar to 
Buck-Morss) that aesthetic experience must be understood to pertain beyond the sphere 
of art. They also acknowledge that the particulars of art experience can provide directions 
toward more general understandings of perception. 
 Buck-Morss, working in dialogue with texts by Walter Benjamin, demonstrates 
how aesthetics, as deployed by fascism and the phantasmagoria of mass media and 
spectacle, can serve rather as an “anaesthetics” that fatally fractures subjectivity, 
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deadening awareness of the senses. The synaesthetic system, her model of embodied 
subjectivity, is vulnerable to such totalizing aesthetic experiences. “The role of ‘art’ in 
this development is ambivalent,” she suggests, “because, under these conditions [of 
phantasmagoria], the definition of ‘art’ as a sensual experience that distinguishes itself 
precisely by its separation from ‘reality’ becomes difficult to sustain. Much of ‘art’ enters 
into the phantasmagoric field as entertainment, as part of the commodity world.”37 
Aesthetics and art, then, can be effectively instrumentalized to the detriment of the 
synaesthetic system. However, if the material dimension of aesthetics acts as a potential 
site of resistance to hegemonic forces, as elucidated by Eagleton and Buck-Morss, then it 
follows that the aesthetics of actual artworks can comprise the radical potential for 
political change. 
 Sustaining the paradoxical nature of aesthetics as an oscillation of body and 
culture is necessary, I believe, for neuroaesthetics to remain politically charged. 
Furthermore, while aesthetics apply to sensorial engagements beyond those of art 
experience, the aesthetics of art experience, in certain circumstances, can manifest as a 
critical form of knowledge. Buck-Morss describes the critical capacity of the body as a 
kind of “sniffing danger,”38 an embodied ability to identify and resist cultural impositions 
while nevertheless remaining culturally engaged. Given the question of neuroaesthetics 
specific to art experience, then, I aim to explore how aesthetics provides a forum for 
celebrating, flexing, assessing and extending potentially radical human cognitive 
capacities.  
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 In this dissertation, I will engage a neuroaesthetic analysis of artworks that 
effectively intertwine conceptual and material practices to invoke aesthetics as a 
conscious, embodied awareness of sense perception – a non-linguistic, but transferrable, 
form of experiential knowledge. While Buck-Morss locates the possibility for dissent in 
the body, her synaesthetic system does not describe a body without culture, but a body 
situated in his or her “(culturally specific, historically transient) environment,”39 and 
when Krauss rescues the aesthetics of modern art from detached transcendence and 
restores it to the temporal bodies of artists and audiences, those bodies come with 
experiential knowledge that informs their engagements with the art. Mind itself is not the 
enemy of critical aesthetics, nor is reason, but rather it is the mind/body split that 
fractures the subject and situates culture and nature as polar opposites. 
  Aesthetics, as historically positioned by Eagleton, embodies a nature/culture 
dialectic; but within his articulation mind and body co-exist uncomfortably, oscillating in 
a paradoxical configuration in which the body produces resistance to hegemonic cultural 
conditions that engage the mind. In contrast, while neuroscientific research perpetuates 
dualisms of various kinds, it also perpetuates an anti-Cartesian materialism that collapses 
the mind/body split; neuroscientists do not separate mind from body, but rather consider 
mind as a physiological process of the brain. I am interested in how neuroaesthetics, in 
entertaining the anti-Cartesian, or embodied, principles of neuroscience, provides an 
opportunity to reconsider the conceptual address made by certain artworks as a 
physiological mode of engagement in itself. Rather than segregating mind and body into 
different orders of experience, I hold that neuroaesthetics would insist that all forms of 
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cognition – including those that derive from collective cultural interactions – constitute 
biological processes. In this respect, neuroaesthetic analysis can productively extend 
contemporary notions of the aesthetic –such as those put forward by Halsall, Jansen, and 
O’Connor as well as Eagleton and Buck-Morss – that argue for the consideration of both 
social and sensorial modes. Fundamental to the perception of artworks, then, the 
collective, social dimensions of aesthetics manifest as embodied processes in individual 
experience.   
 
The Argument 
The beginning of the dissertation will establish a critical framework for my 
neuroaesthetic analysis of art by introducing new voices to the neuroaesthetic discourse 
and delineating some of the methodological constraints of neuroscientific experiment. I 
will then proceed to present case studies of contemporary artworks, exploring the 
embodied processes by which each work may facilitate a different form of neuroaesthetic 
awareness through the art experience. The aim of this project is to extend the 
neuroaesthetic conversation beyond the select group of participating neuroscientists and 
art historians. Current neuroaesthetic discourse tends to overlook a range of thinkers – 
from art history, art theory, science and technology studies, and affect theory – who 
contribute valuable insights about the situated body as a site of critical knowledge 
production.  
 In Chapter One, I will undertake to provide an orientation to the contemporary 
field of neuroaesthetics to introduce my perspective within a broader, interdisciplinary 
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context. In addition to bringing more thinkers from the humanities into the discussion, I 
will also engage with cognitive and neuroscientific research that impacts theories of 
embodiment differently from the neuro-imaging experiments currently implemented 
under the umbrella of neuroaesthetics, thus problematizing current neuroaesthetic 
polemics between conscious and non-conscious perceptual processes as they impact on 
emerging theory about the aesthetic experience of art. The first chapter will establish a 
theoretical framework for my later interrogation of neuroaesthetic research.  
 As a practicing curator, artist, art theorist and art historian, I have found it 
necessary to formulate my own embodied relationship as a subject of neuroscience in 
order to better understand the critical discourse around methodology emerging from 
within the neuroscientific field. As mentioned above, I adopt a standpoint methodology 
informed by Haraway’s notion of situated knowledge. To this end, I spent a number of 
hours inside an MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scanner as a volunteer subject of a 
neuroscientific study at Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto. In addition, I audited a course 
at York University on the physics of MRI and the necessary conditions for neuro-imaging 
experiment design. I also met with a number of neuroscientists to tour their labs and learn 
from them first-hand about their experimental methodologies. Chapter Two will begin 
with a report on this field research in order to introduce readers without neuroscientific 
backgrounds to some of the methodological challenges inherent to neuroaesthetic 
experiments using neuro-imaging techniques. The chapter will then proceed to examine 
and problematize some of the more strident claims being made for fMRI (functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging) research. My assessment of the methodological limitations 
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of neuroscientific inquiry that I observed as a research subject in specific conditions of 
embodiment will open the door of the field for my ongoing investigation into alternative 
research sites that do not share the same limiting conditions. As a result of my 
experience, I will theorize that artworks considered in art contexts can provide forms of 
neuroaesthetic knowledge that augment those produced in neuro-imaging labs. The first 
two chapters will serve to establish this critical foundation and working method for the 
neuroaesthetic case studies that follow. 
  In the case studies that follow in Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six, I will 
examine how artworks operate neuroaesthetically by facilitating audience awareness of 
their own cognitive processes. I will endeavour to demonstrate that art considered in art 
contexts can produce neuroaesthetic knowledges about perceptual cognition that are 
methodologically inaccessible and epistemologically irrelevant in the context of the 
neuroscientific experiment. Of course, the converse also applies – neuroscientific 
experiments produce generalized knowledge about the physiology of perception that 
can’t be gleaned through first-hand experience of artworks alone. My goal for the case 
studies is not to polarize aesthetic and neuroscience against one another, because to do so 
would be to mask certain interdisciplinary relationships between art and science that can 
help resituate neuroaesthetics as a critical methodology. Alongside research conducted in 
the lab, I aim to extend the scope of neuroaesthetic inquiry to entail research conducted in 
the gallery. In the case studies that follow, I will engage with both art theory and 
neuroscientific theory research paradigms as equally informative modes of inquiry, and 
elucidate points where they converge and diverge.  
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 At the same time, however, I will attempt to demonstrate that while 
neuroaesthetics produces materialistic accounts of perceptual cognition, a theoretical 
embrace of the physiological dimensions of art experience does not have to thereby adopt 
an ideology of biological determinism. Rather, neuroaesthetics can sustain the contingent, 
provisional and intersubjective variables of social conditions as they manifest corporeally 
in the workings of the embodied brain. The case studies will support two interconnected 
goals for this dissertation: one is to establish a neuroaesthetic methodology that considers 
how particular artworks and their audiences operate as agents in the co-production of 
knowledge about perception and cognition emerging in the context of the gallery rather 
than the lab, while the other is to enlist those same artworks to help resituate 
neuroaesthetics critically within a broader interdisciplinary matrix of embodied 
aesthetics.  
 Each of the artworks I will examine operates in the manner of performative 
assemblage. By this I mean to suggest that the neuroaesthetic experience of these works 
emerges as an active process, performed collectively by multiple, interconnected agents. 
In coming to this formulation, I will draw from theories of collaborative knowledge 
production put forward by theorists in science studies – specifically Donna Haraway, 
Bruno Latour and Karen Barad – each of whom resists traditional understandings of 
scientific objectivity. These three thinkers reject the possibility of a singular, detached 
and comprehensive viewpoint by taking account of the contributions to knowledge 
formation made by subjects and objects of study and technical apparatus, in conjunction 
with subjective observers. Knowledge, in this formulation, emerges as a performance in 
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that it comprises an ongoing, contingent process. Thus, in taking stock of knowledge, the 
theorist must situate herself as one of many participants in a multivalent assemblage. I 
will draw parallels between this model of scientific knowledge production as a collective 
process and aesthetic modes of knowing that emerge in art experience, drawing on 
Haraway, Latour and Barad to offer additional support for Stafford’s neuroaesthetic 
proposition that artworks themselves make contributions to cognition in their 
engagements with audiences.  
 In the four chapters that constitute the case studies, I will examine artworks by 
contemporary artists FASTWÜRMS, Olafur Eliasson, Kristin Lucas and Omer Fast, each 
of whom creates artworks that address their audiences as situated, active participants in 
the co-production of heightened, embodied awareness of their own cognitive processes, 
or what I would term neuroaesthetic knowledge. In each case study I will ask what 
specific forms of cognition the artworks in question reveal and I will explore in detail the 
processes by which that knowledge comes about.  
 Chapter Three comprises the first case study, examining Donky@Ninja@Witch 
(2007), a large and multivalent installation by the artist collective FASTWÜRMS. 
Entering the exhibition was somewhat like entering a living brain engaged with multiple 
systems of sensory and intellectual stimulation. Structured as an impossibly complex 
intersecting web of associations, the installation defied detached viewpoints, rather 
inviting audiences to navigate through the diverse plethora of potent images, objects and 
icons. This chapter will link a discussion of the associative webs presented by the 
configuration of artistic elements in the exhibition with research on cognitive processes 
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of association emerging from computational neuroscience. I will suggest that 
FASTWÜRMS’ installation contributes to neuroaesthetic knowledge by facilitating 
embodied awareness of associative processes as they are taking place. Furthermore, this 
chapter will explore how FASTWÜRMS situate themselves and their human audiences 
as animals engaged in social networks that also entail non-human animals in ongoing, 
communicative interaction. In focusing so closely on the biology of human perception, 
neuroaesthetic theory risks invoking a polemic that would situate nature and culture as 
distinct and mutually exclusive causal domains. To answer this problem, I intend to 
examine FASTWÜRMS’ formulation of how nature and culture emerge conjoined as co-
constitutive spheres of influence operating in all forms of material engagement. This 
chapter will contain a detailed analysis of FASTWÜRMS’ practice at the confluence of 
nature and culture, informed by theoretical texts from both contemporary art history and 
science studies, thereby establishing a frame of reference for neuroaesthetic consideration 
in which neither nature nor culture can be considered in isolation from one another.  
 Just as I will propose that nature and culture operate as co-constitutive fields, I 
will also suggest that the neuroaesthetic dimensions of the artworks that I consider 
conjoin both social and physiological modes of knowing. To this end, Chapter Four will 
examine artworks that address the sense of sight as an embodied, social process. In the 
history of art, vision, more than any other sense, has been reified as a transcendent and 
isolated perceptual mode. The prevalence of departments of visual art, and the more 
recent conjoining of art history with visual culture, are just two indications of the extent 
to which fine art discourse privileges the sense of sight. In the context of neuroaesthetic 
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inquiry, it is also interesting to note that neuroscience has amassed more knowledge 
about vision than any of the other senses. Despite the work of feminist art theorists and 
art historians to problematize the reification of vision, practitioners in both art and 
science continue to position sight in isolation from other modes of perception and 
cognition. Olafur Eliasson contributes to neuroaesthetic inquiry with artworks that 
trouble notions of vision as a discrete perceptual process. As distinct from neuro-imaging 
experiments on vision which commonly produce scientific knowledge about 
nonconscious visual processes that operate without the subject’s knowing, Eliasson 
brings normally nonconscious dimensions of visual cognition into conscious awareness. 
 Chapter Four will ask how colour installations Room For One Colour (1997), 
360° room for all colours (2002) and Your utopia (2003) by Eliasson produce 
neuroaesthetic awareness of vision as a capacity for embodied knowledge of 
contemporary, techno-mediated environments. Eliasson’s works facilitate awareness of 
the physiological limitations of human colour perception. Drawing connections between 
Haraway’s notion of primate vision and the neuroscience of colour perception as they 
reciprocally inflect and are informed by Eliasson’s work, Chapter Four will perform a 
neuroaesthetic inquiry into how vision operates as a subjective and culturally conditioned 
mode of interactive engagement with the environment, rather than an objective window 
on the world.  
 As mentioned above, neuroaesthetics can offer a theoretical position from which 
to consider the material dimensions of cognitive processes that include ideas themselves. 
In the final two case studies, I will examine how artworks by Kristin Lucas and Omer 
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Fast make an explicitly conceptual address while at the same time situating 
conceptualization itself as an embodied, aesthetic mode of knowing. Chapter Five will 
take up a conceptual performance by Lucas. In this chapter, I will conduct an in-depth 
analysis of Lucas’ performance in the context of recent theories on mimesis and mental 
simulation arising out of neuro- and cognitive science, and attempt to demonstrate how 
neuroaesthetic awareness produces thoughts themselves as physiological processes 
carrying aesthetic effects. Furthermore, just as Lucas stages her performance in the dual 
social spheres of the legal system and the internet, so too my inquiry will extend 
neuroaesthetics to considerations of collective, social engagement as integral to processes 
of perception. In this way, this chapter will deepen and extend neuroaesthetic 
explorations of how artworks can facilitate culturally relevant, critical knowledge about 
the conditioning effects of techno-mediated environments.  
 Chapter Six will explore the neuroaesthetic significance of relationships between 
mimetic theory and neuroscience as implicated in Talk Show (2009), a video work by 
Omer Fast. Emphatically conceptual in address, the work simultaneously presents a series 
of mimetic performances that engage audiences through affect. I will examine the ways 
in which the work’s mimetic operations recall the shifting discourse emerging from 
neuro- and cognitive science on mirror neurons – groups of brain cells that activate the 
same way when someone is observing an action as when they are performing an action. 
Exploring mimetic engagement as a mode of intersubjective communication that entails 
both conceptual and affective dimensions, I will consider how Fast’s video as well as 
  
28 
recent mirror neuron discourse both support the notion of embodied experience in terms 
of a socially inflected and conscious mode of knowing the world.  
 Each case study will examine how artworks, considered in art contexts, can 
facilitate specific forms of neuroaesthetic knowledge through their embodied modes of 
address and experience. The neuroaesthetic methodology that I will advance here is 
specific to artworld knowledges. I will show some of the ways that art, considered in its 
contexts, can augment knowledges regarding art produced in neuroscience labs. Such a 
neuroaesthetic methodology is interdisciplinary, engaging embodied awareness of 
cognition produced by specific artworks while simultaneously extending the 
neuroaesthetic conversation to include perspectives from art history, art theory and 
science studies. Such a modality of analysis defies biological determinism by troubling 
hierarchical dichotomies between nature and culture, physiological and social modes of 
engagement, non-conscious and conscious neural process, body and mind to posit a 
neuroaesthetic theory in which such dualities converge as co-constitutive dimensions of 
art experience. • 
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The Co-constitution of Nature and Culture in Embodied Art Experience 
 
In this chapter I present an overview of some of the key works of neuroaesthetic 
literature to date, with a view to broaden the discourse to consider texts from 
other disciplines that resonate closely with neuroaesthetic concerns.1 My inquiry 
builds on wide-ranging inter-disciplinary research on embodied knowledge 
produced by thinkers in art history, art theory, neuroscience, cognitive science, 
philosophy of science studies, philosophy of social and political thought and 
affect theory. I do not aim to present a comprehensive review of the 
neuroaesthetic literature. A great deal of neuroaesthetic research has been 
produced on music and the brain2, for example, which is beyond the scope of this 
investigation. In order to establish a theoretical framework for the consideration 
of embodied experience of artworks as a form of neuroaesthetic knowledge, I will 
delineate four key, interrelated themes; a troubling of the Cartesian polemic 
between conscious and non-conscious experience emerging from foundational 
neuroaesthetic texts; a theoretical turn in art history toward assessing the presence 
of artworks rather than their representational qualities; a collapse of the 
dichotomy between culture and nature expressed by thinkers in science studies; 
and the notion of the feedback loop as a paradigm for embodied perception 
emerging in both cognitive neuroscience and affect theory. I aim to demonstrate 
that, when taken together, these interdisciplinary investigations support the notion 
that body, brain, mind and world conjoin as co-constitutive elements of 
neuroaesthetic experience. This interdisciplinary framework will provide essential 
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grounding for the case studies that follow, in which I will argue that certain 
artworks facilitate specific forms of neuroaesthetic knowledge through audience 
awareness of cognitive processes.  
 
Neuroaesthetic Polemics of Conscious and Nonconscious Experience 
The early days of neuroaesthetics in the late 1990s and early 2000s were marked 
by territorial discord. Since then the discourse has broadened and become 
somewhat less polemic. Some art historians and theorists have embraced the field 
as a fruitful site for research and analysis, while the number of neuroscientists 
involved in experimental neuroaesthetic research has also expanded. 
Nevertheless, interdisciplinary conflicts continue to fulminate around questions of 
causality and intention invoked by neuroscientific privileging of nonconscious 
neural processes as the engines that drive human experience. 
 The first neuroaesthetic debates, instigated by neuroscientists V.S. 
Ramachandran and Semir Zeki, largely took place in the Journal of 
Consciousness Studies in 1999-2000. One of the early papers, and certainly the 
most controversial, was by neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran and philosopher 
William Hirstein proposing “eight laws of artistic experience.”3 Ramachandran 
and Hirstein playfully directed their neuroscientific assertions about art as an 
explicit act of interdisciplinary provocation.4 The authors’ list of laws, or 
neuroscientific principles, included various aspects of perception such as grouping 
and binding – the brain’s tendency to organise even random visual data into 
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shapes – and contrast extraction – the brain’s tendency to focus on edges and 
boundaries rather than extensive surfaces. The latter was invoked to support the 
authors’ assertion that line drawings are more aesthetically compelling than 
photographs.5 The neurological law which seemed to have had the most traction 
was “peak shift” – the brain’s tendency to prefer an exaggerated form of that 
which is desired.6 This concept derived from experiments on rats who were 
rewarded for choosing a rectangle over a square. After they had learned the task, 
the rats were then presented with the original rectangle and an even more 
rectangular rectangle, and they chose the latter. According to the authors, peak 
shift indicates that the exaggerations of caricature comprise a compelling aspect 
of almost any art experience. They drew from examples in Indian art, such as a 
statue of the Goddess Paravati from the Chola period (circa 11th century), arguing 
that peak shift explains why observers consider the abstraction of the female form 
to be beautiful. (Unfortunately, what the authors gained from the cultural diversity 
of the art forms they considered, they lost in their unreconstructed performance of 
gender essentialism.)7   
 The paper received vociferous negative response from thinkers in the 
humanities. Notably, in the same issue of the journal, art historian Ernst 
Gombrich published a short and damning response to Ramachandran and 
Hirstein’s suggesting that their universal statements about art were unfounded, 
that they simply didn’t know enough about art to make a convincing argument, 
suggesting that “[e]ven a fleeting visit to one of the great museums might serve to  
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convince the authors that few of the exhibits conform to the laws of art they 
postulate.” 8 John Hyman, philosopher and professor of aesthetics published an 
essay at Interdisciplines online (since reprinted in the book Beyond Mimesis and 
Convention9) stating that the concept of “peak shift” had been misunderstood and 
exaggerated by Ramachandran and Hirstein, specifically suggesting that their 
theory was not really about art but about sexual attraction, and that they 
demonstrated a very limited knowledge of art. At the same time, he was also 
critical of Gombrich’s response, and explicitly rejecting a “closing of the ranks” 
of expertise.10 While Gombrich’s response was territorial, implying that 
neuroscience had no business addressing art, Hyman was more open to the 
possibility of interdisciplinary dialogue.  
 While I agree with Hyman that Gombrich’s “closing of the ranks” was 
unnecessarily pre-emptive, I can understand some of the latter’s frustration. A 
number of the issues raised by Ramachandran and Hirstein were discussed by 
Gombrich in his book Art and Illusion, first published in 1960. While the authors 
cited Gombrich,11 indicating that they were aware of his work, they did not raise 
the fact that he reached different conclusions than they did, based on similar 
evidence. For example, the experiment of the rat and the rectangle that 
Ramachandran and Hirstein used to support their Peak Shift theory could be read 
in different ways. For Ramachandran and Hirstein, it was the rectangularity of the 
rectangle itself that the rat learned to prefer, a kind of reified rectangular ideal. 
But what if, rather than producing a caricature of rectangularity, the rat had 
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learned a relative relation between the shapes presented? In 1960, Gombrich cited 
a similar experiment. 
According to a classic experiment by Wolfgang Köhler, you can 
take two gray pieces of paper – one dark, one bright – and teach 
the chickens to expect food on the brighter of the two. If you then 
remove the darker piece and replace it by one brighter than the 
other one, the deluded creatures will look for their dinner, not on 
the identical gray paper where they have always found it, but on 
the paper where they would expect it in terms of relationships –
 that is, on the brighter of the two. Their little brains are attuned to 
gradients rather than to individual stimuli. Things could not go 
well for them if nature had willed it otherwise. For would a 
memory of the exact stimulus have helped them to recognize the 
identical paper? Hardly ever! A cloud passing over the sun would 
change its brightness, and so might even a tilt of the head, or an 
approach from a different angle. If what we call “identity” were 
not anchored in a constant relationship with environment, it would 
be lost in the chaos of swirling impressions that never repeat 
themselves.12 
 
Rather than suggest that the chickens had learned to prefer the attribute of 
brightness, Gombrich emphasised the chickens’ process of parsing visual stimuli 
as a relational condition of performing identity in ongoing interaction with the 
environment. He positioned the chickens as active agents making perceptual 
distinctions to help them navigate the world. Ramachandran and Hirstein’s 
suggestions stand in marked contrast to Gombrich’s as they construe the 
rectangle-preferring rat as a passive receiver of stimuli, driven by a predetermined 
urge for rectangularity. Sadly, Gombrich passed away in 2001 and the public 
debate between he and Ramachandran ended at an interdisciplinary impasse.13  
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 In his latest book, published in 2011 and written for a popular audience, 
Ramachandran again raised his set of universal laws of art and the brain, but this 
time he proposed a caveat. 
Before moving on to the next seven laws, I want to clarify what I 
mean by “universal.” To say that the wiring in your visual centres 
embodies universal laws does not negate the critical role of culture 
and experience in shaping your brain and mind. Many cognitive 
faculties that are fundamental to your human way of life are only 
partly specified by your genes. Nature and nurture interact. Genes 
wire up your brain’s emotional and cortical circuits to a certain 
extent and then leave it to faith that the environment will shape 
your brain the rest of the way, producing you, the individual. In 
this respect the human brain is absolutely unique – as symbiotic 
with culture as a hermit crab is with its shell. While the laws are 
hardwired, the content is learned.14  
 
Ramachandran’s concessions to the role of culture in the emergence of 
consciousness were refreshing, but he nevertheless continued to situate the brain 
primarily as a passive object determined by genetics and environmental forces. 
The term “hardwired” requires critical examination, implying as it does that 
neural networks are fixed for life, while there is no doubt that Ramachandran 
himself thoroughly understands the concept of neural plasticity15 – the fact that 
new neural networks can sometimes be formed in adult brains as a result of 
certain activities. The adjective “hardwired” references the history of relations 
between neuroscience and robotics, raising the spectre of artificial intelligence as 
applied to robotics, which gives rise to a host of poignant cultural anxieties about 
the reification of humans in the service of military technoscience. Ramachandran, 
then, has chosen a term that functions as a red flag to readers in the humanities. 
His provocations, teasing at territorial disciplinary boundaries, have certainly 
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helped to ignite neuroaesthetic debates, primarily through his consistent 
privileging of nonconscious neural processes.  
 The same 1999 issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies published an 
essay by neuroscientist Semir Zeki, titled “Art and the Brain.”16 That year, Zeki 
also published a book on neuroaesthetics, Inner Visions: An Exploration of Art 
and the Brain,17 and established a department of neuroaesthetics at University 
College London. In Inner Visions, Zeki made it clear that he was not addressing 
the art experience comprehensively, that through the lens of neuroscience he 
could not address emotions in art, and that he was not proposing a formula for art 
but rather exploring his own curiosity on connections between art and the brain.18 
At the same time, however, he also made the following claim.  
All visual art is expressed through the brain and must therefore 
obey the laws of the brain whether in conception, execution or 
appreciation and no theory of aesthetics that is not substantially 
based on the activity of the brain is ever likely to be complete, let 
alone profound.19  
 
Zeki’s statement read as an interdisciplinary provocation, suggesting that art 
follows laws that are the purview of neuroscience while seemingly dismissing the 
centuries-long history of aesthetics in the humanities. The statement has 
functioned as a rallying call for those arguing both for and against the value of 
neuroaesthetics, sparking a considerable amount of negative response. As 
mentioned earlier in the Introduction, philosopher Alva Noë reacted to Zeki’s 
reduction of human experience to brain activity, responding that “[i]t is people, 
not their brains, that make and enjoy art.”20 Students of mine, studying 
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neuroaesthetics in an undergraduate sculpture seminar at the University of 
Guelph, reacted defensively to Zeki’s authoritative tone, while vehemently 
rejecting the notion raised by both Zeki and Ramachandran, that art obeys laws 
that are the purview of science. In science, laws are derived from a collective, 
historical process of theory and experiment why which numerous researchers test 
and negotiate one another’s claims over long periods of time. The scientific 
notion of a law is imbued with the understanding that any law is provisional, and 
may someday be overturned if enough substantial evidence is gathered to 
challenge it.21 
 Nevertheless, speaking across disciplines, Zeki’s assertion that art must 
obey the laws of the brain reads as a statement of authority over art analysis from 
the privileged position of neuroscience. Both Zeki and Ramachandran had clearly 
set out to stake a claim in aesthetic theory, making statements that invoked their 
own authority to scientifically assess nonconscious neural process inaccessible to 
anyone other than neuroscientists. When taken in context, however, these 
statements read less like an empirical assault on other disciplines and more like 
justifications for conducting speculative research within the discipline of 
neuroscience. To this day, for example, neuroscientists remain unable to explain 
empirically how consciousness is produced by the brain, and their neuroaesthetic 
investigations allow some of them a forum for speculation and exploration that 
challenges the methodological and epistemological boundaries of their discipline. 
The neural processes that are most easily observed and measured by neuroscience 
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are nonconscious and they have traditionally been associated with inherited and 
supposedly immutable neural structures. Zeki has always been particularly 
invested in researching vision, and the neural laws that he invoked in Inner 
Visions primarily described visual processing in the brain. His research has 
consistently adhered to a bottom-up model of consciousness, a traditional 
neuroscientific paradigm in which it is assumed that small components of brain 
anatomy – localized networks of neurons assigned with particular tasks – transfer 
signals upward through the complex system, from the nonconscious zones low in 
the network toward the higher cognitive areas where conscious thought occurs. 
Operating with the bottom-up model, Zeki, like many other neuroscientists, 
assumed the traditional stance of privileging nonconscious processes as the first, 
and therefore causal, events determining human perception. He turned to art 
analysis, however, as a means of querying the extensive neuroscience of vision, a 
collective body of knowledge to which he has made significant contributions. In 
his more recent book, Splendours and Miseries of the Brain (2009), for example, 
Zeki elaborated his speculative theory of microconsciousness. According to Zeki, 
certain perceptions such as colour, do not require involvement from the so-called 
higher brain areas, such as the cerebral cortex, in order to become conscious. He 
suggested that certain spots in the synaptic chains operate as “essential nodes,” 
sites where the sensory information becomes a perception, giving rise to local 
microconsciousnesses.22 Zeki made it quite clear that his theory was speculative, 
and not yet supported by neuroscientific experiment. In this way, while Zeki has 
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consistently adhered to a bottom-up model of the brain privileging non-conscious 
processing, he also used neuroaesthetics to problematize and open up this model 
from within. 
 In Zeki’s research on human colour perception, he demonstrated that 
colour itself is a construct of contingent and relational neural processes. Thus, he 
construed the laws of the brain as active processes of engagement, conveying 
impressions of the brain as a living organism formed through ongoing interaction 
with the environment rather than the passive machine invoked by 
Ramachandran’s use of the term “hard-wired.” Similarly situating art as an active 
process, Zeki insisted that the artist and the brain23 share a common goal; to 
gather knowledge about the world.24 I will explore specific implications of Zeki’s 
neuroaesthetic research on colour in Chapter Four. What I want to note for now is 
that while Zeki has presented a bottom-up model of vision – meaning that non-
conscious processes are understood to form the foundation for conscious 
processing, and are thereby driving the entire system – he has nevertheless 
emphasised the active character of vision as a meaningful process of engaging 
with the world. While Ramachandran suggested that the brain was passively 
driven by sensorial stimuli, the brain that Zeki described was actively seeking 
stimuli and making contingent decisions, even at nonconscious levels of 
perception. Thus, a close reading of Zeki problematizes the hierarchical 
dichotomy between conscious and nonconscious neural processing.  
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 Two art historians, John Onians and Barbara Maria Stafford (both former 
students of Gombrich) have written books of neuroaesthetic theory. These authors 
presented two markedly distinct frames of reference for considering the role of 
nonconscious neural processes in the art experience. Onians chose to embrace the 
authority of neuroscience as an empirical validation for his art historical claims, 
while Stafford chose to enter the conversation by engaging with a wide range of 
contingent negotiations within neuroscience, considering those debates in concert 
with her art historical investigations into the perception of art.  
 In his book, Neuroarthistory: From Aristotle and Pliny to Baxandall and 
Zeki, Onians presented a somewhat whimsical historiography examining twenty-
five diverse historical figures including Aristotle, Alberti, Hogarth, Winckelmann, 
Kant, Marx, Wölfflin, Freud, Gombrich and Zeki. Explaining that his book was 
about “brains” rather than “minds,” Onians privileged the brain as a nonconscious 
organ driving human experience.  
More habitual terms [than “brain”], such as “mind” and 
“intelligence,” with their lofty, even godlike, associations, distort 
our view of the people to whom they are credited in a precisely 
opposite sense, by overemphasising the active character of their 
relation to the world.25 
 
Here, Onians indicated that part of his motivation for producing neuroaesthetic 
research was specifically to counteract theories of art that emphasise conscious 
thought.  
 In the book, Onians attempted to show how certain art historical theories 
had been “validated” (Onians’ term) or not by contemporary neuroscience. For 
  43 
example, he asserted that William Hogarth’s suggestion that the serpentine line is 
the essence of beauty was “wrong” because neuroscience has since “proven” that 
people prefer symmetry.26 The neuroscience on symmetry, however, pertains to 
perception of human faces, and links with the evolutionary theory that people tend 
to prefer symmetrical faces because they indicate healthy potential mates.27 
Turning his attention to Winckelmann, Onians here suggested that the 
neuroscience on symmetrical preference proves the art historian was correct in his 
assertion that some standards of beauty are universal.28 In this way, somewhat 
haphazardly, Onians applied evolutionary theory as a empirical truth underwriting 
neuroscientific findings on symmetry, which he then activated to underwrite 
principles of form and composition in art.  
 In his chapter on Gombrich, Onians dismissed his former teacher’s 
reluctance to embrace biological imperatives as underlying factors in the art 
experience. While Onians employed neuroscientific laws to confer empirical 
authority on his claims, Gombrich used the science of perception to help him 
articulate a relational dimension to aesthetic experience. In order to understand 
how a painter can create a convincing image “despite the fact that no one shade 
corresponds to what we call ‘reality,’” Gombrich suggested that “science has to 
explore the capacity of our minds to register relationships rather than individual 
elements.”29 As in his invocation of the chicken experiment mentioned above, 
Gombrich characterized perception as an active process of engagement rather than 
a passive mode of reception.30 His interdisciplinary explorations were framed as a 
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mode of questioning with the aim of opening up hitherto unrecognized 
possibilities for configuring art experience rather than a totalizing world view that 
enlisted neuroscience to fix the art experience as a biologically determined 
process. “My sympathies,” he wrote, “are with those who warn us against rash 
speculations about inborn reactions in man [sic]...”31 and he explicitly argued 
against mechanistic models that posit human experience as form of passive 
response to stimuli.32  
 Onians identified a conflict in Gombrich’s work between his interest in the 
biological factors that influence perception and style and his reluctance to 
diminish human agency and volition. Onians encapsulated Gombrich’s concerns, 
saying, “Brought up in Austria as an assimilated Jew, his experience, first, of anti-
Semitism in the twenties and, then, of Nazism in the thirties, had made him wary 
of biology in general and a biology of inheritance in particular.”33 But, Onians 
continued, “Fortunately, we no longer need to be so cautious, and it is possible 
now to revisit his arguments and note where neurobiology and neuropsychology 
either support or weaken [Gombrich’s] claims.”34 In an era when evolutionary 
theorist and renowned atheist Sam Harris, for example, invoked the supposed 
empiricism of fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) technology as a 
means of establishing the moral superiority of Western atheism over Islam,35 it is 
unclear how Onians could be so confident that biological determinism was no 
longer a threat in contemporary society.36  
 Onians opened his book Neuroarthistory by explaining that, in light of 
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contemporary understandings of postcolonial theory, art history was currently 
undergoing various forms of reinvention because it comprised a “framework 
developed for the study of a single tradition.”37 For Onians, neuroscience offered 
a solution to the art historical problem of understanding the social contingency of 
diverse cultural experience by positing empirical observations that could be 
universalised across the human species.  
After all, whatever the social and cultural differences between 
individuals and groups making and using art at different times and 
in different places, they all share, and have always shared, a 
common biology. Being members of a single species that left 
Africa perhaps only sixty thousand years ago, they all had the same 
genetic make-up, and this meant that their brains were essentially 
the same, the formation and operation of their neural apparatus 
being governed by the same principles.38  
 
Aligning himself with recent neuroscientific investigations by Norman Bryson, 
Onians claimed, through Bryson, that “subjectivity is an even more real 
phenomenon than he and others had realised, being formed less by ideologies and 
discourses than by cerebral and visceral experiences.”39 What Onians neglected to 
mention, however, was the fact that, like art history, neuroscience was also a 
Western cultural tradition and that the findings of neuroscience emerged 
provisionally within a critical, contingent and negotiated discourse. While the 
biophysical phenomena of aesthetic experiences do indeed demand 
acknowledgement from art historians, it is far too easy, and culturally naive, to 
fully delegate that task to the empirical authority of science. 
 Onians elided the interdisciplinary challenges of neuroaesthetics by 
deploying the contemporary findings of neuroscience as empirical validation for 
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past art historical inquiry. He positioned the empiricism of neuroscience as a 
welcome return to nature, in contrast to deconstruction and poststructuralist 
theories that, in his opinion, over-emphasize the importance of cultural context in 
the creation of meaning in art. 40 Onians should be read in the context of other 
contemporary art and science theorists, such as Dennis Dutton41 who strive to 
justify art’s importance by imbuing it with scientific authority but neglect to 
account for the critical negotiations that comprise scientific practice.  
By contrast, Barbara Maria Stafford took a different approach in her 
comprehensive book Echo Objects, The Cognitive Work of Images, critically 
engaging a wide-range of neuroaesthetic issues and debates. Acknowledging the 
negotiated and contingent aspects of neuroscientific knowledge she took up issues 
such as the universal grammar of form, the implications of mirror neurons for 
mimesis and empathy, the relationships between geometric pattern and 
hallucination, and more. Stafford’s central theme, to which she returned 
repeatedly, was that artworks themselves manifest cognition by facilitating a 
process of synthesis and assemblage in which the audient’s automatic neural 
systems of perception intertwine with volitional attention, situating the brain in 
reciprocal relation with the body, other people, and the environment. She traced 
art historic precursors to contemporary neuroaesthetic theory, paying particular 
attention to the associationists of the Romantic era who believed in a universal 
grammar of form. Stafford argued, however, that much of the neuroaesthetic 
literature tended to privilege automatic neural processes, and thus ignored the 
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possibility that conscious thought might sometimes play an important role in art 
experience.42 
Stafford aimed, in part, to validate conscious and wilful attention as a 
viable subject of neuroaesthetic study that ought to be considered alongside the 
nonconscious processes already embraced in the field. She imbued this argument 
with a certain urgency, worrying that the contemporary techno-media fosters the 
automation of intelligence and the fragmentation of subjects into component 
parts.43 A particular capacity of certain artworks, she argued, was to “snap 
[viewers] to attention: they make [viewers] awake and aware of the present.”44 
For Stafford, art served to make audiences aware of their own cognitive processes 
as they directed their attention to the task of combining diverse elements into a 
meaningful synthesis. While she accepted and embraced the neuroscience of 
nonconscious perception, she resisted bottom-up models of the brain and, drawing 
from cognitive scientist Andy Clark, argued instead for a theory of extended 
mind, formulating cognition as a distributed relational network in which the 
nervous system and its environment could be considered co-constitutive and 
entangled.45 The argument Stafford advanced was not that conscious modes of 
engagement should be privileged over nonconscious processing, but that the two 
should be considered in concert.  
While Stafford identified value in the work of Zeki and Ramachandran for 
reconsidering the “formal side of historical art making,”46 she questioned the 
limitations of the bottom-up model that they employed. She explained that, “[t]he 
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difficulty with this atomization of the processes of segmentation is that it can have 
the effect of dissociating seeing from thoughtful, that is, learned action.”47 
Examining dozens of diverse artworks – including emblematic engravings from 
the 16th and 17th centuries; landscape, still life and portrait paintings from the 
18th and 19th centuries; and contemporary video, photo and collage works by 
artists as diverse as Joan Jonas, Andy Goldsworthy and Warren Neidich – 
Stafford argued that the composite image was “the prototype for how [viewers] 
integrate sensation and concept.”48 She emphasized that the cognitive work of 
unifying disparate visual elements demands active attention and foreknowledge as 
well as automatic, nonconscious neuro-visual response. In contrast to Onians, for 
whom the role of conscious thought in art experience was overrated,49 Stafford 
problematized the polemic between nonconscious and conscious processes that 
other neuroaesthetic researchers sought to reinforce.  
 Stafford’s neuroaesthetic contribution is invaluable for several reasons. 
Firstly, her comprehensive research into a variety of conflicting neuroscientific 
models gave her a critical perspective, and she understood that neuroscience itself 
was a negotiated, critical discourse. In contrast to Onians, Stafford did not confer 
neuroscience with the authority to validate or invalidate aesthetic propositions, 
rather she considered artworks themselves as theoretical agents capable of 
generating knowledge and provoking questions about embodied aesthetic 
experience. Thirdly, she insisted on the role of conscious thought, suggesting that 
neuroaesthetics must expand in order to account for the importance of volitional 
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attention as a condition of aesthetic experience. Finally, Stafford also 
acknowledged that the interdisciplinarity of neuroaesthetics required some 
humility and a suspension of disciplinary authority. Those in the humanities, she 
suggested needed to concede that there are lawlike, or physiologically determined, 
aspects to art in that automatic neural systems are involved in perception. In 
return, neuroscientists needed to concede that art is not just an illustration of 
modular brain function, but in itself performs cognitive work. “Compound images 
in particular,” she argued, “are the medium or interface where world and subject 
get co-constructed, that is, echoically presented to one another’s view.”50 In this 
way, she located artworks as the engines of her neuroaesthetic theory, while at the 
same time emphasising the role of conscious awareness as an important facet of 
the art experience.  
 Ramachandran and Hirstein inaugurated the neuroaesthetic debates by 
provocatively suggesting that neuroscience could provide universal explanations 
for human art experience based on nonconscious neural processes. In doing so, 
they dismissed previous art historical research on the science of perception, 
blatantly neglecting to contend with theories put forward by Ernst Gombrich 
decades before, to advance their own theory that privileged a mechanistic model 
of the brain. Zeki also made bold disciplinary assertions implying that no theory 
of aesthetics would be adequate if it was not based on the laws of the brain. At the 
same time, however, Zeki advanced his investigation into insightful, speculative 
territory, probing beyond the limits of neuroscientific experiment and positioning 
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the brain as an organ seeking knowledge in active engagement with the 
environment, rather than a passive machine awaiting inputs. Onians attempted to 
imbue his speculative neuroaesthetic historiography with an empirical authority 
derived from neuroscience, but failed to account for any of the epistemological 
complexities of negotiating knowledge claims across disciplines. He made a 
conceptual leap between the fact that neuroscience tends to focus on the study of 
nonconscious neural processes and his own assertions that those processes alone 
are sufficient to explain the perception of art. Finally, Stafford introduced 
epistemological contingency to the interdisciplinary discourse by researching 
neuroscientific models that problematize Ramachandran and Zeki’s assertions. As 
an art historian, she joined the neuroaesthetic conversation with a combination of 
disciplinary confidence and critical questioning, demonstrating that the dichotomy 
between nonconscious and conscious experience remains unresolved even within 
the discipline of neuroscience and advancing art historical theories of perception 
to help illuminate and usefully complicate the interdisciplinary neuroaesthetic 
discourse. 
 In this section, I have provided a brief overview of some foundational 
texts in the neuroaesthetic literature, linking territorial conflicts emergent in the 
interdisciplinary discourse with cross-disciplinary privileging of nonconscious 
over conscious experience of art. My aim has been to draw out key themes in 
neuroaesthetics, rather than to provide a comprehensive report on the literature. In 
part due to Zeki’s high profile and influence, a variety of neuroaesthetic 
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experiments are now being conducted in various neuroscience labs, under various 
auspices around the world, and more art historians and theorists are taking up 
neuroaesthetic lines of inquiry. While the discourse still contends with 
interdisciplinary conflicts and provocations, many researchers from both art and 
science express understanding and respect for the epistemological opportunities 
afforded by one another’s disciplines. For the remainder of this section I will 
briefly introduce some of this research.  
 In 2009, neuroscientists Martin Skov and Oshin Vartanian published an 
anthology, Neuroaesthetics, representing key neuroscientific research projects. 
The editors explicitly stated that their book was targeted to the “broader science 
community” in an effort to justify neuroaesthetics as a “basic part of the larger 
neuroscience program.”51 Skov acknowledged, however, that “neuroaesthetics 
needs to work in tandem with traditional aesthetics as a starting point.”52 In 
particular, the editors remarked that aesthetic functions were “phenomena that 
characterize our interactions with a wide array of objects...”53 and that 
neuroaesthetic researchers needed to define what is meant by aesthetics. In one of 
the essays in the anthology, neuroscientist Steven Brown and independent scholar 
Ellen Dissanayake asserted that, “As presently conceived, neuroaesthetics has no 
way of distinguishing art from nonart.”54 Rather than simply forging ahead with 
empirical research into the neural anatomy of aesthetic experience, Skov, Brown 
and Dissanayake requested a disciplinary pause, and then stepped back to re-
assess the foundational terms of the investigation. Brown, who is director of the 
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NeuroArts Lab in the Department of Psychology, Neuroscience and Behaviour at 
McMaster University, frequently engages in both formal and informal 
collaborations with artists, art historians and others in the humanities whose 
research may inform his work.55 This kind of collegial approach on the part of 
neuroscientists will serve neuroaesthetics well.  
 Some art historians are also effectively taking up neuroaesthetics from 
non-defensive positions. Whitney Davis, for example, seriously engaged Zeki’s 
theory of vision as an active process of configuring the world in an essay for the 
online journal Nonsite published out of Emory College of Arts and Sciences.56 I 
will discuss Davis’ essay in more detail presently, but for now I want to 
emphasise that he neither dismissed Zeki’s claims nor appropriated them to 
validate his own claims. Rather, Davis undertook to think deeply through certain 
implications of Zeki’s theory of the brain as an active, knowledge-seeking agent, 
to formulate his own speculative notion of visuality, or “socially constructed ways 
of seeing,”57 informed by both art history and visual culture. In Zeki’s research, 
Davis found support for his own extension of neuroaesthetics to engage with the 
contingency of cultural conditioning as fundamental to art experience.  
 As diverse researchers continue to join the neuroaesthetic discussion, the 
need for interdisciplinary context becomes more urgent. In the following sections 
of this chapter, I will examine how theories of embodied perception emerging in 
art history, science studies, and cognitive neuroscience and affect theory resonate 
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with and problematize neuroaesthetic dichotomies between conscious and 
nonconscious experience.   
   
Art Historical Polemics of Presence and Representation 
As the duality between conscious and non-conscious processing has been 
problematized by some neuroaesthetic researchers, art historians have begun to 
query similar and related dichotomies. Every researcher mentioned here has 
characterised the polemic differently, but the conundrums they’ve articulated are 
interconnected. Margaret Iversen and Stephen Melville recently troubled an art 
historical dichotomy between reading and seeing an image and in 2005 George 
Didi-Huberman drew on turn of the century art historian Aby Warburg to situate 
his own method of contending with the illegible aspects of artworks’ materiality 
in direct opposition to Irwin Panofsky’s rational method of iconology developed 
in the early 20th century. In 2008, Keith Moxey drew on Didi-Huberman, among 
others, to name an emerging polemic between art historical attention on artworks’ 
representational capacities and their material presence. Rosalind Krauss 
positioned her 1993 work on the “optical unconscious”58 – in which she 
configures vision as an irrational, embodied and psychologically inflected process 
– in opposition to what she understood as Clement Greenberg’s reification of 
vision as autonomous, transcendent and timeless. Each of these art historical 
inquiries connects thematically to the neuroaesthetic dichotomy of conscious and 
nonconscious processes outlined above because each articulates a desire to 
  54 
theoretically reconnect sensory perception with the intellect and culturally 
inflected modes of knowing.  
 This section begins with an outline of the art historical polemics of 
perception troubled by Iversen and Melville, Moxey, Didi-Huberman and Krauss. 
I will then proceed to make a case that Susan Buck-Morss’ notion of the 
“synaesthetic system” offers a useful framework for considering embodied 
experience as an integrated dynamic between the perceptions of the senses and 
knowledges emerging through worldly, cultural engagements. I will conclude this 
section by applying this critical framework to two neuroaesthetic propositions: a 
collaboration between art historian David Freedberg and neuroscientist Vittorio 
Gallese who employed neuroscientific findings to propose that artworks 
communicate nonconsciously and without cultural mediation, and Whitney Davis’ 
essay on neuro-visuality, mentioned above, in which he raised the important point 
that artworks, as distinct from many other objects of perception, have been 
“actively configured”59 for audience perception, thus invoking a temporal process 
of recursion, or feedback, between conscious and nonconscious modes of 
engagement.   
 In their recent book Writing Art History, Margaret Iversen and Stephen 
Melville identified an art historical polemic between the senses and the intellect. 
Art-historical writing oscillates between two fundamentally 
different approaches to its objects. Some art historians and critics 
aim to “read,” interpret or decipher the artistic “text.” ... Others, 
however are critical of any approach to the work of art that 
diminishes our sensory-aesthetic experience of it. ... On the one 
hand, the work of art is more or less reducible to language, while 
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on the other, it has nothing in common with it. As soon as one 
spells it out like this, it becomes obvious that either formulation is 
a travesty. Art and thought, seeing and reading, cannot be divided 
up in this way.60 
 
In refusing to dichotomise seeing and reading, Iverson and Melville set up a 
premise of interconnectivity between sensory perception and conscious thought. 
The implication for art history is a return to aesthetic considerations that value 
embodied forms of knowledge without essentializing the body as a deterministic 
site distinct from cultural engagement.  
 Iversen and Melville’s book informs neuroaesthetic theory, not only 
because they refused to polemicize the senses and the intellect, but also because 
they formulated sense perception as a culturally inflected mode of engagement. 
They elucidated this point by contrasting Irwin Panofsky’s iconographic 
methodology with Martin Heidegger’s ontological philosophy. “For Heidegger, 
they explained, “‘de-distancing’ is a dimension of what we are, whereas for 
Panofsky perspective is a tool we might or might not take up – a figure for 
method and not for existence.”61 Or, more simply, “....while Panofsky sees objects 
as available for interpretation, Heidegger sees them as given in interpretation, 
already caught up in interpretation simply in being the things they are.”62 Whereas 
Heidegger’s formulation created a circular tautology in which observers could 
never fully detach themselves from the conditions of their observations, Panofsky 
set out “both to guarantee and, more importantly, to define ‘objectivity.’”63 In 
troubling art historical attachments to scientific objectivity Iversen and Melville 
made a valuable contribution that supports a critical reading of neuroaesthetic 
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literature and provides a warning for art historians, such as Onians, who might be 
tempted to appropriate scientifically derived empirical claims as validation for art 
historical analyses without considering the embodied and conditional 
subjectivities of scientific observers.  
 George Didi-Huberman has addressed the art historical conundrum of how 
to situate the material aesthetics of artworks in relation to cultural contexts. Like 
Iversen and Melville, he framed his argument explicitly as a form of resistance to 
Panofsky’s rationalist iconological methodology. In his book Confronting Images, 
Didi-Huberman proposed an art historical epistemology to account for the 
material presence of images. Irwin Panofsky, he argued, championed a scientific 
system based on the legibility of signs and symbols in order to exorcise other, 
more chaotic kinds of understanding. Thus, according to Didi-Huberman, 
Panofsky was able to turn a blind eye to ways that images themselves could alter 
art historical epistemologies, and maintain a sense of methodological order.64 
Didi-Huberman chose instead to focus on illegible operations of images, drawing 
from both Aby Warburg and Sigmund Freud in his use of the term “symptom” to 
denote the way that images can manifest an “arborescence of associations or 
conflicted meanings.”65 Through his analysis of several canonical paintings – 
including Fra Angelico’s The Annunciation in the Monastery of San Marco, and 
Jan Vermeer’s Girl with a Red Hat – Didi-Huberman demonstrated how his 
notion of “symptom” emerges from the materiality of artworks, rather than from 
their signifying imagery. 
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 Didi-Huberman lamented what he perceived as a shift in Panofsky’s 
thinking away from the difficult questions posed by embodied perception toward 
a more legible methodology that foreclosed on the irrational dimensions of 
aesthetics. Before Panofsky left Germany for America, Didi-Huberman wrote, he 
posed a deeply critical question pertaining to aesthetic perception as a mode of 
knowing.   
How does “the relation of the soul to the world of the eye” express 
what becomes for each of us, “the relation of the eye to the 
world?” This is the basic question. It takes things in their nascent 
state, it already interrogates the phenomenology of perception from 
the following angle: how does the perceived visible acquire 
meaning for us?66 [emphasis Didi-Huberman’s] 
 
Panofsky’s early inquiry resonates with a contemporary neuroscientific question: 
how do the mechanisms of the brain produce consciousness? Specifically, for 
neuroaesthetics, how is it that perceptions take on meaning? For Didi-Huberman, 
the relationship of image to meaning necessarily involved the subjective domain 
of psychology, and he found a similar embrace of the unknowable in Panofsky’s 
earlier writings. Didi-Huberman demonstrated, however, how Panofsky 
eventually abandoned the unknowable in the rationalist art historical methodology 
that he derived. Thus, Didi-Huberman argued, Panofsky developed a system in 
which art could only speak to consciousness and the unconscious must therefore 
be denied,67 and this denial of the symptom in the image led to a methodology 
that was incomplete. “[Panofsky] forbade himself – and forbade the history of art 
– from seeing, or rather confronting the moment when images do violence.”68 
Panofsky’s drive to make art history an objective, scientific practice gave him 
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license to read only what he wanted to read into the images he studied. Thus, his 
methodology denied the subjective position of the art historian and, for Didi-
Huberman, elided the unknowable and potentially disruptive effects of artworks’ 
material presence. Nevertheless, Didi-Huberman did not renounce Panofsky’s 
rationalist method outright. 
Thanks to Panofsky’s warnings, we know better just how the 
historian of art engages, at every instant, his reason and his 
“scientific” desire for verification: we know better just how we 
need not be afraid of knowledge. But despite Panofsky’s exorcisms 
– and thanks to the risks taken before him by Aby Warburg – we 
also know how we needn’t be afraid of not knowing. We must, in 
this history, have the courage to confront both parties, both 
“pictures”....69 
 
Just as Iversen and Melville refused to choose between seeing and reading, Didi-
Huberman advocated an art historical methodology to simultaneously entertain 
both reasoned and irrational engagements with art.  
 In a 2008 essay surveying recent research in visual studies, art historian 
Keith Moxey posed the question, “Is it possible to conceive of the image as both a 
representation and a presentation at the same time?”70 He identified a theoretical 
polemic between ontological and semiotic approaches – between those who 
consider art images as presences and those who consider them as representations. 
Drawing, in part, on Didi-Huberman, Moxey suggested that the art historical 
discipline was turning away from semiotic methodology in favour of a more 
sensorial approach. 
Bored with the “linguistic turn” and the idea that experience is 
filtered through the medium of language, many scholars are now 
convinced that we may sometimes have unmediated access to the 
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world around us, that the subject/object distinction, so long a 
hallmark of the epistemological enterprise, is no longer valid.71  
 
Here, Moxey made a valuable contribution in naming an axis of tension between 
postmodern analyses of cultural conditioning and a growing restiveness about the 
ways in which such linguistically derived analyses have been understood to 
invalidate, or render irrelevant, the sensed perceptions of the body. As I will argue 
in detail in Chapter Six, however, while claims for unmediated access to the 
world would seem to privilege the senses, they in fact deny the role of the senses 
as cognitive modes of knowing by stripping them of social and cultural inflection. 
In raising the polemic between presence and representation, Moxey, perhaps 
inadvertently, reinforced the dichotomy as he explicitly formulated an art 
historical return to presence as part of a reaction against social history.72 At the 
same time, however, he also tentatively acknowledged that formulations of 
presence and representation may not be mutually exclusive, and that both “add 
power and complexity to our current understanding of the visual.”73 Thus, while 
Moxey maintained a more polemic stance than Iversen and Melville or Didi-
Huberman, he did identify an heuristically useful dichotomy between ontological 
and semiotic modes of analysis and opened the possibility that it may not be 
necessary to resolve to one mode or the other.  
 Unfortunately, Moxey’s polemics elided feminist art historical contentions 
with the body. While he acknowledged formulations of situated subjectivity 
invoked by feminist thinkers Irit Rogoff and Donna Haraway, he posited their 
standpoints in opposition to a list of largely male art historians who, he claimed, 
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addressed the materiality of objects rather than contextual cultural conditions. 
Moxey implied that the art historical attention to materiality he identified was a 
recent phenomenon arising in opposition to postmodern cultural analyses, and 
thus he neglected a long history of feminist contention with Cartesian polemics of 
body and mind. Feminist artists of the 1970s, for example, vigorously asserted the 
body as a site of subjectivity, while subsequent feminist, postcolonial, and queer 
theorists objected to essentialisms emerging from over-identification with the 
body as a fixed site of identity. For example, in her 1990 book Gender Trouble, 
feminist philosopher and queer theorist Judith Butler accounted for gender as “a 
corporeal style, an ‘act,’ as it were, which is both intentional and performative, 
where ‘performative’ suggested a dramatic and contingent construction of 
meaning.”74 Butler situated her view on materiality within an argument that 
pointed exclusively to discursive modes of being, and potentials for political 
change within those modes. Thus, she made an explicit refusal to discuss the body 
as an a priori material entity. For Butler, any statement about the body as matter 
was, inherently, in itself a normative social construction, and for her to make such 
a statement would be to undermine her own deconstructive efforts.75 Thus, she 
charged any address to the materiality of the body with reductive essentialism, 
giving rise to misunderstandings that she therefore denied the existence of 
material reality.76 In fact, one could argue the opposite; Butler’s concerns about 
addressing material reality as such could be construed as a respect for the 
ontology of the body that she refused to obscure by making declarations that 
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could not, in fact, be ontological. In any case, Butler’s complex and nuanced 
discourse represents one of the important feminist contributions to discussions of 
the body as a culturally inflected site that Moxey’s polemic elides.  
 While Butler’s discursive approach to the body has been (mis)read as a 
denial of corporeal experience, feminist art historian Rosalind Krauss explicitly 
entangled the senses and the intellect in her revisionist book on modernism, The 
Optical Unconscious. She challenged the self-referential logic of Greenbergian 
high modernism as it carved out zones of autonomy for the senses, treating vision 
itself as an “abstract condition with no before and no after.”77 Greenberg’s 
materiality of media opened into a disembodied zone of optical transcendence, 
detached from not only the other senses of the body, but also from the cultural and 
historical conditions of the art experience. Krauss problematized the modernist 
paradigm that positioned each artistic discipline as “grounded in its unique and 
separate domain of experience,”78 addressing vision explicitly as a fully embodied 
mode of perception. Resonating with Didi-Huberman’s challenge to Panofsky, 
Krauss’ version of modernism, written “against the grain” of Greenberg, was 
concerned with the unchartable “blind, irrational space of the labyrinth”79 rather 
than the clean and tidy optics of the grid. As Didi-Huberman drew from Freud to 
describe how images can haunt us through “symptom,” Krauss drew from Lacan 
to show how relationships of self to vision are always processual and cyclical.80 
She coined the term “optical unconscious” to describe the temporal, carnal and 
irrational aspects of vision that haunt the modernist paradigm. 
  62 
 If, as Krauss suggested, cognition is corporeal, then perceptual stimuli, 
including vision, can neither be disengaged from the infinitely heterogeneous 
conditions of culture, nor from the irrational processes of biology. Susan Buck-
Morss, in her cautionary critique of modernity’s splitting of subject, body and 
agency, posited a similar entanglement in her theorization of the “synaesthetic 
system.”81 
The nervous system is not contained within the body’s limits. The 
circuit from sense-perception to motor response begins and ends in 
the world. The brain is thus not an isolable anatomical body, but 
part of a system that passes through the person and her or his 
(culturally specific, historically transient) environment. As the 
source of stimuli and the arena for motor response, the external 
world must be included to complete the sensory circuit.82 
 
Writing in the 1990s, Buck-Morss was responding to Walter Benjamin’s proposal 
from 1936 that the aestheticization of politics was fascist, and the best form of 
resistance was the politicization of art. In her sensorial history of early 
modernism, she showed how aesthetics has come to mean a dulling of the senses, 
a splitting of the subject, the body and the environment that dangerously persists 
in the present day. The modern myth of autogenesis, whereby man creates 
himself, hinges on an Enlightenment construction of rationality that denies the 
uncontainable excesses of the senses and consequently the feminine and 
homoerotic aspects of corporeal experience.  
 In the political context of the 1970s, asserting female subjectivity meant 
contending with modern dualisms, and one prevailing strategy adopted by 
feminist artists such as Carolee Schneeman and Ana Mendieta was to celebrate 
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and valourize the elements that had been traditionally delimited and demeaned as 
feminine – nature and body. Whereas the body was challenged and revisioned in 
the celebration of its excesses by feminist theorists such as Carolyn Merchant, 
elisions between gender subjectivity and the material body carried a constricting 
form of essentialism. The challenge facing feminists such as Krauss and Buck-
Morss was not to further essentialize the body as excessive, but to rethink dualism 
altogether – positing bodies as socially situated entities with cognitive capacities. 
I wish to bring such feminist constructs forward into neuroaesthetics, retaining 
Butler’s lesson that identity categories are co-constituted by that which they 
exclude.83 Thus, in this dissertation, I argue for a neuroaesthetic methodology that 
situates the physiological and cognitive capacities of brains/bodies within the 
contingencies of their cultural contexts. Buck-Morss’ synaesthetic system is 
useful here, situating the biophysics of the sensing body as part of a larger system 
of engagement with the world that entails cultural and historic specificities.  
 Cartesian duality persists in contemporary art historical investigation as a 
dichotomy between social construction and sensorial perception in the analysis of 
artworks. Neuroaesthetics, for some art historians such as Onians, has provided 
resolution by seemingly obviating the need for consideration of cultural 
difference. Onians was not alone in embracing neuroscientific findings as 
epistemological alternatives to social construction for art history. In 2007, art 
historian David Freedberg and neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese teamed up to apply 
mirror neuron theory to aesthetic experience. I will discuss the shifting 
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neuroscientific discourse around mirror neuron theory in Chapter Six. For now, it 
is enough to understand that mirror neurons are small groups of brain cells that 
activate the same way when one is performing a particular action, or observing 
that same action performed by another. In suggesting that mirror neuron 
activation provided an “embodied simulation” of another’s experience, Freedberg 
and Gallese explicitly argued against the “primacy of cognition in responses to 
art.”84 The authors situated their theory in direct opposition to the “new art history 
of the 1970s” which, in their words, insisted on “purely historical, cultural and 
social factors in responses to art.”85 Given the vehemence with which they 
dismissed social construction, Freedberg and Gallese’s adaptation of neuroscience 
as providing direct access to materiality can be read, in part, as a backlash against 
the difficult questions posed by feminist and queer theory. Political standpoints, 
aside, however, their polemic framed the compelling proposition that viewers 
were able to experience the meanings of artworks physiologically, responding 
empathically to the poses represented in figurative works or to the movements 
indexed in gestural abstractions. This raises the question: is it really necessary to 
dismiss cultural conditioning in order to consider material response to artworks? 
  The polemic that Freedberg and Gallese invoke between embodied and 
socially conditioned responses to art relies on the assumption that the body and 
society operate as distinct spheres of influence on aesthetic experience. Art 
Historian Whitney Davis, who is versed in queer theory, has taken some steps 
towards problematizing such nature/culture dichotomies. As mentioned above, he 
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wrote an essay conjoining art historic and neuroscientific knowledges in his 
concept of neurovisuality. “By ‘visuality,’” he explained, “art historians mean 
socially constructed ways of seeing, Sehformen as Heinrich Wölfflin called them, 
often shaped in interaction with styles of art, depiction, and built form (often 
called ‘visual culture’).” Neurovisuality, for Davis, referred to “the neural 
circuitry laid down in populations of people using just those artifacts visually in 
the ways in which they were culturally intended. ”86 Like both Stafford and Buck-
Morss, Davis expressed an urgent contemporary need to assess the cultural 
contingency inherent to visuality as an embodied capacity because of the ways 
that techno-media may be conditioning their users’ sense of vision in fundamental 
ways. For Davis, the discursive descriptions of art historians and neuroaesthetic 
“read-outs” of brain activity generated by laboratory experiments could be “fully 
translated into one another” because, “taken on their own terms, they are different 
representations of what we can see (or of what is seen by us) when apprehending 
the painting as an artwork.”87 Davis acknowledged, however, that neuroaesthetic 
experimental methodology was not yet developed to the extent that a direct 
parallel could be drawn between neuroscientific and art historical forms of 
knowledge. In assessing the problem, he suggested, as I do in this dissertation, 
that artworks present a particular kind of address that can not be replicated in 
neuroscientific imaging experiments.  
[W]hen we look at things that have been actively configured for 
our seeing as actively configuring what is seen we aestheticize 
twice over or in a feedback loop, redoubling the aesthetic 
momentum of seeing: we paint the painting painted for our 
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painting of it–repaint it. This recursion or redoubling is a necessary 
condition for neurovisuality even though it may not be sufficient 
for it.88 
 
Because the experience of artworks entails the conscious knowledge that they 
have been intentionally created in order to facilitate aesthetic response, art works 
make an address to conscious thought at the same time that they present affective 
stimuli to the biophysical sensorium. Thus, the audient is invited into a recursive 
awareness of their own processes of perception as they are taking place. While 
Davis did not state it explicitly, his insight implied that conscious processing is 
integral to aesthetic experience even at non-linguistic levels of apprehension. In 
Chapter Two I will discuss technical barriers that prevent fMRI imaging 
experimenters from producing “read-outs” that can account for this kind of meta-
level processing. For now, my aim is to emphasize Davis’ points that the 
particular address that artworks make to viewers is currently not quantifiable 
through neuroscientific imaging, and, furthermore, that artworks address the 
senses and intellect simultaneously, facilitating a neuroaesthetic awareness of 
perception as a cognitive mode of knowing.  
 Art historical investigations into embodied art experience inform and 
broaden neuroaesthetic inquiry by troubling traditional dichotomies between the 
senses and the intellect. Iversen and Melville delineated an art historical 
epistemology that conjoined seeing and reading. While Didi-Huberman likewise 
enacted an art historical methodology that embraced both the knowable and the 
unknowable as valid objects of research, Rosalind Krauss explicitly positioned 
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corporeal perception of art as a psychologically inflected mode of cognition. 
Addressing aesthetics as a philosopher of social and political thought, Susan 
Buck-Morss proposed her notion of the synaesthetic system, offering an effective 
model for how to conceive of the perceiving body as a cultural entity. While 
Moxey elided important feminist work on embodied art experience, he 
nevertheless made an important contribution by delineating axes of tension 
between representation and presentation, historically situating a contemporary 
turn toward material objects as a form of backlash against the discursive cultural 
constructions of postmodernism. This backlash is evident in the collaboration 
between Freedberg and Gallese, who enlisted neuroscience to formulate a 
neuroaesthetic theory that by-passes cultural contingency, positing embodied 
perception of artworks as an unmediated form of communication. Davis, on the 
other hand, retains cultural contingency in his neuroaesthetic formulation of 
neurovisuality as a recursive confluence of sensory perception and intellectual 
knowledge. In each case, these researchers have articulated the interconnected 
nature of body and mind, and their work thereby deepens and extends 
neuroaesthetic understandings of the relationship between conscious and 
nonconscious processing. In particular, Didi-Huberman, Krauss and Davis have 
demonstrated that art historical investigations can produce rigorous examinations 
of biophysical materiality without the need to bracket out social considerations. In 
this, their research resonates closely with theories that have been put forward by 
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philosophers of science who strive to collapse epistemological dichotomies 
between nature and culture.  
 
Collapse of Nature/Culture Emerging from Science Studies  
The prevailing emphasis on nonconscious processing in the neuroaesthetic 
literature stems from methodological constraints in neuroscientific experiment 
that privilege nonconscious processes as valid objects of study. In Chapter Two I 
shall explain these constraints in detail. Here, I wish to emphasise that many 
influential neuroaesthetic scholars, such as Ramachandran, Zeki and Onians, have 
positioned nonconscious brain function as a natural phenomenon – and thus a 
valid object of scientific inquiry – associating conscious processing with the 
realm of culture, a zone of influence about which neuroscientists can only 
speculate. Buck-Morss' synaesthetic system offers an alternative model that 
positions cultural influence as integral to the natural processes of perception, and 
the art historical research mentioned above also supports an interdisciplinary 
neuroaesthetic framework for considering nature and culture as co-constitutive 
aspects of the art experience. In this section I draw further support from three 
philosophers of science, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway and Karen Barad, each of 
whom has explicitly set out to challenge the ways that traditional notions of the 
scientific method have reinforced a false dichotomy between nature and culture. 
Their investigations also problematize the polemic, invoked by Moxey, between 
discursive and perceptual modes of knowing.  
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 Latour argued that the nature/culture polemic had been forcefully 
expressed in a modernist dichotomy between modes of knowing that was never 
valid in the first place. In his words, “we have never been modern.”89 Haraway, 
writing in conversation with Latour, advanced an heuristic model of “situated 
knowledges,” a feminist framework designed specifically to account for the 
integration of material reality and cultural contingency. Karen Barad engaged 
with both Latour and Haraway, drawing from quantum physics to posit her 
theoretical formulations of “intra-action” and “agential materialism” which 
reconfigure matter itself as a temporal network of mutually inflective processes 
rather than a collection of fixed and predetermined objects. 
 In a curatorial essay written in 2002, Latour challenged theoretical 
dichotomies between discursive construction and empirical reality.   
If westerners had really believed they had to choose between 
construction and reality (if they had been consistently modern), 
they would never have had religion, art, science, and politics. 
Mediations are necessary everywhere. If you forbid them, you may 
become mad, fanatic, but there is no way to obey the command and 
choose between the two-polar opposites: either it is made or it is 
real. That is a structural impossibility, an impasse, a double bind, a 
frenzy. It is as impossible as to request a Bunraku player to have to 
choose, from now on, between showing his puppet or showing 
himself on the stage.90 
 
The reason “we have never been modern,” according to Latour, is that modernity 
enforced a false dichotomy between nature and culture. Social scientists may have 
debunked ordinary people for naive beliefs that power came from what he termed 
the “objective properties intrinsic to the nature of things” when in fact objects 
were empty surfaces upon which the normative values of society were inscribed. 
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Conversely, social scientists may have also debunked ordinary people for naive 
beliefs in volition and free will, when in fact the nature of things governed our 
behaviour. In either case humans came out as puppets, devoid of agency.91 
Continually deflecting agency, and thus responsibility, from nature to culture and 
back again, Western moderns have actually proliferated nature/culture hybrids, or 
“quasi-objects” such as the hole in the ozone layer, hybrid corn, digital machines, 
etc. Nature and culture, however, have never actually been separated – just as 
humans have always produced hybrids, so too the modern device of assigning 
nature and culture to different spheres has allowed the modern production of even 
more hybrids. 
Latour, then, is not postmodern, rather he is amodern, meaning that he 
rejected the notion of modernity altogether. As he described it, postmodernism, 
like modernism, was a symptom of the modern culture/nature split. Postmodern 
theorists no longer believed in the guarantees of modernism, but they could not 
take action because postmodernism dismissed all empirical work as illusory, 
which left debunking and denouncing as the only remaining options. Latour called 
for theoretical deployment instead of unveiling, and interdisciplinary fraternizing 
instead of debunking.92  
 He explained that the disciplinary separation of facts (science), politics 
(sociology) and discourse (deconstruction) have brought modern Western culture 
to an impasse where agency (i.e., responsibility) has been consistently deflected.93 
Latour’s motivations were in part ecological. Using the hole in the ozone layer as 
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an example of an empirical manifestation, politically determined and discursively 
potent, he pointed a finger at Jacques Derrida, expressing frustration at those who 
would “make fun of the belief in a reality.”94 He acknowledged that yes, the 
ozone layer could be figured as a discursive construction, but it also had material 
consequences and material origins. Thus, Latour asserted a human capacity to 
impact the material world and a human accountability to the material 
consequences of human actions, while at the same time asserting the influence of 
the material world as fundamental to the formulation of cultural constructs.  
 A further aspect of Latour’s formulation, important for neuroaesthetics, is 
that he ascribed agency to non-human, and even inanimate, entities: “The 
reopening of the question of agency in terms of climate,” he explains, “and more 
generally in terms of ecological crisis, is one of the things that makes my position, 
which seemed strange earlier on, completely common sense ... humans are not the 
only ones making agencies in the world.95 Human and non-human actors 
including technological apparatus, contribute to knowledge in the science lab in 
an interconnected web that Latour terms an assemblage. Scientific facts, then, 
must be understood as both constructed and real. “When we say that a fact is 
constructed,” says Latour, “we simply mean that we account for the solid 
objective reality by mobilizing various entities whose assemblage could fail; 
‘social constructivism’ means, on the other hand, that we replace what this reality 
is made of with some other stuff, the social in which it is ‘really’ built.”96 While 
Latour rejected the hierarchical, deterministic role that social constructivism 
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ascribed to culture over nature, he did not reject the social. Rather, he extended 
the concept of social interaction to include the inputs of non-human entities and 
material objects. Thus, both culture and nature inhere as co-constitutive 
dimensions of the real world. 
Like Latour, Donna Haraway placed equal weight on both matter and 
discourse, seeking to problematize dichotomies between the two. In her 1988 
essay, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Haraway posed a challenging feminist question. 
So, I think my problem, and “our” problem, is how to have 
simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all 
knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognising our own “semiotic technologies” for making meanings 
and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a “real” 
world, one that can be partially shared and that is friendly to 
earthwide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, 
modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness.97  
 
In refusing to let go of either pole of the dichotomy between “radical 
constructivism” – the discursive formulation of science as a text – and “feminist 
critical empiricism” – an allegiance to a form of objectivity based on 
acknowledging and accounting for the world we inhabit – Haraway suggested that 
it was time to “switch metaphors,”98 by which she meant to propose an alternative 
way of thinking about knowledge of the world. 
 Haraway's theory of “situated knowledge,” was a way of activating the 
particular subjectivities of people engaged in specific, real life situations. Instead 
of operating as a detached and omniscient understanding, this kind of knowledge 
could never be totalizing as it was always inflected by both material 
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circumstances and cultural conditions. Situated knowledge provides an alternative 
to both “totalizing versions of claims to scientific authority” and to relativism, 
both of which, in Haraway's words, “deny the stakes in location, embodiment and 
partial perspective,” making it “impossible to see well.”99  
 Haraway theorized situated knowledge as a shifting mode of subjectivity. 
“The knowing self is partial, in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there 
and original; it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and 
therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be 
another.”100 Science, then, could be construed as a “positioned” rational practice 
that did not produce final closure, but rather provisionally explored the 
“contestable and contested.”101 While Latour, to some extent, adopted a 
comprehensive, bird’s eye view on networked assemblages that produce 
knowledge, Haraway argued that only partial knowledge could be objective, and 
any transcendental claims were thereby false.  
 Haraway, like Latour, argued for an embodied agency of non-human 
actors, but she arrived at this position through her engagement with the 
sex/gender debates in feminism and queer theory. While she was alert to the 
dangers of biological determinism that inhere in constructions of sex as a 
biologically determined “object,” she also refused constructivist implications of 
the body as a “blank page for social inscriptions.”102 Whereas humanist science 
assumed that “nature is only the raw material of culture,”103 instead, she argued, 
“the world encountered in knowledge projects is an active entity.”104 Haraway’s 
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feminist situated knowledges formulated material objects as agents in the co-
construction of knowledge, as distinct from resources to be limitlessly 
manipulated to human ends.    
 Karen Barad, a feminist philosopher of science who studied with 
Haraway, also questioned nature/culture dichotomies emerging through the 
sex/gender debates. In particular she challenged Butler, who explicitly refused to 
discuss the body as an a priori material entity.105 “How,” asked Barad, “did 
language become more trustworthy than matter?”106 Barad welcomed critiques of, 
what she terms, representationalism – “the idea that beings exist as individuals 
with inherent attributes, anterior to their representation”107 – from “feminists, 
poststructuralists, postcolonial critics and queer theorists.”108 While she 
acknowledged Butler’s theory of performativity as an alternative,109 she remained 
unsatisfied with what she saw as Butler’s inability to ascribe agency to matter. In 
Barad’s reading Butler set up matter as a “passive product of discursive 
practice.”110 Barad may have been overstating her case against Butler, whose 
concerns about addressing matter as such could be construed as a respect for the 
ontology of the body that she will not compromise by making declarations that 
cannot, in fact, be ontological. Such discursive convolutions did not satisfy Barad, 
however, and she set about to propose a formulation that could account for the 
contingent relationship between matter and discourse, at the same time extending 
the discussion of matter beyond the sexed, human body debated in identity 
politics111 to include the non-human entities that factor in scientific knowledge.112    
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 Barad drew directly on the “philosophy-physics”113 of early twentieth 
century physicist Niels Bohr to formulate her theories of intra-activity and 
agential realism. In this her work speaks in dialogue with feminist philosopher 
Luce Irigaray, who, frustrated that quantum physics studies particles that can not 
be perceived, complained that science was moving too far away from first-hand 
observation of material objects and events. 
The scientific enterprise has entered a “universe” where sensory 
perception has almost no currency, a situation which could lead to 
the cancellation of the object at stake in physics: the matter 
(whatever its attributes may be) of the universe and of the bodies 
that constitute that universe.114  
 
For Irigaray, quantum physics operated too much in the realm of discursive 
theory, divorced from the lived experience of perception. Indeed, Bohr’s quantum 
physics did reject “things” as “ontologically basic entities,”115 but Barad 
celebrated the extent to which he construed the interrelationships between matter, 
the scientist’s subjectivity, and the apparatus (technology) employed as a 
mutually constitutive “relational ontology.”116 For both Bohr and Barad, it was 
the phenomena that arose in specific, local intersections of activity between 
various agents – none of whom, Barad implied, need necessarily be human – that 
constituted reality.117 Barad named this dynamic of activity “intra-action,” distinct 
from interaction which “presumes the prior existence of independent entities...”118 
For her, Newtonian physics, with its “God’s eye view of the universe...” was a 
story that was “written into our bones.”119 But the indeterminacy of quantum, sub-
atomic physics decentred this point of view. “All this ‘quantum weirdness’,” 
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wrote Barad, “(the display of an increasing array of uncanny phenomena) is 
actually ‘quantum queerness,’ and I don’t mean simply strange. Q is for queer - 
the un/doing of identity.”120 For Barad, then, matter was one of several agents in 
the production of phenomena, materialized locally and conveying meaning that 
was relevant to the specific context of the intra-action. In this sense, objectivity 
was preserved for the scientific method, construed, as she stated, as a “local 
resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological indeterminacy”121 
[emphasis Barad’s]. Breaking from traditional scientific distinctions between 
nature and culture, and further breaking from constructive suggestions that culture 
either inscribes meaning on pre-existing bodies or produces material bodies,122 
Barad proposed instead that matter was “not a thing, but a doing, a congealing of 
agency.”123 In formulating matter as a process, rather than an object, Barad built 
on Latour’s notion of cultural/natural assemblages and Haraway’s construction of 
material objects as agents in the co-production of knowledge to formulate a 
philosophical position situating indeterminacy itself as an agential capacity of the 
material world.  
 While both Haraway and Barad shared common ground with Latour in 
their collapse of nature/culture dichotomies, both broke from him as well, calling 
for more radical, feminist reconsiderations of scientific epistemology. In her 1996 
essay “Modest_Witness@2nd_Millenium,” Haraway specifically challenged 
Latour, suggesting that he did not ascribe enough importance to the myth-making 
systems of techno-science.124 For Latour, the Western phase of belief in 
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modernity’s dualisms was over and hybridity had arrived. Haraway was worried, 
however, that contemporary technoscience was proffering narratives of salvation 
through the restoration of essentialist concepts of human nature. Barad, likewise, 
worried that while Latour invited the agency of non-human entities, his system 
did nothing “to address the kinds of concerns that feminist, queer, postcolonial, 
(post-)-Marxist, and critical race theorists and activists have brought to the 
table.”125 Barad was more sympathetic to deconstruction than Latour, pinpointing 
the “constitutive effects” of the exclusions in intra-active systems as well as the 
inclusions.   
 While Barad came to her theory through a deep engagement with quantum 
physics, her focus on agential materialism has implications for neuroaesthetics as 
well.  
The entangled practices of knowing and being are material 
practices. The world is not merely an idea that exists in the human 
mind. To the contrary, “mind” is a specific material configuration 
of the world, not necessarily coincident with a brain. Brain cells 
are not the only ones that hold memories, respond to stimuli, or 
think thoughts (where “holding,” “responding,” and “thinking” are 
intra-active engagements with, and as parts of, specific 
configurations of the world).126  
 
Barad’s distinction between mind and brain could not be reduced to Cartesian 
dualism because both, in her construction, were comprised of the stuff of the 
material world. Her suggestion that mind could be partly located in other forms of 
matter besides brain cells resonates with theories of embodied cognition emerging 
in neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness.127 
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 Drawing from Latour, Haraway, and Barad, I situate aesthetic experience, 
whether it takes place in the lab or the gallery, as a form of performative 
assemblage in which embodied knowledge emerges from the collaborative input 
of all participating entities, human and non-human, conscious and non-conscious. 
In the gallery, the institution itself can be considered as an actor, as well as the 
social networks of funding bodies, colleagues, critics and historians within which 
that institution functions. In turn, the artist, audience, and curator are all actors, 
moreover, the artwork itself is an actor as are the technological systems of 
display. The aesthetic experience of art is thereby multi-dimensional, situated, 
partial, temporal, un-repeatable and material. By taking as much of the 
assemblage into consideration as possible, human actors are able to test their own 
experience against the other actors in the network and thus situate aesthetics as a 
collective form of knowledge.  
 Likewise in the neuro-imaging lab, the institution in which the lab is 
housed is an actor, as is the social network of funding bodies, colleagues and 
critics who inform and help establish the conditions of the research. The scientists 
who designed the study are actors, the subjects whose brain’s are examined are 
actors, the technicians who run the MRI scanner are actors, the scanner is an actor 
and the stimuli that activate neuronal firing are actors. The neurons that fire are 
also actors, as are the data produced by the neuronal activations, the statistical 
formula applied to the data and the graphs and other images eventually produced. 
As in the gallery, the individual art experience in the lab is multi-dimensional, 
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situated, partial, temporal, un-repeatable and material. Under the conditions of 
experiment, if all goes well, multiple sets of data coalesce into findings that 
constitute provisional facts.   
 In both circumstances of the gallery and the lab, the process of knowledge 
involves many agencies, inclusions and exclusions. In each discipline, the 
assemblage is comprised of such different agents that the knowledge produced 
can’t simply be transferred from one situation to the other in order to underwrite, 
authorize or explain the knowledge produced. Yet, actors in either the lab or the 
gallery can bring with them, as part of the assemblage, knowledge from the other 
discipline. So that in the context of the art gallery, for example, an audience 
member may wonder “What are my neurons doing now?” and use the question 
derived from the lab to posit hypothetical agents – one’s own neurons – operating 
in aesthetic intra-action with all of one’s other cells, thoughts, memories, sense 
perceptions, and affects. Formulations by Latour, Haraway and Barad support a 
neuroaesthetic methodology that relinquishes dichotomies between nature and 
culture in the context of art experience, formulating the materiality of the body as 
a process and thus bringing conscious and nonconscious processing together in 
situated and temporal engagements with art.  
 
Perception and Interaction through Feedback and Affect 
In proposing a temporal, neuroaesthetic co-constitution of body, mind and culture, 
I draw further support from theories positing feedback between the body and the 
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environment that have emerged simultaneously in neuroscience and cultural 
studies. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio levelled an important challenge to his 
discipline when he insisted, in 1994, that the brain cannot be considered in 
isolation from the ongoing interactions of the body with the world. Likewise, in 
2007, neuroscientist Warren S. Brown and philosopher Nancey Murphy published 
a co-written account of cognition as an ongoing process of feedback and 
interaction with the environment. In 2002, cultural theorist Brian Massumi 
introduced his concept of affect as an incipient state of physical intensity 
resonating in feedback networks simultaneously activated within the body and 
between the body and its perceived external stimuli. Cultural theorist and curator 
Jennifer Fisher has taken up affect theory in the context of aesthetics, examining 
affects of curation and display culture as collective modes of embodied 
engagement. 
 Most, if not all, neuroscientists are materialists, in that they believe mind 
is a material phenomenon of the organic brain. In his influential 1994 book, 
Descartes’ Error, Damasio suggested that the materialism of brain science can 
work against the discipline’s anti-Cartesian agenda.  
There may be some Cartesian disembodiment [...] behind the 
thinking of neuroscientists who insist that the mind can be fully 
explained solely in terms of brain events, leaving by the wayside 
the rest of the organism and the surrounding physical and social 
environment – and also leaving out the fact that part of the 
environment is itself a product of the organism’s preceding actions. 
I resist the restriction, not because the mind is not directly related 
to brain activity, since it obviously is, but rather because the 
restrictive formulation is unnecessarily incomplete, and humanly 
unsatisfactory.128 
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Damasio suggested that the crucial philosophical problem for neuroscience was 
not a mind/brain split, but a brain/body split. Damasio researched the mysterious 
case of a 19th century victim of brain damage, Phineas Gage, who seemed to have 
miraculously retained all of his neurological functions after a metal spike was 
driven through his brain in an industrial accident. As years went by, however, 
Gage’s life changed dramatically, formerly popular and successful, over time he 
lost his marriage, his job and his friends, eventually becoming lonely, depressed 
and dissolute.129 Correlating the neurological data on Gage’s injury with patients 
of his own suffering similar pathologies, Damasio surmised that Gage’s brain 
damage had hampered his emotional processing. Gage was able to perform well 
on neurological tests conducted within the confines of the lab, but in the complex 
and unstructured flow of life experience, his inability to draw on the information 
of emotional stimulus made it impossible for him to make wise decisions. 
Emotions, Damasio argued, function as important indicators of body states, 
constantly inflecting cognition through the body’s ongoing interactions with the 
world. For him, neuroscientific accounts of the brain should not isolate its 
function from the complex dynamics of embodied life experience.  
 Murphy and Brown similarly addressed the neuroscientific importance of 
feedback between the brain and the environment. They took ten years to write 
their book, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? (2007). As Brown explained in an 
interview with Ginger Campbell (The Brain Science Podcast), it took them that 
much time to arrive at a mutual language, one that would have traction in both 
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neuroscience and philosophy.130 Questions of agency drove their investigation. If 
the mind and body were determined by autonomic, inherited micro-processes how 
could people be held accountable for their actions? To address this question, 
Murphy and Brown delineated their theoretical framework of reductive 
materialism. In reductive materialism, which describes traditional neuroscience, 
the parts are seen to determine the behaviours of the whole. Conversely, the 
authors explained, in non-reductive materialism the behaviours of the parts are 
determined by the structures of the system in which they function.131 Murphy and 
Brown’s formulation was very similar to Buck-Morss’ synaesthetic system in that 
it situated the brain and body in ongoing feedback relations with the world. 
Conventional neuroscientific models described the brain as functioning much like 
a mechanical device; sensory input entered through the body, was registered in 
the “lower” levels of the brain, and then travelled “upward” synaptically to the 
cerebral cortex where it eventually transformed into a conscious perception. This 
linear model was in many ways an heuristic tool, because the synaptic activity 
was not uni-directional. During a perceptual event, there was constant feedback in 
the brain, with as many, if not more, signals simultaneously coming “downward” 
through the system. Nevertheless, the neuroscientific study of isolated neural 
processes tends to emphasise a bottom-up, linear chain of events. Murphy and 
Brown argued for a model of top-down causation, but by this they did not mean to 
invert the bottom up model – which would infer causation on conscious processes 
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and imply that human thoughts determine human behaviour. Rather, they argue 
for a different kind of model altogether.  
A word on terminology. While “top-down causation” and 
“downward causation” are the appropriate contrastive terms to 
“bottom-up causation,” and while these are the terms currently 
used in the literature, they are, unfortunately, open to 
misinterpretation. This happens when one forgets that “higher” in 
this context refers to two systems, S and S’, where S’ is said to be a 
higher order system because it incorporates S and relates S to its 
environment; in other words, because it includes S and the effect 
on S of boundary conditions not themselves constituent of S. The 
discussions of downward causation in philosophy of mind usually 
fail to take this into account. Mental properties are said to 
supervene on brain properties, diagrams are drawn with the mental 
properties above the brain properties, and then the question is 
posed as to how the mental property “up there” can influence the 
brain property “down here.” ... our account of the mental in terms 
of a brain event in context is in fact that it precipitates in a broader, 
more complex causal or semantic system.132  
 
The top-down causation they invoked was not a matter of one kind of neural 
process driving another, but instead the complex dynamics of an entire system, 
including the body, the environments the body engages and the knowledges the 
body and brain accrue over time. “All organisms,” they explained, “all biology, 
are in continuous feedback relation with the environment.”133 All forms of 
cognition, Murphy and Brown implied, were extensive with embodied experience.  
While Murphy and Brown mined the interdisciplinarity of their 
collaboration to advance their notion of neural feedback, Brian Massumi similarly 
formulated interdisciplinary connections with neuroscience to propose resonant 
feedback between the brain, body and world as the process giving rise to affect. 
He provided a benchmark definition of affect in his 2002 book Parables for the 
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Virtual. Like Haraway and Latour, Massumi was concerned with the extent to 
which postmodern theory had engendered considerations of nature as a purely 
discursive construct. He nevertheless eschewed a romantic return to human 
nature, and, similar to Haraway and Latour, proposed instead the theorization of a 
nature-culture continuum. His goal, however, was not to restructure the 
epistemological paradigms of science, but to encourage the humanities into a 
negotiation with science in order that the humanities may better articulate their 
own particular strengths.134 Influenced by Gilles Deleuze, Massumi adopted a 
show-don’t-tell writing style, meaning that his writing itself performed discursive 
experimentation at the interstices of cross-disciplinary boundaries. For Massumi, 
the as-yet-undefined sites of in-betweeness offered the most generative 
possibilities for theorizing perceptual experience. Affect, then, comprised an 
embodied state of in between, equated with physical states of intensity. Massumi 
distinguished affect from emotion, suggesting that the former was not subjective, 
but rather resided in “autonomic” and “nonconscious” processes.135 Affect, for 
Massumi was a state of potential, a moment between incipient action and action in 
which all myriad potential expressions were present. For Massumi, then, the 
virtual realm of potential gave affect its autonomy, implying a possibility of 
escape from local conditions. In this way, he reformulated constructivist 
contingency as a material phenomenon. Nature, he proposed, need not be 
understood as a cultural construct nor as transcendent to culture, but simply as 
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nature. Rather than collapsing nature/culture dichotomies, Massumi argued for 
the autonomy of affect as a means of acknowledging nature on its own terms.  
In arguing for the autonomy of affect as a nonconscious phenomenon, 
Massumi drew on the neuroscientific bottom-up model of mind, as proposed 
specifically by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet who suggested that the seemingly 
agential dimension of “higher-order” conscious processes, such as volition, was 
an illusion produced by the deterministic behaviour of automatic processes 
triggered in the brain.136 Here, I find Massumi’s invocation of neuroscience 
troubling because, while his approach was more nuanced and informed than 
Onians, he nevertheless similarly drew on neuroscience as a means of pitting 
natural processes and cultural discourse in opposition to one another; associating 
nature with mechanistic bodily functions as construed by science, as if science 
itself were not itself a discursive, cultural process.137 Massumi invoked 
neuroscientific models as an alternative to social constructivism, conflating nature 
with science, and thus inadvertently reinforcing nature/culture dichotomies rather 
than radically troubling them as Latour, Haraway and Barad have done.     
At the same time, however, Massumi’s formulation of affect did posit 
perception as a reciprocal process, similar to Murphy and Brown’s model of mind 
as a system of feedback relations with the world. He situated affect as a 
contingent, interstitial concept, drawing on from theories of consciousness that 
refuse the Cartesian dualism of the mind/body split.  
 [V]olition, cognition, and presumably other “higher” functions 
usually presumed to be in the mind, figured as a mysterious 
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container of mental entities that is somehow separate from body 
and brain, are present and active in that now not-so- “raw” domain. 
Resonation assumes feedback. [...] The body doesn’t just absorb 
pulses or discrete stimulations; it infolds contexts, it infolds 
volitions and cognitions that are nothing if not situated. Intensity is 
asocial but not presocial...138 
 
For Massumi, affect was of the body, but the body also entailed mind – thus he 
understood the entire organism to be entangled in ongoing relation with its 
natural/cultural contexts. 
Furthermore, Massumi wrote in a different disciplinary context from 
Latour, Haraway, and Barad; it makes sense that the materialist aspects of 
experience would need to be asserted more emphatically in the field of cultural 
studies, where discourse prevails, than in the field of science studies where the 
normative materialism of science comes under critique. As Massumi asserted, 
“part of the idea is to put the humanities in a position of having continually to 
renegotiate their relations with the sciences – and, in the process, to rearticulate 
what is unique to their own capacities (what manner of affects they can 
transmit.)”139 I would assert, however, that Massumi’s emphasis on science as the 
authority on nature does both science and the humanities a disservice. Massumi 
suggested that “the humanities need the sciences...a lot more than the sciences 
need the humanities.”140 It is certainly true that art theorists pose questions to 
scientists more frequently than scientists approach art theorists for information, 
but this may indicate that people in the humanities are by and large well aware of 
their need for the sciences, while scientists tend to isolate themselves from other 
disciplines, thereby limiting the kinds of questions that science deems worthy of 
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investigation. Neuroaesthetics is an exceptional field because some 
neuroscientists, such as Zeki, have opened up their investigations to new 
challenges posed by artworks, even if they are not yet fully engaged in reciprocal 
conversation with art theorists. In any case, for a truly entangled understanding of 
natural/cultural processes, it should not be necessary to ascribe primacy to one 
side or the other. One approach I would like to assert is to consider the affects of 
artworks as part of a collective assemblage of communication.   
While Massumi posited affect as a material dimension of the perceptual 
process, he did not directly address it in the context of aesthetics. Jennifer Fisher, 
however, has made a feminist argument for considering affect as an embodied 
dimension of aesthetic engagement. In her 2006 essay “Exhibitionary Affect,” she 
asserted that affect is “distinct from individually felt emotion,” in that it 
“consolidates collectively sensed singularities of feeling.”141 By emphasising the 
collective nature of affects, Fisher described embodied art experience as 
inherently relational, thus avoiding essentialist notions of nature. As she explained 
in an earlier essay on haptic aesthetics, 
 The aesthetic can be understood, first, as a relational form, one 
which can account for the connections attendant in processes of 
identification, social affiliation and discursive practice; and 
second, as involving sensory mediation of social states and cultural 
formations.142  
 
Fisher has refused dichotomies which would champion either culture or nature as 
the privileged zone of aesthetic experience; instead, she has emphasized how 
affect, in part, operates as a material manifestation of collectively experienced 
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intensities. Her work demonstrates that art, considered in art contexts, can 
facilitate viable forms of knowledge about embodied experience. 
Affect operates as a contingent, interstitial concept, in part because the 
term is derived from theories of consciousness that refuse the Cartesian dualism 
of the mind/body split. Massumi’s invocation of feedback suggested that while he 
considered affect to be of the body, that body also entailed mind. In resonance 
with Murphy and Brown, Massumi situated the entire organism in ongoing 
relation with its natural/cultural contexts. 
 If I repeat myself in over-stating the importance of resisting culture/nature 
dichotomies, I do so because such dualisms are tenacious, as Murphy and Brown 
have identified. 
We [the authors] constantly need to remind ourselves (as well as 
our readers) that mental phenomena pertain to the entire person, 
both brain and body, in social relations (at least, past social 
relations if not present ones), and active (at least at times) in the 
physical world. This is easier said than done – we are as much 
children of Descartes as are our readers.143 
 
Cartesian dualism would isolate the body as a natural organism, from the mind’s 
association with social and cultural spheres. In this dissertation, I draw support 
from Murphy and Brown in formulating a neuroaesthetic methodology that 
positions nature and culture as co-constitutive spheres of influence in art 
experience. Notions of feedback invoked by Murphy and Brown and Massumi 
resonate with Buck-Morss’ synaesthetic system, situating the body in ongoing 
reciprocal relation with its environment. At times in this dissertation I will invoke 
findings from neuroscientific experiments, not to explain how the natural brain 
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gives rise to cultural constructs in the mind, but rather to demonstrate how 
cultural experiences can emerge, in part, as physiological processes enacted in the 
body. Thus, I aim to activate neuroaesthetics in the analysis of specific artworks 
to demonstrate that even cognitive processes derived from collective cultural 
interactions constitute material processes of engagement between body, brain and 
world. 
 
Art and the Brain 
As this chapter may have implied, both art and the brain are strangely elusive and 
ineffable objects of investigation. In order to consider either, researchers must 
contend with collapsing and oscillating distinctions between subject and object. 
By bringing art and the brain together, neuroaesthetics reveals deep theoretical 
questions about the co-constitution of body and mind inherent to both 
neuroscience and art history. The brief public clash between Ramachandran and 
Gombrich, for example, reveals a difference of opinion about perception that is 
not necessarily commensurate with disciplinary difference. For instance, art 
historian Onians might agree with Ramachandran that perception is essentially a 
predetermined, passive process, while neuroscientist Zeki might be more 
sympathetic with Gombrich’s art historical understanding of perception as an 
active negotiation with the world. Neuroscience and art history have very 
different methodological obligations and epistemological conditions, but this does 
not mean that the two disciplines are necessarily in opposition, just that their 
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modes of knowing are differently constructed and constrained. As neuroscientists 
and art historians increasingly engage in the interdisciplinary field of 
neuroaesthetics, researchers are challenged to develop more comprehensive 
understandings of the histories and contingencies conditioning one another’s 
disciplinary knowledge claims. 
 As I have shown in the first two sections of this chapter, the privileging of 
nonconscious over conscious neural processes driven by neuroscience in the 
neuroaesthetic literature resonates with an art historical polemic between 
discursive constructions and material investigations, formulated by Moxey as a 
contemporary scholarly turn away from representation and toward the presence of 
artworks. Both of these dichotomies are informed and troubled by the art 
historical investigations of Didi-Huberman and Krauss each of whom argued for 
embodied modes of knowing as constituent dimensions of reasoned analysis. 
Buck-Morss’ synaesthetic system operates here as a conceptual hub, and I rely on 
her articulation of the nervous system as an active and socially inflected 
perceptual entity in my proposition that a robust neuroaesthetic methodology can 
insist on the mutual co-constitution of body, mind and collective culture without 
ascribing hierarchical causality to any one sphere.  
 I have situated neuroaesthetics in the context of interdisciplinary 
frameworks established by Latour, Haraway and Barad each of whom collapsed 
distinctions between nature and culture in his or her refusal to confer priority over 
either material experience or discourse. I find Barad’s assertion that “[t]he 
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entangled practices of knowing and being are material practices”144 particularly 
helpful for highlighting the interconnectedness of knowledge and existence while 
at the same time emphasising that both emerge as physical manifestation. Finally, 
notions of feedback between body, mind and world emerging from both 
neuroscience and affect theory flesh out the interdisciplinary breadth of research 
on embodied experience that informs neuroaesthetic inquiry.   
  While the interdisciplinary range of this dissertation is vast, I believe that 
projects of this scope are critically necessary for neuroaesthetics to flourish. 
Unless the field’s own interdisciplinarity can be queried and addressed, 
neuroaesthetics may flounder as a hodgepodge collection of reductive attempts to 
explain how the brain causes and determines art experience. Art historical interest 
in neuroaesthetics may have been kick-started, to some extent, by a cultural 
pendulum swing away from postmodern linguistic theory. But material reality is 
not a back-lash, and culture itself is also manifest in the physical morphology of 
organisms. Interdisciplinary thinkers such as Barad, Haraway, and Buck-Morss 
are uncompromising in their insistence that an embrace of material reality does 
not constitute an escape from cultural contingency. Artworks and art audiences, as 
it happens, are also expert at performing material manifestations within 
indeterminate contexts of shifting and infinitely variable conditions.  
 In this chapter, I have convened a constellation of thinkers to establish the 
interdisciplinary standpoint from which I will conduct my neuroaesthetic case 
studies in Chapters Three to Six. In Chapter Two, which follows this one, I will 
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report on field research into neuroscientific experimental methodologies, laying 
groundwork for my theorization that artworks in art contexts can facilitate 
neuroaesthetic modes of knowing that augment and sometimes challenge 
neuroaesthetic knowledges produced by neuroscientific means. •  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  93 
End Notes to Chapter One 
                                                
1 My goal is not to translate various disciplinary knowledge claims into a common set of terms. 
For example, as a practicing curator and art theorist, my disciplinary obligations, in Stengers’ 
terms, are different from those of neuroscientists, and I would misrepresent each epistemology if I 
tried to suggest that we share identical research questions within a singular frame of reference. 
Rather, I propose that effective communication occurs when researchers acknowledge and respect 
disciplinary differences. By bringing together texts from disparate disciplines, I aim to reveal how 
diverse researchers on embodied knowledge can challenge and extend one another’s inquiries 
without demanding strict adherence to any single paradigm.  
 In embracing disciplinary difference, I am influenced by philosopher of science Isabelle 
Stengers who advocates an “ecology of practices” in which “no practice be defined as ‘like any 
other.’” (Stengers, 184) As Stengers explains, “... the ‘ecology of practices’ first implies that 
whatever its goodwill, its practitioners will not cross the border of the practice it addresses without 
a transformation of the intention and the aim of the address, what is often called a 
misunderstanding.” (Stengers, 189) Writing partly in response to the Science Wars of the 1990s, 
she acknowledges that the postmodern claim that “physics is a social practice like any other” was 
insulting to physicists who understandably frame their discipline as a result of specific, local sets 
of “obligations” that other practices do not share. (Stengers, 190) Drawing from Stengers, I 
attempt, to the best of my abilities, to address the knowledges produced by neuro- and cognitive 
science within their own disciplinary frames of reference. See, Isabelle Stengers, “Introductory 
Notes on an Ecology of Practices,” Cultural Studies Review 11, no. 1, (March 2005): 183-196. 
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(New York : Plume, 2007). 
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contributor, with Ellen Dissayanake, to the anthology Neuroaesthetics. See, Steven Brown and 
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Neuroaesthetics (Amityville: Baywood Publishing Company, Inc., 2009). 
 
 
3 V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein, “The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of 
Aesthetic Experience,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 8, no. 6-7 (1999): 15. 
 
 
4 After receiving negative criticism for the paper he co-authored with Hirstein in 1999, 
Ramachandran published a follow-up interview in which he makes the following confession. 
“We mainly did it for fun. Also we hoped the essay would serve to generate a 
useful dialogue between artists, neuroscientists, perceptual psychologists and art 
historians — to bridge C.P. Snow’s two cultures. The article was intended to be 
whimsical, provocative and slightly tongue-in-cheek, and to serve as a starting 
point — it certainly wasn’t intended to be a complete theory of art (even 
assuming there is such a thing!).” See, V.S. Ramachandran, “Sharpening up The 
Science of Art: An Interview with Anthony Freeman,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, (2000): 9. 
Ramachandran and Hirstein certainly succeeded in starting a debate, and their controversial paper 
introduced the concept of neuroaesthetics with a bang.  
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Limitations and Possibilities for Art Research in the Neuro-Imaging Lab 
 
In the previous chapter I situated key works from the neuroaesthetic literature within a 
larger interdisciplinary context of research on embodied knowledge, laying the 
groundwork for a neuroaesthetic methodology that considers how artworks in art contexts 
can facilitate neuroaesthetic knowledge. This chapter will focus on the methodological 
constraints of neuro-imaging experiment design and examine how the epistemological 
conditions of the neuroscience lab impact neuroaesthetic research.  
 I will begin by discussing a few of the most sensational fMRI (functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging) experiments reported in mass media, with the aim of 
unpacking some of the popular myths about brain scans. Next, I will describe the 
mechanics of the MRI scanner and neuro-imaging experiment design, drawing from my 
own first-hand experiences as a volunteer subject in an fMRI study at Sunnybrook 
Hospital in Toronto, information I learned while auditing a course on fMRI taught by 
Keith Schneider in the Department of Biology at York University, as well as my own 
independent research on the workings of MRI scanners and the methodologies of neuro-
imaging experiment design. My goal here is to demystify the brain scan and provide 
readers with some working knowledge of neuro-imaging methods. During his course, 
Schneider explained that while some neuroscientists may leave the physics of neuro-
imaging up to technicians, researchers need a basic understanding of how the MRI 
scanner works in order to design effective experiments. Since much of the neuroaesthetic 
research emerging from neuroscience labs involves MRI, it is my feeling that basic 
information about the technology may also benefit neuroaesthetic researchers in art and 
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art history who wish to engage their neuroscientific colleagues across disciplines. Once I 
have laid out some of the mechanical issues inherent to MRI, I will explore some of the 
critical practices that neuroscientists engage to hold one another accountable to the claims 
they make based on fMRI evidence. I will conclude with a critical analysis of a specific 
fMRI experiment in neuroaesthetics, conducted by neuroscientist Ulrich Kirk and a team 
of researchers. My goal in this chapter is not to debunk or belittle the neuroaesthetic 
findings of neuroscientists, but rather to explicate and unpack some of their 
methodologies in order to better understand how art works, considered in art contexts, 
can facilitate different modes of knowledge from those produced in the lab and thus 
contribute meaningfully to the growing collective body of interdisciplinary 
neuroaesthetic research.  
 
Some Sensational fMRI Applications 
As with microscopes and x-rays before them, MRI scanners are historically loaded 
symbols in society, culturally imbued with the seemingly clairvoyant power of medical 
science to look inside the human body. Neuroscientists, according to popular myth, can 
deploy their magical machines to divine people’s inner thoughts and feelings. In truth, 
most neuroscientists who use MRI are engaged in an ongoing process of collective 
critical assessment of the limitations on the kinds of knowledge their experiments can 
actually produce. Unfortunately, this negotiated and contingent dimension of 
neuroscience remains largely unavailable to lay people, who are much more likely to 
encounter the sensational claims exaggerated by journalists than the nuanced and critical 
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debates that occur within the discipline.1 As a friend of mine – a political activist and 
professor of sociology – put it recently, “It certainly seems like neuroscientists can look 
right in and read our minds.” Her comment, made during a casual chat on a crowded city 
bus, reflects a cultural anxiety about the conflation of technoscience with surveillance, a 
fear that neuroscientists may become thought police who will exploit the private inner 
feelings of individual citizens in the service of capitalism and/or state control. This fear is 
by no means unfounded. News stories abound about the use of MRI scanners as lie 
detectors,2 as a means of uncovering how consumers really feel about advertisements,3 
how voters really feel about political candidates4 and as tools for recording people’s 
dreams.5 With these kinds of message about MRI circulating in the media, it is no wonder 
that cultural anxiety about the authoritative position neuroscience has been growing. 
 An American company called No Lie MRI claims to provide “unbiased methods 
for the detection of deception and other information stored in the brain.”6 Another 
company, FKF, deploys MRI to provide consumer research to fortune 500 companies. 
Their tagline reads, “Find out the difference between what consumers say and what they 
are really thinking.”7 This kind of application of MRI technology is not only ethically 
dubious, it is also regarded sceptically by the majority of the neuroscience community. 
As fMRI researcher and cognitive scientist Edward Vul told Wired Magazine, it is very 
easy for a subject to sabotage any kind of scan, including lie detection, just by “moving a 
little, holding your breath, or even thinking about a bunch of random stuff.”8 According 
to cognitive scientist Adam Anderson at the University of Toronto, FKF’s claims are 
overstated because brain scans can only reveal which parts of the brain are engaged at 
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given moments in time. The emotional states associated with specific regions of the brain 
have been explored and hypothesized but they have not been reliably determined.9 
Usually in experimental design, the subject’s state of mind is induced or self-reported, 
and the brain areas that activate during fMRI are then correlated with the presumed 
emotions. So for FKF to claim that they can tell what someone’s inner state is by looking 
at what part of the brain is activated represents a classic error of mistaking correlation for 
causation. Anderson is not alone in his criticisms, and neuroscience blogs are rife with 
FKF detractors.10 Nevertheless, the media hook that scientists might read people’s minds 
proves irresistible to journalists, and so stories like these tend to make the headlines. 
 While certain sensational claims made by companies like No Lie MRI and FKF 
are easy to debunk because their methodologies are considered weak by other 
neuroscientists, fMRI is nevertheless a powerful and effective tool. For example, a 
sensational report11 that spawned the Fox News headline “Mind-Reading Experiment 
Reconstructs Movies in Our Mind”12 was the product of methodologically rigorous and 
accountable research. The headline was misleading, but only slightly. By showing movies 
to subjects and recording neural activity in the visual areas of their brains, the Gallant 
Lab at Berkeley compiled a large database of correlations between certain patterns of 
neural activations and certain formal elements of moving images. These neuroscientists 
also compiled an enormous database of moving images (using raw material from 
YouTube) with visual elements that strongly correlated with their database of neural 
activations. Experiments involved showing a subject a video, scanning their brain for 
visual activations, correlating the data with images in the YouTube database, then playing 
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back composite movies that bore significant resemblance to the movies that the subjects 
had originally been shown.13 Thus, researchers were indeed able to reliably decode 
patterns of neural activation and translate them into moving images. Now that a robust 
database has been compiled, the research findings imply that future experiments may be 
able to decode subjects’ dreams.     
 However, while the Fox News headline suggests that this process constitutes 
“mind reading” the researchers themselves make no such claim.  
While our computational models of some cortical visual areas perform 
well, they do not perform well when used to decode activity in other parts 
of the brain. A better understanding of the processing that occurs in parts 
of the brain beyond visual cortex (e.g. parietal cortex, frontal cortex) will 
be required before it will be possible to decode other aspects of human 
experience.14 
 
Compared to other areas of the brain, the vision areas have been mapped in 
comprehensive detail. The visual activations recorded here – as compared with a complex 
neural process such as lying, for example – represent non-conscious neural processes that 
take place within well defined spatial locations in the brain. Visual processing is 
particularly suited to fMRI experiment.15 The project has been designed to 
mechanistically record and mechanistically reproduce only the most mechanistic aspects 
of visual processing, not to read the subjects’ minds.  
 Nevertheless, the implications of this research are enormous. Right now, the 
experimental validation lies in the fact that the movies produced through correlation 
match up with the movies that the subjects were shown as stimuli. If a subject’s vision 
centres were to be scanned in the absence of a visual stimulus, and matched to the 
YouTube database, the resulting movie might represent the subject’s internal 
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representations, but there would be no experimental proof except for self-report, which is 
generally considered unreliable. These are the conditions under which the Gallant Lab’s 
databases and experimental methods could be taken up and applied as a mind-reading 
device, and like the work of No Lie MRI and FKF, this would begin to border on pseudo-
science. While the Gallant Lab researchers are explicit about the limitations of their 
methodology, their project nevertheless taps into cultural desires and anxieties about the 
power of technoscience to see inside the human mind, and thus makes for top news 
headlines. Unfortunately, the popular conception of MRI as a mind-reading machine 
precedes the publication of neuroscientific reports – reports biased by mind-reading 
connotations in the media spin – depriving a general readership of the opportunity to 
engage in negotiations about the critical and ethical boundaries of fMRI research. The 
implication for neuroaesthetics is that researchers operating outside the discipline of 
neuroscience may be dazzled by such sensationalised news stories to the extent that they 
imbue neuroscience with an absolute authority to underwrite and explain the findings of 
their own disciplinary practice. A more nuanced understanding of neuro-imaging 
methodology can foster the criticality necessary for truly reciprocal interdisciplinary 
communication and research.  
 
Getting Inside the Scanner: How it Works  
In order to formulate my own epistemological standpoint of perception regarding 
neuroscience – based in sensorial, relational and aesthetic experience – I volunteered for 
an fMRI at Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto (Fig.1). I wanted to explore first-hand how it 
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felt to be a neuroscientific test subject, and I wanted an embodied experience of the 
aesthetic environment inside the scanner itself. In addition, I somewhat narcissistically 
desired an image of my own brain, and this reward was prominently promised on the 
poster calling for volunteers. There were two types of brain scan conducted in the 
experiment and I signed up for both. The first was an MRI scan, which creates a static, 
high resolution anatomical image of the brain and takes a long time to record (Fig. 2). 
The second was an fMRI scan. An fMRI scan is a low resolution image of activities (the 
“f” stands for “functional”) in the brain that take place over very short periods of time. 
fMRI scans often comprise a sequence of trials, in order to show changes in brain activity 
over a period of time, stimulated by the subject’s performance of a specific task. The low 
resolution data from fMRI scans – represented in images as pixellated areas of bright 
colour – are usually mapped onto high resolution anatomical MRI scans prior to 
publication (Fig. 3).  
 Up until the 1970s, MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) was called NMR 
(Nuclear Magnetic Resonance). MRI does not produce radiation, but the technology does 
use nuclear physics to manipulate the tissues of the brain at the subatomic level. Fig. 1 is 
a picture of me just prior to being inserted in the scanner. The big circular bore of the 
scanner contains a very powerful magnet (so powerful, in fact, that there is a very real 
danger of metal objects being sucked in, potentially damaging the machine or even 
injuring the person inside). The bore emits a constant, static magnetic field. When a 
person’s head is inserted into the scanner, the magnet causes the protons in the hydrogen 
atoms in the tissues of her brain to spin together in alignment with the magnetic field.  
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 Fig. 1 also shows the head coil, a cylindrical cage-like object just inside the bore 
of the scanner that produces radio frequency (RF) magnetic pulses, directed 
perpendicular to the constant magnetic field of the bore. The RF field can be turned on 
and off very quickly. Once the protons in the brain are synchronised by the static 
magnetic field, RF pulses flip them into different spins, or higher energy states. When the 
RF pulse is switched off, the protons gradually come back into alignment, a lower energy 
state. The process of realignment, called “precession,” releases energy in the form of a 
photon. The scanner also has a set of RF detector coils that record the photons as they are 
released. The energy emitted is the same as the energy that was induced by the RF coil, 
and comprises the signal that is used to produce an image. This signal, captured by the 
scanner, consists of raw data which is sent to a computer running specialised software. 
Different protons in different tissues precess at different rates, and so the various areas of 
the brain can be differentiated from one another mathematically, and then translated into 
an image.  
 After the technician took my picture, she gave me earplugs and had me lie down 
flat on my back. Pads were jammed in tightly around my head to hold it in position. Once 
my body had been fixed in place, the table began to move slowly, sliding me into the 
scanner. My head slid inside the RF coil, part of which I could see about an inch and a 
half in front of my nose. As mentioned in the introduction, the audio environment inside 
the scanner was extremely jarring. The cooling system required to keep the main magnet 
conducting produced a slow rhythmic chugging sound, while the expansion and 
contraction of the RF coils produced a loud and penetrating grinding noise. At the time, I 
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had not yet done the research to understand where the sounds were coming from. The 
combination of close confinement and audio barrage made me feel helpless and 
disoriented. I was resolved to endure the full two hours required to record the anatomical 
MRI scan, so my only recourse was to try and calm my racing heart. I finally became 
acclimatised enough to relax. Eventually I managed to fall asleep while the powerful 
magnetic fields manipulated sub-atomic particles in my brain.  
 Oddly enough, when the scan was complete I felt strangely invigorated and 
refreshed. As I went to the change room to get dressed, however, I passed a pale and 
nervous-looking woman in a hospital gown waiting for her session in the scanner. I was 
suddenly struck with a sense of how lucky I was to be a volunteer test subject as opposed 
to a patient. Furthermore, compared to many people who volunteer for science, I was not 
motivated by money, but by my own research interests. Had I been undergoing a two-
hour scan for medical reasons, I’m sure it would have been impossible for me to attain 
such a pleasant state of relaxation. 
 Days later, I returned to the lab at Sunnybrook Hospital for an fMRI scan. This 
experience transpired quite differently. An fMRI scan produces digital images 
representing three dimensional space. Just as a pixel comprises the smallest unit in a two-
dimensional digital image, a voxel is the smallest three-dimensional unit in a digital fMRI 
scan – a small cube of space plotted in the subject’s brain. In order to delineate a voxel, 
the scanner must be programmed to record frequencies within a specified area of length, 
width and height. As only one RF signal emits from the scanner, the process of 
determining these three axes requires a complicated methodology. The magnetic fields 
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produced by the scanner are gradient, meaning that the strength of the frequencies 
diminishes along a spatial continuum. When someone’s brain is inserted into the field, 
the signal will be stronger at some locations in the brain, and progressively weaker in 
others. Thus, experimenters can correlate specific frequencies in the field with specific 
brain regions. In fMRI, experimenters isolate a “slice” of the brain by setting the head 
coil to only activate the specified range of frequencies that corresponds with desired 
spatial locations. This “excitation pulse” produces one of the three required dimensions. 
The other two dimensions are determined by processes called frequency and phase 
encoding. For frequency encoding, another gradient field is introduced, running 
perpendicular to the excitation pulse. This means that the differences in proton spin can 
be measured throughout the vertical dimension of the slice. The third dimension is 
established temporally. For pulse encoding, researchers apply yet another field in short 
bursts, or pulses, causing the protons to align. When the pulse is turned off the protons 
“precess” out of phase and transmit an RF frequency to the detector coils. The software 
then applies a mathematical process called the “Fourier Transform” to break the signal 
down into the relevant component frequencies. A three dimensional voxel has now been 
delineated.  
 Once the technicians had inserted me into the scanner for the fMRI scan, they 
placed two key pads with buttons into my hands, down by my thighs, so that I could 
perform a task that would stimulate activity in the right and left hemispheres of my brain. 
Again lying immobilised on my back, I looked upward through a periscope through 
which I could see a screen, set up at my feet, where the visual component of the task was 
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displayed. I couldn’t close my eyes and drift off to sleep this time and the process became 
a surreal experience of disembodied interaction. I almost immediately began to feel as if 
the images on the screen were projected right inside my head. Targets, simple computer 
graphics that I was asked to focus on, appeared and disappeared on the right and left sides 
of the screen, and it came to seem as if the images were actual manifestations of the right 
and left hemispheres of my brain. Confined and immobilized, the task became strangely 
immersive, as if responding to visual targets was now, and had always been, my entire 
life’s purpose. Eventually, however, my thoughts began to stray. 
 Initially my thoughts were gloomy, as I mentioned in the introduction, but 
eventually I was able to remind myself that I was inside the scanner by choice and free to 
leave. I decided to let my mind play over the situation. What kind of mental life would I 
have, I wondered, if I was a creature who had only ever been in this situation, always 
performing these actions, always seeing these images, hearing these sounds, and hardly 
ever moving at all. Would I begin to experience rich depth in the details of my 
environment? How would my brain networks change as a result of the constant left-right 
staring and clicking? Of course none of these musings had any bearing on the task-
induced activity in my brain that was relevant to the researchers. I was told by the 
technician that the button pushing was designed to activate my motor areas, the staring 
was for my vision areas, and the thinking about what to push was for decision making. 
While I was aware that my brain was under surveillance, I was also aware that the 
thoughts and feelings that mattered to me most were in no danger of being logged and 
classified.  
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 While anatomical MRI scans record different tissue structures in the brain, fMRI 
scans record changes in blood flow. In technical terms, fMRI measures the “blood-
oxygen-level dependent” or BOLD effect. Neuronal activity requires energy, and blood 
provides the fuel, so blood will concentrate in areas of the brain that are busy and 
engaged. The network of veins and arteries is extremely fine and precise so the 
vasculature itself doesn't limit the resolution of the scan. The BOLD effect manifests as a 
signature shape in the RF frequency, detected through the process of Fourier Transform 
that breaks the signal down into useful components of information.   
 In fMRI experiment design, researchers must predetermine the resolution of the 
data they want to record, and in doing so, they must take careful account of the signal to 
noise ratio. The amount of useful signal they can receive from the scanner is limited by 
the time scale of the BOLD response (this temporal limit was one of the biggest 
challenges that the Gallant Lab had to overcome when recording visual activations 
caused by moving images). Also, blood pooling in nearby veins outside the area of 
interest can cause signal noise when it recedes. Thus, resolution is a balancing act. The 
smaller the voxels, the more precisely researchers can localise the effects, but the signal 
will be weaker because there is less blood to measure per unit. A strong signal is 
important because there can be a lot of noise, but a strong signal may also result from 
noise. Head movements cause noise, as well as inconsistencies in the magnetic field 
caused by the scanner itself, the morphology of the person's brain, and inconsistencies in 
the blood. It's very easy to get false positives. So the size of the voxels needs to be large 
enough that there is a strong signal, but small enough for the signal to be relevant. In 
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addition, different neural activities take varying amounts of time, so experimenters also 
need to consider how long the activation signal will be, based on what kind of activation 
they are trying to stimulate. Brain processes that unfold over long periods of time, such as 
certain kinds of memory, are difficult to record with fMRI.  
 Every human brain is unique in size and shape. Therefore, some noise also enters 
into the data when researchers combine information from different subjects together into 
one set, or image. As I mentioned earlier, because fMRI data must be captured quickly, it 
arrives at a much lower resolution than anatomical MRI data. If the final image 
represents one subject, the activations from fMRI will usually be mapped onto an 
anatomical scan from that individual. But most studies use multiple subjects. In this case, 
thresholds must be set for what counts as fMRI activation in order to correct for head 
movements and eliminate other noise. The little coloured areas representing neural 
activity in most fMRI scans represent an average of neural activity across a number of 
subjects. Because everyone’s brain is a different shape, the points of neural activity need 
to be ‘normalized’ and mapped together to fit a standard model. One of the most common 
ways to create an fMRI image is to re-map the data onto a standardized brain space, 
collectively utilized by researchers in the field. Thus, the brightly coloured regions in 
fMRI brain scans commonly used as illustrations on websites and in magazines often 
represent data from a group of subjects, averaged, normalised and plotted onto an 
underlying image of a single brain.  
 Several days after I had completed my sessions in the scanner, a researcher from 
Sunnybrook emailed me a jpeg image of my brain (Fig.3). After the intensity of my 
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experiences in the scanner, was excited and eager to see the scan. Like many souvenirs, 
however, when it finally arrived it was somewhat disappointing – as an image it seemed 
disconnected from my experience, remote and uninteresting. I have tried to make artwork 
with the image, digitally animating it with some success, but no matter how much I 
manipulate my brain scan, I fail to feel a personal connection with it. I stare at it and 
think, “that’s my brain,” which triggers no emotional response at all. I don’t love or hate 
it, and I do not find it fascinating. If the scan was diagnostic, I expect I would feel 
invested in it as a representation of my own anatomy with implications for my future. As 
it is, however, the notes that I took on my experiences have much more emotional 
resonance as vivid records of the events that transpired.  
 
Neuroscientific Criticality and Accountability  
fMRI images carry a great deal of authority when they are published in magazines and 
websites. To a lay person, they can read as direct, photographic documentation of neural 
activity. It is helpful for researchers who wish to engage critically with neuroscience to 
understand the extent to which those images have been constructed. At this point, I want 
to attach Latour’s connotation on my use of the word “constructed,” and make it clear 
that while an image may have been heavily mediated and painstakingly assembled, these 
steps in no way makes it an arbitrary or meaningless artifact. For all the manipulation that 
goes into the construction of brain scans, they do represent information about the 
workings of the human brain. An awareness of the constructed nature of fMRI scans does 
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not disqualify them as evidence of scientific facts, rather it enables one to engage more 
deeply by making critical distinctions between them.  
 As mentioned above, neuro-imaging researchers face many decisions when 
setting the parameters for measurement, and they must make even more decisions about 
what kinds of statistical filters to apply to the data after it has been collected. The signal 
to noise ratio is very tight (often there is more noise than signal), so without careful data 
analysis noise can easily register as signal, leading researchers to create compelling but 
misleading images suggesting neural activity where there is none. The noise/signal 
problem of fMRI was highlighted in a very amusing, and critical report by neuroscientist 
Craig Bennett in his first year of graduate work. As part of a routine calibration 
procedure, Bennett and his team used a dead salmon as a control subject in an fMRI 
experiment. He explained as follows. 
For our first attempt we scanned a pumpkin. During the next pilot testing 
session Abby brought in a Cornish game hen to be scanned. This really 
upped the ante, as we had now put a dead bird into the head coil. When 
pondering our next step the comment was made: “we should scan a whole 
fish.”16  
 
When the scan showed signs of brain activity in the dead salmon, the researchers decided 
to publish their results. They wrote up a report and presented it at the Human Brain 
Mapping conference in San Francisco. Bennett also wrote about the project on his blog 
and the story became an internet sensation. While some people, according to Bennett, 
took the report to mean that “the dead fish is actually still thinking or that we have 
observed evidence of the ethereal soul,”17 the actual point of the report was to emphasize 
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that it is easy to get false positives from fMRI if statistical corrections are not properly 
applied to the data. As Bennett explained on his blog, 
The more I think about the affair the more I believe that the fish has the 
chance to impact the field of neuroimaging in a very positive way. 
Predefined significance thresholds with a specified cluster extent are a 
weak control to the problem of false positives in imaging data. 
Statisticians and methods researchers have argued about the need for 
multiple comparisons correction for some time. In just one figure the 
salmon data illustrates exactly why we need stronger controls for the false 
positive problem in fMRI. I hope it finds a good home in an open-minded 
journal.18 
 
In the field of neuroscience, researchers examine one another’s methodologies and 
experiment design very critically. The methodology sections of neuroscience papers are 
extremely technical, and it would be too much to ask that art theorists and historians 
develop the expertise to understand them thoroughly. However, for effective cross 
disciplinary dialogue, it is useful to understand the contingent nature of neuroscientific 
information.  
 Compared to physics or biology, neuroscience is a young field and 
neuroaesthetics is even younger. Neuroaesthetic researchers such as Zeki, Skov, Brown 
and Dissanayake and Ulrich Kirk, are still attempting to formulate parameters for what to 
study and how to study it.19 One of the biggest challenges to experimental neuroaesthetic 
research is that it is much easier to study nonconscious process using fMRI than it is to 
study higher order cognition and consciousness. Vision, as mentioned above, lends itself 
well to fMRI because the vision areas are large and have been mapped out in detail, thus 
making it easy to target what is called a “region of interest.”  
 While fMRI technology is better suited to nonconscious processes, there are many 
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neuro-imaging experiments, including some in neuroaesthetics, that focus on higher-
order processing. As exciting as it is to see the science focus on conscious neural 
processing, these experiments sometimes stretch the credible limits of fMRI experiment 
design. Again, I want to assert that my goal is not to debunk neuroscientific claims. 
Neuroscience is an emergent field, and tackling the complex structures of consciousness 
requires explorative research. I do aim to examine how neuro-imaging methodologies are 
negotiated within the discipline, so that neuroaesthetic researchers in art and art history 
can begin to contextualize the findings of neuroscientific research as applied to art 
experience.   
 Experiments that address human personality tend to receive greater coverage in 
the press, because they make claims to reveal aspects of the human conscious condition. 
Alarmed by some of the claims being made by his peers, neuroscientist Edward Vul 
spearheaded a team of researchers that set out to challenge the methodologies applied in 
high-profile experiments on human consciousness. In 2009, Vul, et al, published a 
controversial and influential paper titled, “Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies 
of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition.” Vul and his team conducted a survey of 
55 neuroscientific experiments on emotion, personality and social cognition.  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of emotion, 
personality, and social cognition have drawn much attention in recent 
years, with high-profile studies frequently reporting extremely high (e.g., 
>.8) correlations between brain activation and personality measures. We 
show that these correlations are higher than should be expected given the 
(evidently limited) reliability of both fMRI and personality measures. The 
high correlations are all the more puzzling because method sections rarely 
contain much detail about how the correlations were obtained.20 
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Vul and his team became suspicious because, while the data seemed too good to be true, 
most of the papers did not explain properly how their data had been selected. The 
scientists sent a questionnaire to each of the researchers asking for information on their 
methodologies. Vul’s primary question was how the specific voxels for study were 
chosen across the range of subjects tested. It turned out that in the majority of 
experiments, a kind of circular analysis had been applied. Rather than predetermining a 
region of interest in the brain and then selecting the voxels that were activated in that 
region, experimenters were choosing to analyse the data from activated brain regions that 
had been closely correlated with the kinds of behaviour that they proceeded to induce. In 
his paper, Vul exposed this common methodological weakness in the application of fMRI 
technology for experiments on higher-order cognitive processes. As he explained,   
A separate correlation across subjects was performed for each voxel 
within a specified brain region. Each correlation relates some measure of 
brain activity in that voxel (which might be a difference between 
responses in two tasks or in two conditions) with the behavioural measure 
for that individual. Thus, the number of correlations computed was equal 
to the number of voxels, meaning that thousands of correlations were 
computed in many cases. At the next stage, researchers selected the set of 
voxels for which this correlation exceeded a certain threshold, and 
reported the correlation within this set of voxels. What are the implications 
of selecting voxels in this fashion? Such an analysis will inflate observed 
across-subject correlations and can even produce significant measures out 
of pure noise.21 
 
In layperson’s terms, the experimenters made foregone conclusions about which data 
they would deem relevant, and used those conclusions to delineate which data they would 
use for analysis. According to Vul, that tautological methodology was not scientifically 
rigorous enough, and he was able to make a very compelling case for various ways in 
which these kinds of experiments could easily over-inflate their findings. His exposé was 
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not meant to suggest that the scientists under scrutiny were heinously and intentionally 
making unsupportable claims. Instead, his critique emerged as part of an ongoing process 
of negotiation in neuroscience, in which acknowledgment of the complex and contingent 
nature of fMRI studies leads to refinements in experimental methodology that increase 
the chances of producing accurate research. Vul, et al, identified a flaw in the system, not 
to put a stop to experiments on emotion, personality and social cognition, but rather to 
help make those experiments more effective. While Vul’s findings have been publicly 
debated within the neuroscientific discipline, most of the researchers involved now seem 
to agree that circular analysis must be avoided in future fMRI studies.22  
 The experience of artworks entails complex cognitive processing, and thus the 
refinement of methodologies for studying such higher order processes bodes well for 
neuroaesthetic fMRI research. While Zeki’s foundational work in neuroaesthetics has 
tended to focus on the nonconscious processes of the visual system, neuroscientists are 
now using fMRI to examine conscious dimensions of the art experience. In fact, in 2009, 
Zeki himself endorsed an fMRI study lead by Ulrich Kirk and Martin Skov on the 
importance of context to aesthetic judgment. The study asked two questions: 1) does 
contextual information influence aesthetic judgment of visual stimuli? and 2) where, in 
the network of brain areas previously established to be involved in the aesthetic 
experience, does the activity of dealing with context take place?23  
 Prior studies suggested that an extensive network of brain structures was involved 
in aesthetic response, including areas for the processing of reward, perception and 
decision making. Based on previous research which had found that a small section of the 
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brain near the eye – the medial orbitofrontal cortex or medial OFC – would become 
active when subjects were processing contextual information, Kirk, et al, hypothesized 
that the same region would be activated by shifting contextual information during 
aesthetic judgement of artworks. The scientists thereby chose the medial OFC as their 
region of interest, and isolated this region in the subjects’ brains for observation in the 
scanner. 
 Fourteen subjects were chosen (graduate and undergraduate students) who had no 
formal art education. The visual stimuli were comprised of digital images of paintings, or 
sections of paintings, culled from the internet. Experimental subjects were told that some 
of the images were from the prestigious local art museum, while others had been created 
in Photoshop by the experimenters themselves. The images were randomly labelled 
“Gallery” or “Computer” despite the fact that all of them were actually canonical works 
of 20th century abstraction, including paintings by Mark Rothko, Jackson Pollock, 
Wassily Kandinsky and Juan Miro (all of which were cropped to a standardized square 
format). In the scanner, subjects were shown 200 images with “Gallery” and “Computer” 
labels for a duration of five seconds and they were asked to rate each image aesthetically 
on a scale from 1-5.  
 As the experimenters had predicted, subjects tended to show a preference for the 
images labelled “Gallery.” In addition, the fMRI data showed activations in the medial 
OFC that correlated with aesthetic judgments for images labelled “Gallery” more than for 
images labelled “Computer” independently of whether the gallery image was preferred or 
not. Thus, the experimenters concluded that context affects aesthetic judgment and, 
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further, that the aesthetic response in the medial OFC region of the brain is modulated by 
context. They did raise some questions, however, which troubled the clarity of the 
concept of aesthetics as positioned in the experiment. First, the scientists suggested that 
the neural activation they found was due to a response to pleasure rather than to the act of 
judgment making itself. Yet, because of the random allocation of the terms “Gallery” and 
“Computer,” the anticipation of pleasure was probably due to what the researchers 
described as the “subjects’ conception of the image, rather than its sensory properties,”24 
meaning that while the subjects were experiencing pleasure, that response was triggered 
by their ideas about the image rather than by sensorial stimuli produced by the image 
itself. Second, researchers queried why the label “Gallery” gave rise to a higher 
expectation of pleasure, and suggested that this finding might be due to subjects’ 
assumptions of prestige, money, or a combination of both. Kirk, et al, suggested that 
disassociating prestige from money would be the focus of further research.  
 While I am very excited to see context discussed in physiological terms, this study 
does raise some critical questions. In particular, from the perspective of an art theorist, I 
am troubled by the question of how, exactly, the experimenters were able to assume that 
their subjects were having an aesthetic experience. Nowhere in this paper was the term 
“aesthetic” actually defined, and it seems as if the experimenters were relying on a 
tautological premise; they were asking their subjects to judge images, and the images 
were artworks, therefore, in their estimation, the subjects were making aesthetic 
evaluations. And yet, in the art world, many participants – auction house evaluators, art 
critics, and art historians alike – frequently make value judgments on artworks that are 
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independent from their own aesthetic experience of the work. An auction appraiser may 
be aesthetically indifferent to a given work, but still deem it to have monetary, market 
value, and an art historian may personally dislike a given work while acknowledging its 
art historical importance. It seems to me that perhaps, by labelling the images “Gallery” 
or “Computer,” the experimenters set up a system whereby their subjects actually by-
passed aesthetic experience and skipped straight to judgement-making.  
 Based on my own experience as a subject in an MRI scanner, my larger question 
about this research is whether the necessarily passive role of the subject of neuro-imaging 
experiments – undressed, immobilized, confined, bombasted with aggravating audio and 
forced to look stare in one direction at a set of images predetermined by the 
experimenters – might actually preclude the possibility of full aesthetic engagement. 
While neuro-imaging subjects are given no choice about what to observe or how long to 
spend with each image, gallery-goers are invited to roam and select the artworks to they 
want to spend time with. Does the aesthetic experience require an element of choice? 
Certainly not everyone is going to be drawn to every artwork that they see, but even if, as 
a subject in a scanner, I happened to be presented with an image that captured my 
imagination, would I even be able to fully enter into an aesthetic state of engagement 
while subject to the extreme physiological conditions inside the scanner?  
 Kirk, et al, made a neuroaesthetic assumption that the anticipation of pleasure 
governed aesthetic choice. Yet, in contrast to the teleological notion of pleasure and 
reward, my hunch is that the act of open-ended, agential exploration plays a more central 
role in aesthetic experience. As visitors walk through a large gallery or museum, for 
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instance, they will often scan the space looking for something that catches their eye. Once 
engaged in an artwork, the viewer may decide to move on, or may decided to stay with 
the piece and look further. At this point a choice is made about whether to allow the 
artwork to exert further aesthetic influence. For some, the relationship with a single work 
of art may last a lifetime. The affective contingencies of aesthetics do not always entail 
pleasure, sometimes the artwork creates an annoying disturbance, posing niggling 
questions or inducing uncomfortable feelings that the viewer cannot immediately 
reconcile and explain. One neuroscientific theory that would support my hunch is Jaak 
Panskepp’s suggestion that the most fundamental chemical reward system in the brain is 
attached to the act of active seeking, rather than hedonic pleasure.25 Likewise, Zeki 
delves into this territory when he speculates that unfinished or broken works, such as 
Michelangelo’s Belvedere Torso, engage the brain more intensely because it continues to 
seek for information rather than resolving the experience and moving on. I would like to 
see a neuroaesthetic fMRI study that specifically addresses these agential moments in the 
aesthetic experience. I feel strongly, however, that the context of the scanner should be 
taken into account as a factor in neuroaesthetic fMRI experiments. 
 What affects – such as confinement, disorientation, and resistance to loud sounds 
– might be produced by conditions of the scanner itself that significantly impact on 
aesthetic experience? Some groundwork has been done on the physiological effects of the 
scanner environment, though not, to my knowledge, in the context of neuroaesthetics. In 
a recent study by Markus Muehlhan, et al. (dated Sept. 2010), a group of German 
researchers examined the influence of stress induced by the conditions inside the MRI 
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scanner. They state that the “claustrophobic properties of the scanner, discomfort, 
loudness, a low sense of control and the novelty of the situation can act as stressful 
factors.”26 Subjects in the study were given a visual detection task designed to reveal 
effects of stress on the attention networks in the brain. Activity in the thalamus was 
observed using fMRI, and correlative hormonal measures were taken via saliva tests. 
Subjects were also given a Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire. The researchers 
determined that stress caused by the scanner may influence neuronal activations. I would 
suggest that for neuroaesthetics it would be useful to build on this research and examine 
whether or not the stressful conditions of the scanner environment can be mitigated by 
enhancing the subject’s sense of agency. To borrow a phrase from science, more research 
needs to be done in this area.  
 The questions I have raised about Kirk’s experiment on context and aesthetic 
judgement do not in any way invalidate the research. At this early stage, all 
neuroaesthetic inquiry is provisional and speculative, including my own. The field of 
neuroaesthetics can only grow more robust from increased interdisciplinary engagements. 
Furthermore, as an interdisciplinary researcher it is important to keep in mind that 
research goals of neuroscience and the research goals of art theory may not coincide. In 
this instance, for example, the study asked two questions: 1) does contextual information 
influence aesthetic judgment of visual stimuli? and 2) where, in the network of brain 
areas previously established to be involved in the aesthetic experience, does the activity 
of dealing with context take place?27 While the first question about the role of context 
carries deep relevance to art theory, the second question about locating such processes in 
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the brain does not – I am not a neural anatomist and I have no professional inclination to 
map the various regions of the brain. Yet this is the question that Kirk, et al, were most 
successfully able to answer, achieving a significant goal within their own disciplinary 
paradigm. My role as an interdisciplinary colleague is not to dismiss their findings 
because they don’t match my research goals, but rather to celebrate in a spirit of 
collegiality and wonder if there is additional research that my disciplinary practice can 
contribute to the conversation. In this regard, the first question posed by these researchers 
has also been asked by art theorists and art historians – does contextual information 
influence aesthetic judgment of visual stimuli? While an art theorist drawing on the a 
long history of aesthetic inquiry in the humanities might be tempted to simply answer 
“yes,” the interdisciplinary challenge posed by neuroaesthetic inquiry is to ask the 
question “if so, how?” While I am not currently satisfied with the answers provided by 
Kirk, et al, I am grateful for their ambitious, exploratory forays into the synthesis of bio-
physiology and cultural context. Again, there is more research to be done.  
 
Conclusion 
Unfortunately, it may ultimately be impossible to empirically analyse the contextual 
conditions of the MRI scanner in contrast to other kinds of contexts for embodied art 
experience, since brain scans cannot be performed without neuro-imaging machines. 
However, art theorists and art historians have compiled an extensive body of knowledge 
on aesthetic experience in the context of galleries and museums, archives, computer 
screens, movie theatres, etc. In fMRI experiments, specific constrained behaviours are 
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induced in subjects, and then the physiological neural activity that accompanies those 
behaviours is recorded and analysed. Subjects are typically stripped of agency and 
positioned as passive receivers of perceptual stimuli. While the subject may experience 
many thoughts and feelings in the scanner, only those neural processes under observation 
are considered meaningful to the experiment. The experience of artworks in a gallery 
provides an excellent corollary in that art audiences, in contrast to fMRI subjects, are free 
to pick and choose from a vast array of sensorial stimuli, including, but not limited to, the 
artworks on display. In the art context, an aesthetic engagement manifests as an active 
choice, a reciprocal engagement between the audience and the artwork. While the 
experience has bio-physical manifestations, there are no limits on the thoughts and 
feelings, past experiences, cultural knowledges and social networks that contribute to the 
embodied knowledges facilitated by the encounter.  
 Throughout this dissertation, I will aim to demonstrate that effective 
neuroaesthetic research can be produced by correlating and contrasting situated findings 
on embodied experience. This will be derived from the study of art in art contexts, with 
and against neuroaesthetic findings emerging from neuroscience labs. In the chapters that 
follow, I will activate a neuroaesthetic inquiry by conducting case studies of specific 
contemporary artworks, considered in gallery contexts, and examining how each of these 
works facilitates particular embodied knowledges about perceptual cognition. This will 
become evident in the next chapter where I will examine how a complex, multi-
dimensional installation by the art collective FASTWÜRMS facilitates the awareness of 
cognitive processes of association. • 
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FASTWÜRMS: Cognitive Association as a Neuroaesthetic Mode of Knowing 
 
Entering FASTWÜRMS’ impossibly intricate multi-media installation, 
Donky@Ninja@Witch, felt somewhat like navigating the overlapping networks of a 
living brain as it engages and interacts within multiple systems of sensory and intellectual 
stimulation. Viewers encountered witches and cats communicating telepathically; axes, 
scythes and dildos hung flat on the walls like hieroglyphs; a giant bat intricately woven 
out of coloured string; spider webs made of sexy bras and panties; a pirates’ skull 
collection; ninjas skulking through the night; a witch’s cauldron; incantations; cats, bats, 
bulls, crows, stars, moons, horseshoes, snakes, spiders, owls, wigs, hats, mirrors, potions, 
cloaks and a donkey; a hair salon for freaks; a denim-lined magic marker tattoo parlour; a 
playground for cats and humans – the list could go on and on, as the installation defied 
inventory and description. Potent objects, images and icons covered almost every inch of 
wall space from floor to ceiling – all of them cross-talking through complex visual and 
connotative networks that wove throughout the installation in a tumultuous, porous flow 
of nested feedback loops. Gallery goers were invited to navigate an intricate web of non-
linear associations, both visual and conceptual, so densely woven as to resist any kind of 
cartographic stock-taking, or omniscient point of view. In order to engage with the work, 
one had to situate oneself within it. 
 In the previous two chapters I positioned neuroaesthetics within a broader 
discourse on embodied experience, and unpacked some of the methodological challenges 
that neuroscientists face when addressing neuroaesthetics. The remainder of the 
dissertation presents four case studies, each of which will theorize how certain artworks 
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invite self-reflexive awareness of particular cognitive processess. This chapter examines 
FASTWÜRMS’ retrospective exhibition, Donky@Ninja@Witch, curated by Philip Monk 
at the Art Gallery of York University in 2007. In order to produce this ambitious 
installation, FASTWÜRMS physically inhabited the gallery for several weeks, sleeping 
in a tent on the floor at night and working to construct an impossibly intricate network of 
potent images and objects during the day. In early 2008, the artists re-installed the 
exhibition a second time at the Contemporary Art Gallery (CAG) in Vancouver. 
 FASTWÜRMS is a collective identity comprised of artist/witches Kim Kozzi and 
Dai Scuse.1 The name functions not only as a professional designation for their 
collaborative endeavours, but as a singular artistic entity comprising their co-constitutive 
practice. As FASTWÜRMS join together in their practice, they also engage associations 
with other entities as collaborators. “In the Witch world,” they have asserted, “Others are 
understood to include all peoples, animals, plants, the vast web of life, the universe.”2 
Within the complex installation, notions of the web functioned as both a recurring visual 
theme and as a conceptual model for the structure of the exhibition as a whole. As Jenifer 
Papararo noted in the exhibition catalogue produced by CAG, “for [FASTWÜRMS] the 
web is used as a symbol to characterize a belief system grounded in connection, not 
disconnection.”3 Entangling beholders in webs that operated on several cognitive 
registers – from the visual to the social – Donky@Ninja@Witch emphasized perceptions 
as active performances emerging within an interspecies subjectivity. Audiences were 
invited to participate as agents in the network, and they had to make their own decisions 
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about how to enter and navigate FASTWÜRMS’ matrix of campy role play, magic and 
aesthetic engagement.  
 I aim to demonstrate that Donky@Ninja@Witch, provided a neuroaesthetic model 
of consciousness by using the context of the gallery to facilitate embodied forms of 
knowledge about association as a cognitive mode of engagement. Donky@Ninja@Witch 
did not address beholders as detached observers, but rather as situated percipients 
participating within complex webs of non-hierarchical, associative interconnection. In 
contrast to the context of neuro-imaging experiments that configure subjects as passive 
responders to external stimuli, Donky@Ninja@Witch presented art as a process requiring 
active and self-reflexive engagement on the part of participants. I shall argue that, 
FASTWÜRMS’ installation allowed for consideration of cognitive “association” (or 
“abduction” in cognitive terms) as a physiological process. Because abduction has proven 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to model in neuro- and cognitive scientific 
contexts, Donky@Ninja@Witch offers a unique site of neuroaesthetic research. 
Furthermore, FASTWÜRMS activated their ongoing practice as witches to trouble 
culture/nature dichotomies, including non-human species as agents collaborating within 
their installation’s myriad, interconnected networks. The exhibition suggests that humans 
may operate in embodied social networks with non-human animals as well as with one 
another. In this way, Donky@Ninja@Witch makes a neuroaesthetic contribution by 
situating cognitive processes of association within a performative assemblage that 
exceeds and extends humanist perspectives seeking to place nature and culture in 
hierarchical relation to one another.  
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 I shall begin by briefly introducing post-humanist formulations by Bruno Latour 
and Donna Haraway that inform my neuroaesthetic analysis of Donky@Ninja@Witch by 
both troubling nature/culture dichotomies and by reconfiguring knowledge as a 
collaborative proccess of engagement between diverse and implicated entities, rather than 
a reified product delivered by detached observers. While Latour and Haraway write from 
the disciplines of science studies and philosophy to examine the formulation of scientific 
knowledge, I shall draw connections between the kinds of performative assemblage and 
situated knowledge that they propose, and the neuroaesthetic knowledges facilitated by 
Donky@Ninja@Witch operating within the gallery context. Next, I will situate the ways 
that Donky@Ninja@Witch troubles nature/culture dichotomies and activates audience 
participation within the context of their past work, and I will then go on to to provide a 
more detailed description of the exhibition itself. Once I have established these 
contextual parameters, I will make a detailed analysis of how the installation activated 
webs, both visually and structurally, to facilitate neuroaesthetic awareness of cognitive 
processes of association. As these webs entailed both human and non-human agents, I 
will proceed to explore how FASTWÜRMS’ have approached inter-species 
communication, considering Amanda Boetzkes’ writing on earth artists and Karen 
Barad’s work on agential materialism to contextualize the art experiences offered by 
Donky@Ninja@Witch within contemporary configurations of human and non-human 
interaction. Finally, I will return to a brief consideration of how Donky@Ninja@Witch 
configured the gallery as a site of neuroaesthetic knowledge production, in contrast to the 
modes of knowing produced in the neuroscience lab.  
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Troubling Nature/Culture Dichotomies 
In considering FASTWÜRMS’ installation as a producer of neuroaesthetic knowledge, I 
am informed, in part by Zeki’s assertion that both art and the brain seek to “gain 
knowledge about the world.”4 Zeki was not referring to knowledge as a packaged product 
for consumption in the form of a lab report or didactic treatise, but to knowing as an 
ongoing experiential process of sensorial engagement. I extend Zeki’s formulation to 
consider how Donky@Ninja@Witch facilitates neuroaesthetic knowledge by  
producing embodied awareness of cognitive processes of association. In order to 
understand the process by which this particular mode of knowing takes place in the 
gallery installation, I draw from Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway, both of whom have 
brought science and the humanities together, writing in critical dialogue with one another, 
and converging on the notion that culture and nature are intertwined in collective, 
contingent knowledge-producing processes that entail human and non-human agents.  
 In Canada, where FASTWÜRMS have worked for their long career, traditional, 
colonial formulations of nature have drawn from the sublime – nature represented as an 
imposing, empty landscape. FASTWÜRMS, however, formulate nature differently. As 
Barbara Fischer explained, “They are not from a place where there is no language, where 
there are no meanings and representations...”5 These artists, then, have formulated nature 
as a distinctly social, cultural space, abuzz with myriad, meaningful associations. Their 
installations have operated as assemblages that parallel science as a subjective, collective 
practice of knowledge formation.  
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 Latour informs my neuroaesthetic analysis of FASTWÜRMS’ artwork in two 
ways; first, he has insisted that modernity incurred a false dichotomy between nature and 
culture; second, he suggested that knowledge is not discovered by detached observers, 
but is rather conditionally produced by complex assemblages of participating agents –  
including human and non-human actors. The technological apparatus of an MRI scanner, 
then, using Latour’s formulation, can be understood to contribute agentially to the 
knowledge that it helps produce, along with the subject in the scanner, the technicians 
who operate the machine, the scientists who collate and interpret the data, the journalists 
who report on the findings, and the publics who consume disseminated knowledge, and 
more. Latour’s notion of a natural/cultural assemblage can illuminate the post-humanist 
operations of FASTWÜRMS’ installation as it entails both non-human species and non-
sentient objects as participants. Like the MRI lab, Donky@Ninja@Witch also comprises a 
collective of agents that entails the artists, the artworks and the audience in a 
collaborative formulation of localized, embodied knowledges. The forms of knowledge 
facilitated in the art installation are different from those produced in the neuroscience lab. 
While scientists seek to negotiate forms of knowledge that, however provisional, can be 
quantified and instrumentalized, embodied aesthetic knowledges can be non-linguistic, 
temporally extended and ephemeral. Nevertheless, for FASTWÜRMS, expressions of 
witchcraft-as-art and art-as-witchcraft are analogous to scientific practice. “A good word 
for ‘magic’,” they explained, “is ‘gnosis.’ The aspiration of witches is to become wise. 
Magic and knowledge are really interchangeable.”6 Donky@Ninja@Witch aspires to 
facilitate knowledge for its audiences through collaborative assemblage and association.  
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 For Latour, nature, social structures, discourse and being are, and have always 
been, co-constitutive and entangled.7 If social structures and discourse are taken as 
natural, and nature is taken as social and discursive, then an emphasis on the discursive 
dimension of knowledge as a social practice should not threaten its attachment to the 
natural world.8 FASTWÜRMS have similarly entangled nature and culture, always 
emphasizing the agency of the various actors entailed in their artistic webs. By invoking 
magic in their work, FASTWÜRMS posited the possibility of material transformation, 
but at the same time, through humour and kitsch, left it up to each of their audience 
members to decide just how much magic they were willing to entertain.   
Postmodernism, as Latour suggested, presented a “terrifying” image of the 
modern world by keeping nature, society and discourse distinct. The result, he claimed, 
was a “society made up solely of false consciousness, simulacra and illusions; a discourse 
consisting only in meaning effects detached from everything...” Latour suggested that the 
cause of these disconnections was that the postmoderns believed “they had forgotten 
Being.”9 In Latour’s analysis, no one actually had forgotten Being; rather, the modern 
dichotomy of culture and nature produced a situation in which one could proceed as if 
one had. He invoked science as an example in which objects were “circulating 
simultaneously as subjects, objects and discourse.”10 Latour’s formulation of scientific 
knowledge production can also be applied to aesthetic encounters. The myriad material 
elements in FASTWÜRM Donky@Ninja@Witch, for example, also operated 
simultaneously as subjects, objects and discourse, and they entailed audiences into their 
matrix as collaborative, cognitive agents of aesthetic engagement.  
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Haraway took up Latour and politicized his formulation that knowledge emerges 
through assemblages of agents by emphatically insisting that all points of view are 
always situated and partial. One can’t adopt a bird’s eye view that encompasses every 
aspect of a meaningful construction, and a network can never be fixed in its totality.11 
Furthermore, she placed more emphasis than Latour on social power structures. Haraway 
intended, in part, to reunite culture with nature by addressing the materiality of discourse, 
but she also aimed to establish accountability for one’s own standpoint as it may enable 
the suffering of others. “Feminist accountability,” she suggested, “requires a knowledge 
tuned to resonance, not to dichotomy.”12 Like Latour, she extended her notion of agency 
to objects, but in this case she formulated her theorization as an act of political resistance, 
resisting the reification of nature that results from power strategies of capitalist 
colonialism. As she explained, in the capitalist paradigm, “It – the world – must, in short, 
be objectified as a thing, not an agent; it must be matter for the self-formation of the only 
social being in the productions of knowledge, the human knower.”13 For example, she 
proposed, the “logic of domination built into the nature/culture opposition,”14 has given 
rise to the objectification of the human body. As Haraway suggested, in the practice of 
science, an understanding of objects as agents would shift the dynamic of knowledge 
production away from a deterministic power relation of discovery to a more contingent 
mode of conversation.15  
FASTWÜRMS’ installation Donky@Ninja@Witch produced subjectivities 
commensurate with Haraway’s formulation of situated knowledges by defying detached 
and comprehensive viewpoints. As I shall discuss, FASTWÜRMS also explicitly address 
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power dynamics between species and within social networks, inviting their audiences to 
join them in performatively inhabiting and engaging marginalized subjectivities. 
Percipients entering the installation were faced with a vast labyrinth of objects and 
images that resonated in multiple dimensions through visual and conceptual registers. In 
order to engage with the work, gallery goers were invited to forge their own connections 
within it, proceeding as embodied participants resonating with other entities in 
associative perceptual acts. In the self-reflexive context of the gallery, the 
epistemological conditions of the process and the material conditions of the work 
emerged as co-constitutive dimensions of neuroaesthetic engagement. Extending Zeki’s 
notion of art and brain as seekers of knowledge, I suggest that Donky@Ninja@Witch 
expedited neuroaesthetic knowing as the embodied performance of a contingent 
assemblage, operating from the situated and partial perspective of participants within a 
network, rather than encapsulating a network as a fixed and packaged knowledge 
product. Furthermore, that network extended across species, creating a situation in which 
human modes of knowing were configured in relation to non-human modes, troubling 
humanist boundaries between nature and culture as well as self and other.  
  
A Brief History  
FASTWÜRMS installations have consistently been political, contingent, constructed, and 
far too complex to allow for any singular cartographic reading. In this respect, 
FASTWÜRMS are eminently postmodern, and yet, despite their lexical use of myriad 
iconic signs and signifiers, they have consistently refused to autonomize discourse,16 in 
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Latour’s sense, as distinct from the material world. The art experiences they’ve offered 
were embodied and manifest, real to the same extent as rocks and trees and cats, aesthetic 
epiphanies, political allegiances, and social cliques.  
In the late 1980s, FASTWÜRMS –ironic, savvy to trending artworld tropes and 
the connotative powers of material media – were creating messy, sexy, gawky 
installations in which, as Fischer describes it, “both death and sexuality [were] celebrated 
as part of life.”17 The physiology of experience, what Latour might describe as Being, has 
always been an explicit aspect of their work. While other postmodern artists such as 
painter Andy Patton demythologized the expressive potential of the artist’s hand by 
turning to a process free of gesture, FASTWÜRMS displayed logs that had been formed 
by chewing beavers. While the work of installation artists such as Ian Carr-Harris 
commented on the signifying qualities of man-made materials, FASTWÜRMS fashioned 
uncanny mounds of collected bark and mud. While painter Christian Eckart toyed with 
the hollow satisfaction of fetish, FASTWÜRMS created totems that invoked the resonant 
power of ritual. While Toronto painter Joanne Tod passed comment on the normative 
middle-class constructions of femininity, FASTWÜRMS created their own iconic 
goddess, Powerful Birch Girl, whose image still appears in their installations to this day. 
And yet, even at that time when an arch stance of detachment was apparently de rigueur, 
FASTWÜRMS’ enthusiastic sincerity proved popular with audiences, and they exhibited 
in high profile institutions such as the Art Gallery of Ontario and the Ydessa Gallery. 
Always rife with campy kitsch and humour, their work was full of visual and linguistic 
puns indicating their thorough understanding of lexical connotation. They comprehended 
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the discursive operations of signifiers, and they were adept at their deployment. 
Nevertheless, they refused the notion that signifiers were somehow separate from life 
experience – as human animals FASTWÜRMS exercised their discursive talents through 
the manipulation and juxtaposition of material media. 
 In their more recent work, FASTWÜRMS have used a lot less mud and birch 
bark, but nature has remained as a central concept. The cats, of course, have performed as 
actors, in all senses of the word. FASTWÜRMS’ inclusion of self-actualized beasts has 
indicated a conjoining of nature and culture, also evident in the relational processes of 
their audiences’ engagements. While FASTWÜRMS have skillfully deployed 
technologies of cultural mediation, the material dimensions of nature have never been 
cast into doubt.   
 Given that FASTWÜRMS have been positioned among Canada’s most 
established and celebrated artists, there has been a surprising lack of critical writing about 
their work. Fischer’s catalogue essay of 1988 provided a notable exception, situating the 
collective within the historical context of Canadian colonialism, and making in-depth 
analyses about how their work at the time actively entailed audiences in changing 
attitudes about “history, ecology, the body and/or sexuality.”18 Almost 20 years later, in 
2006, critic Robert Enright conducted a substantial interview with the collective, framing 
their practice of art and witchcraft as a form of political subversion.19 Jennifer Fisher and 
Jim Drobnick also made an important critical contribution when they interviewed 
FASTWÜRMS, in 2008, for a catalogue published by the Contemporary Art Gallery in 
Vancouver when Donky@Ninja@Witch toured there after being installed at AGYU.20 
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Fisher and Drobnick emphasized the artists’ collaborative DIY engagements with various 
counter cultures as a mode of art practice that made critical, ironic comment on the 
institutions of contemporary art. For the most part, however, critics have responded to the 
artists’ humorous kitsch aesthetic. This may in part be due to the fact that FASTWÜRMS 
do not assume the attitude of art stars, but participate generously in the art community as 
peers and mentors, and essays such as Jon Davies’ “Props to the Fairy People”21 
enthusiastically acknowledge their positive energy. While FASTWÜRMS’ artwork has 
remained accessible through its playful irony and exuberance, it has also consistently 
transcended art world conventions of representation, troubling distinctions between art 
and audience by making a distinctly embodied address. For this reason, an in-depth 
neuroaesthetic analysis of their work was timely, and the large, ambitious retrospective 
Donky@Ninja@Witch offered a rich site for such research.  
 
Introducing Donky@Ninja@Witch 
FASTWÜRMS’ installation Donky@Ninja@Witch was an ambitious project. Curator 
Philip Monk invited the artists to fill the Art Gallery of York University with a massive 
retrospective of five past installations and one new work. Not content to stage their 
previously interactive installation works as a collection of museum artifacts referencing 
past encounters, FASTWÜRMS’ used several strategies to enliven the space. They 
decided to literally inhabit the gallery – setting up a tent on the floor and living there for 
several weeks during the installation/residency – in order to activate the large space to 
their satisfaction. Carefully considering sightlines from multiple points of view within the 
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gallery, the artists produced fluid transitions and cross-talk throughout the entire 
exhibition by allowing each installation to overlap visually with the others. Moving from 
the front to the back of the first gallery, visitors first encountered House of Bangs (1999) 
(Fig. 5), a DIY hair salon – initially staged as a collaboration at Andrew Harwood’s tiny 
Toronto storefront gallery, Zsa Zsa – where performers offered haircuts on opening night. 
Then came Blood and Swash (2002) (Fig. 4), a felt pen tattoo parlour – initially created 
for Zsa Zsa in collaboration with artist Jill Henderson – where visitors could join the 
artists at tables to get tattoos and/or create their own icons on denim patches. Gusset 
Nation (2004) (Fig. 7) presented a utopian cat playground with balls of yarn, catnip toys, 
giant cobwebs made from bras and panties, and a monitor showing the videos Pussy 
Necropolis featuring Siegfried and Roy’s sexy Royal White Tigers along with 
FASTWÜRMS’ charismatic feline familiars.  
 The second gallery was darker. Passing through the glass doors that separate the 
two spaces, visitors first encountered Pirate Head (2003), a smoke-puffing cannon 
stocked with an uncanny pile of human skulls for projectiles. The next exhibit, Blood 
Clock (2005) (Fig.8) comprised a video installation decorated with axes, scythes, dildos, 
mirrors, busts of the Egyptian cat goddess Bast, and a projection with sublime and 
pensive footage of a white cow drinking from a golden pond at sunset. The final 
installation was a new work, Pink Donky (2007) (Figs. 9-10), in which Witch Nation 
icons such as a giant mock-Canadian flag with a pentagram in place of the maple leaf, 
cauldrons, and animal banners surrounded a small, prefabricated outbuilding, or Nissen 
hut, commemorating a donkey sanctuary. Inside the hut, a monitor displayed the video 
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Witch vs. Ninja, shot in eerie green night vision, in which the witches and a group of 
ninjas flit in and out of shadows on the spooky streets of Venice. Each re-staged 
installation was itself a major undertaking amassing a mind-boggling amount of artwork.  
 FASTWÜRMS couched their delivery of darkness in wicked dark humour. The 
pirate skulls were humorous. A fake cannon was shooting out of the darkness toward the 
glass doors that separated the two galleries. A decal that looked like shattered glass had 
been applied to one of the doors, making it seem as if a skull had been shot right through, 
forming a vaudevillian slapstick hole in the barrier between the light and dark. 
FASTWÜRMS’ kitschy humour held a kind of promise: no matter how deeply one 
chooses to engage with their cosmology, the levity ensured one would always be able to 
find a way back out.  
FASTWÜRMS’ exhibition had many entry points: some people may have 
connected with stonewashed denim, others with pirates, others with hairdressing. Some 
might have found their eyes drawn to spots of saturated colour, others to black and white 
silhouettes. Some visitors would have made an historical investigation, tracing the 
recurrent images and icons from FASTWÜRMS’ retrospective past, others would have 
been encountering the work for the first time. Some might have connected with images of 
owls, others with snakes, others cats, frogs, crows, daggers, moons, etc. Some would 
have wanted to look at pictures, others to watch video, some would have been motivated 
to participate in performative collaboration. Some people would have been drawn to take 
up political identifications with working class culture, some to take up troubled gender 
norms, or to engage with in animal rights issues. Some would have felt a pull to lose 
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themselves in the paranormal, others in kitsch, others in science fiction. Some would 
have felt playful, some frightened, or politically roused, or welcomed into a process of 
healing. Most importantly, these modes of identification overlapped with one another and 
extended beyond the gallery to implicate broader natural/cultural networks – audiences 
were invited to actively situate themselves within the matrix, becoming aware of their 
own cognitive associations in the process.  
 
The Installation and the Brain: Interconnecting Webs of Association 
FASTWÜRMS’ retrospective exhibition, Donky@Ninja@Witch was structured as an 
intricate, open-ended web of overlapping installations that foregrounded cognitive 
processes of association. While FASTWÜRMS were not working specifically with the 
medium of networked computers, the prevalence of interconnecting webs throughout the 
exhibition recalls critical questions raised by new media theorists Geert Lovink and Anna 
Munster in 2005. Lovink and Munster queried a widespread aestheticization of 
connectivity by new media artists and designers that often took the form of two-
dimensional webs, commonly referred to as maps, representing various complex 
networked relations.22 Theorizing online culture as a manifestation of networked 
communities, Lovink and Munster argued that the proliferation of maps perpetuated a 
misunderstanding of the subjective experience from within networks. “The very notion of 
a network,” they wrote, “is in conflict with the desire to gain an overview.”23 Networks, 
for Lovink and Munster, did not function as static graphic structures, but as non-
hierarchical fluid societies, subject to both growth and decay. Furthermore, experience of 
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the network as a participant involved an active process of interaction that could never 
thoroughly account for all the influences and outcomes of one’s actions. Lovink and 
Munster explained that legible maps, fixed and reduced to a finite set of connections, 
elided certain critical modes of knowing. 
Mapping information – the aesthetics of contemporary visualization – 
provides a sense of relief that the twisted and unstructured info-bits that 
roam around in our cognitive unconscious are finally laid-out to rest. A 
beast is tamed.24 
 
Lovink and Munster advocated for a different network aesthetic, one which is “more akin 
to social aesthetics in which we engage in and with the collective experiences of being 
embroiled in networks and being actively part of their making.”25 FASTWÜRMS 
similarly confounded considerations of their networks from the position of a detached 
observer, rather, they invited their audiences to act as participants within embodied webs 
of association. While images of webs proliferated throughout the exhibition, they 
functioned, in part, as visual synecdoche’s for an embodied, dimensional set of 
networked relations too fluid and complex to be represented in graphic form.  
A giant bat hovered above the Blood and Swash installation (Fig. 4). It was made 
of string-art, woven with colourful yarns threaded between green-capped nails that had 
been physically pounded into a stretch of the gallery wall. The design was extremely 
intricate. From a distance the creature was rendered in flat planes of colour that, upon 
closer inspection, abstracted into finely detailed intersecting patterns. Other giant, spider-
like webs – visible in the adjacent enclave housing Gusset Nation - sprawled in organic 
graphic patterns across corners and over the edges of walls. Upon moving closer it 
became instantly clear that one was made from bras and the other from panties – the 
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triangular gussets of the garments making up the repeating shapes of the larger web. The 
bat, loaded with associations from the mythical world of vampires to the scientific world 
of radar and echolocation, was legible as an image, revealing an abstract intricate formal 
structure in its details. The underpant gusset webs, conversely, were iconographically 
legible at the detailed level of components, their exuberant byzantine structure composed 
of real world commodities that resonated playfully with sexual innuendo, gratification, 
and desire.  
While each of FASTWÜRMS’ cobweb sculptures made a two-dimensional 
impact, they unfolded into three dimensions, and further into open-ended networks of 
association between pattern and reference. These webs operated as cues, referencing the 
web-like structure of the entire exhibition, while simultaneously affirming that the overall 
set of associations was far too motile, subjective and complex to be mapped and visually 
rendered. If Sapolsky was right that humans are good at holding onto two different 
realities at once, FASTWÜRMS made that concept manifest by inviting percipients to 
participate by weaving their own webs association between multiple standpoints. 
Furthermore, they extended the nexus of associative perception to engage non-human 
entities. The giant cobwebs of Gusset Nation resonated with the manifold compilations of 
objects and images that spread across every wall of the exhibition. In connotative 
harmony, spiders dotted the show hither and thither: dangling off a crescent moon, 
crawling across a denim patch, or holding court under a fringe of hair. While the webs 
themselves engaged cognitive association, the spiders served as totemic reminders that 
web-spinning is not an exclusively human phenomenon. Simultaneously, the networked 
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connectivity evident in Donky@Ninja@Witch suggested no subject position outside the 
exhibition from which to take cartographic stock of boundaries, connections and 
containments. Instead, audiences were invited to participate as collaborators in the 
formation of networks, forging perceptual connections within open-ended and 
overlapping webs of resonant association. As a multi-layered complex of interconnecting 
networks allowing for fluid leaps of association between any of its nodes, the installation 
mirrored, or perhaps more accurately, produced, the kind of networked activity that 
occurs in the human brain. 
 In fact, neuroscientists have been trying to map the networked components of the 
brain, in order to understand how they are connected, and thus begin to understand, or at 
least predict, how consciousness can emerge. In trying to chart nodes in an 
overwhelmingly complex network, however, they face the same problem identified by 
Lovink and Munster, which is that any map of the network fixes it as a reduced set of 
predetermined nodes intersecting at a frozen moment in time. Neural function entails so 
much complexity and parallel processing that no cartography could ever account for 
every aspect of the brain’s network. Furthermore, some neuroscientists, such as Antonio 
Damasio, have shown that the networked processes in the brain are intimately co-
constituted with the processes in the rest of the body and argue against consideration of 
the brain in isolation.26 To make matters even more complex, when neuro- and cognitive 
scientists consider the brain/body in ongoing interaction with the environment, the 
viability of producing consciousness through detailed mapping of neural networks comes 
under serious question, even as a hypothetical proposition.  
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 Computational neuroscientist Jerry Fodor has situated himself as a bit of a 
whistle-blower, despairing of the aspirations of his discipline. 
You might think that cognitive scientists would be worried a lot about the 
limitations of the Classical computational theory of mind. Speaking for 
myself, I’m worried half to death. In fact, it seems to me, much of the field 
is in deep denial... As usual, the characteristic mechanism of denial is 
suppression.27 
 
Fodor challenged his colleagues to address head-on the structural impossibility of 
quantifying associative cognition, suggesting, specifically, that cognitive scientists had 
been avoiding discussion of “abductive inference.” 28 In the vocabulary of cognitive 
science, abduction stands in contrast to induction. Whereas inductive reasoning is an 
incremental process of “inference from particular to general,”29 abductive reasoning is a 
process of association by which one makes an instantaneous leap of “inference to the best 
explanation.”30 In order for neuroscientists (and/or robotics engineers) to construct a 
computational model for inductive reasoning, particulars could be programmed which the 
system would then analyze according to a set of semantic rules.31 Designing a model for 
abduction, however, falls into a different order of task, not just technically difficult, but 
theoretically impossible. Because abduction operates as an unpredictable leap of 
association, a scientific model would require programming for what Fodor calls, “the 
whole background of epistemic commitments,”32 meaning the entire spectrum of 
knowledge and past experience inherent to a conscious individual. Cognition emerges in 
a subjective network of both past experiences and temporal, perceptual influences that 
cannot be mechanically modeled because the potential associative connections are 
unpredictable and infinite. Thus, because empirical experimentation usually requires 
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plausible working models, neuro- and cognitive scientists, according to Fodor, face a 
methodological impasse in trying to determine how the brain gives rise to consciousness.  
 While cognitive or neuroscientific models of consciousness are limited in their 
ability to provide a context for studying abduction, Donky@Ninja@Witch, as an art 
exhibition, was in no way bound by the scientific requirement for defined and 
quantifiable variables. Rather, the installation could operate as a provisional model for 
examining abduction because its conditions of engagement called forth the very 
“background of epistemic commitments”33 or breadth and depth of accrued life 
experience that scientists are unable to map and program for. Repeated representations of 
webs implied a networked structure, while a rich, unchartable labyrinth of images and 
objects provoked the opened-ended experience of association as a infinitely variable 
subjective experience. The abductions produced by the installation could not be 
predetermined, measured, nor quantified, but they could be observed. Neuroaesthetic 
knowledge about abduction emerged as embodied awareness of associations produced 
between engaged percipients and the objects and images they encountered. The 
associative webs in the installation largely operated non-linguistically, yet they were 
overt to the extent that audiences became self-reflexively aware of them, and thus they 
offered an embodied experience of cognition as a process of reciprocal engagement 
within a networked system. 
 In contrast to other neuroaesthetic theorists such as Onians and Ramachandran, 
the neuroaesthetic approach that I am advancing here does not situate the brain as an 
isolated organism. Considering the brain as part of an aesthetic assemblage – 
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encompassing artworks and their audiences as material agents operating in social 
contexts – is warranted in part by “top-down” models of consciousness, as critically 
reconfigured by Murphy and Brown. In their collaborative book, Did My Neurons Make 
Me Do It? the writers formulated a theory of consciousness that they called non-reductive 
materialism. In reductive materialism, the domain of traditional neuroscience, the parts 
are seen to determine the behaviours of the whole. While non-reductive materialism 
retains considerations of mind as a material manifestation of the brain, the behaviours of 
the parts are here understood to be determined by the structures of the system in which 
they function.34 As Brown and Murphy explained, neural feedback systems are in a 
constant state of flux, shifting and adjusting in ongoing interactions with the world. Thus 
knowledge of the world is here construed again as a process rather than a product. 
Consciousness while material, operates co-extensively with the surrounding material 
environment.35 This model refutes the scientific tradition of atomistic thinking, described 
by Murphy and Brown as follows, 
[A]toms” (in the philosophical sense of being the most basic components) 
are attributed “ontological priority” over the things they constitute. Thus, 
all causation is bottom-up – it is the atoms that do all of the causal work, 
and the supposed causal capacities of macroscopic entities are seen as 
epiphenomenal. When this picture is coupled with a further assumption 
about causation, a holdover from Aristotle, that nothing can be the cause 
of itself, the conclusion is that humans and other organisms cannot be the 
causes of their own behaviour or characters.36 
 
Reversing the tradition of ascribing causal powers to the most basic components of 
matter, the authors argued instead for agency of the whole organism as a system that 
constrains the behaviours of its component parts. In challenging atomistic models of the 
brain, then, Murphy and Brown also challenge ideological hierarchies embedded in 
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evolutionary theory that ascribe ascendency to cognitive functions over non-conscious 
neural processes.  
 Neuroscientists, following in the atomistic tradition of science, have traditionally 
conceived of the brain according to bottom-up models, in which the smallest parts –
 neurons – drive the behaviour of the entire system. Furthermore, neuroscientists have 
made use of evolutionary analogies to describe the structure of the brain, correlating 
“lower” areas where nonconscious processes take place with “older” evolutionary forms 
(hence the phrase “reptile brain.”) The “newer” areas of the brain are “higher” and more 
cognitively developed. The neuroscientific, “bottom-up” model of consciousness 
suggests that non-conscious processes exclusively drive the system. 
 Yet, as discussed in Chapter One, Murphy and Brown’s definition of “top-down” 
is not a direct, spatial corollary to the standard notion of “bottom-up” and they hasten to 
head off any misinterpretation. “Top-down,” in this sense does not refer to a hierarchical 
executive function of conscious thought determining experience and behaviour. Murphy 
and Brown formulate “top down” as an acknowledgement of the constraints of a “higher 
order system” rather than to the anatomical positioning of some brain parts above others 
in an upright body.37 While the notion of a top-down system may resonates with 
deterministic conservativism, in this case, the authors mean to imply the contingency of 
relations between systems. The distinction is important, because while the authors reject 
the notion that the nonconscious activities of neurons at the cellular level determine 
human behaviour and experience, they are explicitly not arguing that conscious thought 
determines behaviour either. Rather, conscious and non-conscious processes work in 
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concert, co-constituted in the embodied systems of the organism as it is engaged in 
ongoing feedback relations with myriad systems in the world.  
 While Murphy and Brown used the written word to explicate the temporal 
reciprocity of cognitive engagement, Donky@Ninja@Witch in fact engaged similar 
cognitive processes through the embodied interactions of audiences. Similar to the human 
brain, the relational complexity of FASTWÜRMS’ installation, and the importance of the 
situated subjectivity of the audience, meant that the exhibition’s effects could not be 
mapped or plotted from the bottom-up. Rather than simply transmitting an experience of 
art from sender to receiver, Donky@Ninja@Witch fostered neuroaesthetic modes of 
knowing as a process co-evolving between many collaborators, including audience and 
artworks. The epistemological framework of witchcraft allowed for a kind of reflexive 
animism –animals were depicted as having agency and input into the forms of the works 
in the exhibition, while the works, many of them depictions of animals, registered on the 
level of icons, with an active agential force or presence in and of themselves. Gallery 
goers were thus invited into immersive and multi-dimensional engagements in which 
they could choose how deeply to suspend their disbelief in order to play a role in 
investing the objects with associative meanings. The resonant networked objects and 
images responded with an affirmation of art’s associative capacity to produce 
engagement with the world. The networks of engagement in FASTWÜRMS’ world 
included associations with myriad non-human entities, and thus the neuroaesthetic 
knowledges that they advance also imbricate nature and culture.  
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Telepathy, Mind Reading, and Inter-species Communication 
One strategy for demonstrating the co-constitution of nature and culture is 
FASTWÜRMS’ emphasis on interspecies communication. In a recent TED Lecture 
neurobiologist Robert Sapolsky suggested that the human quality that most distinguishes 
humans from other animals is the ability to believe two contradictory things at once.38 
Sapolsky, apparently, has not spent much time with cats. Cats are masters of 
contradiction, experts at suspension of disbelief.39 Cats treat a good session of string 
chasing as much like a hunt as a game, and they conduct a good mouse hunt like a playful 
frolic as well as a deadly mission. FASTWÜRMS spend a lot of time with cats and their 
artworks posit a feline-esque agility between signifying modes.  
 FASTWÜRMS’ video Telepathacats (2003) was screened on a monitor as part of 
the Gusset Nation installation in Donky@Ninya@Witch. It opened with found footage of 
a science lab. Two men in white coats maneuvered a large unidentifiable, techno-
scientific piece of equipment. One of the scientists gestured slowly with a white-gloved 
hand, as the other man carefully moves the machine into place. The scene then cut to a 
blindingly white snowy landscape in which the artists – dressed as witches with pointy 
black hats, black capes, and gloves – made slow, hypnotic hand gestures as their cats 
cavorted around them. Set to a techno-dance groove, the edits cut back and forth between 
the witches and the scientists, as each used their hands to shape and direct the movements 
on screen. The cats seemed to be enjoying themselves a great deal, and the patterns of 
their movement synched up with the witches’ gestural directives. As the cats and witches 
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played together, nobody could possibly believe that the interspecies companions were 
actually communicating telepathically ... or could they? 
 Why assume, for instance, that the witches were doing the directing? Perhaps the 
cats were setting the agenda and FASTWÜRMS were simply responding, adjusting their 
movements to reflect the imminent behaviours telegraphed by the cats they knew so well. 
Or perhaps the dynamic was a give and take in which all parties were teasing each other 
with intertwining moments of tension and release. During the climactic scene, one of the 
witches crouched in the foreground making an upwards gesture with his hand, his pointy 
witch hat perfectly composed in the frame, while one of the handsome orange cats, also 
perfectly composed (in both senses of the phrase), leapt dramatically up the side of a 
snow bank. It looked for all the world as if the witch and the cat were in cahoots, both 
playing to the camera, suggesting that we the audience were the ones being teased.  
 Of course there were others elements in this video besides the performing humans 
and cats – the pace of the edits, the dancey trance-like music, the contrast of the figures 
on the white snow, the juxtaposition between outdoor scenes and the science laboratory, 
all contributed to the dynamic tension. The scientists in the video were goofy in their 
solemnity, yet they exuded confidence. They had a methodological system for deploying 
their apparatus, and it worked. The witches adopted a similar demeanour. Nobody except 
FASTWÜRMS could wear those funny hats and pull it off. They seemed both convinced 
and convincing because, while they were certainly playing, they were not just playing. 
FASTWÜRMS really are witches, and they really do read cats’ minds.  
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 The word telepathy has a supernatural connotation, implying a mode of 
communication that happens by means that “cannot be understood by known scientific 
laws.” 40 Yet, mind reading, on the other hand, functions as a perfectly ordinary term in 
the neuro- and cognitive sciences. As I will discuss further in Chapters Five and Six, 
people often make assumptions about the thoughts and feelings of others based on facial 
expressions and body language. While the assumptions drawn from non-verbal 
interaction may not always be correct, they are accurate enough to form the basis of much 
communication. Interspecies mind reading, then, need not come as much of a surprise, 
especially between animals who are as intimate and familiar as FASTWÜRMS and the 
cats with whom they live. 
 Models of mind and inter-species interaction are connected because the ways 
humans think of themselves as biological entities impacts on the way social power 
dynamics are established in self and other relations to culture. Theorists – from Aristotle, 
who proposed that humans have better memory than other animals, affording us the 
capacity for art and reason,41 to philosopher of science Mary Midgley, who suggested 
that humans are unique in the degree to which they communicate with each other, a 
capacity that emerges in babies even before they develop motor skills – have found it 
useful to delineate essential differences between humans and other animals.42 In cognitive 
science, the capacity for theory of mind – which means the understanding that others 
besides oneself have states of mind – ostensibly marks a boundary between humans and 
other species. As neurologist Adam Zeman explained it, “The ability to read our own 
states of mind and to recognize them in others is a central part of human self-
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consciousness, involving what we called the ‘awareness of awareness.’”43 Zeman argued 
that the concept of theory of mind as formulated in cognitive science serves as a 
“corrective to [neuroscientific] ideas framed solely in the language of neuron and brain: 
society plays a powerful role in the creation of a fully fledged human consciousness.”44 
The capacity for theory of mind allows people to form human collectives, but what of 
other species or nonsentient entities with no minds (or, at least, no brains) at all? 
FASTWÜRMS’ aesthetic research methods are interesting in this regard because they 
recognize such entities as participants in their work. Through cohabiting, communicating, 
collaborating, crafting, and collecting, FASTWÜRMS’ processes of embodied 
engagement have manifested in their exuberant exhibitions, where audiences were invited 
to actively join in. As Barbara Fischer has noted, FASTWÜRMS installations appeal to 
the visitor to “get involved, to act, to partake in the tasks that they propose. Their own 
intuitive communications as a collective are thus extended to a yet larger group: the 
artwork’s audience.”45 Instead of producing sublime confrontations between humans and 
a humanist construction of nature-as-other, FASTWÜRMS have positioned humans as  
members of the animal kingdom, actively co-habiting the planet in ongoing interaction 
with other species.  
 
Intelligibility as a Capacity of Humans and Non-Humans Alike 
FASTWÜRMS’ ecological stance is distinctive because they do not recognize 
nature/culture boundaries. Instead, they produce aesthetic experiences that emphasize 
perceptions that emerge within an interspecies subjectivity. By contrast, in her 2010 
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book, The Ethics of Earth Art, art historian Amanda Boetzkes analyzed ecological works 
by earth artists such as Robert Smithson, Andy Goldsworthy and Ana Mendieta and 
James Turrell,46 arguing that these artists withdrew from representing nature, thereby 
acknowledging that nature is irreducible to human experience. Like Georges Didi-
Huberman, Boetzkes engaged earth’s materiality as an “otherness that escapes 
signification.”47 She explained that “... an ecological stance involves revealing the limits 
of an anthropocentric worldview and recognizing these limits as thresholds to the excess 
of the earth.”48 Boetzkes drew on Luce Irigaray’s concept that difference from the other 
provokes wonder which prevents assumption of the other into oneself.49 She insisted on 
the earth’s alterity as a necessary condition for an ethical relationship between humans 
and nature.  
 In the context of contemporary ecological issues, I concur with Boetzkes’ urgent 
call to recognize the material world as such, and I share her view that artworks’ aesthetics 
can manifest as ethical relations between humans and other entities. I resist, however, her 
insistence on affirming an untraversable divide between humans and nature. Writing 
about Andy Goldsworthy’s interventions, for example, she suggested that in “staging the 
body’s separation from the earth’s substance...artists identify a rupture between sensation 
and intelligibility.”50 But it could as easily be argued that Goldsworthy’s aesthetic 
reconfigurations of natural elements do not reinforce distinctions between sensation and 
intelligibility, but rather situate sensation as a mode of intelligibility – the percipient’s 
own awareness of their perceptions and constructions of form manifesting as a 
neuroaesthetic capacity for knowing and engaging with the world.   
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 In examining how FASTWÜRMS entail natural elements as agents in the cultural 
webs they weave, I aim to demonstrate that sensation and intelligibility are in fact 
inextricably intertwined. In my neuroaesthetic formulation, the aesthetic, in 
encompassing the conditions of human perception, affirms the status of humans as 
natural creatures, while simultaneously revealing the role of sensation as a culturally 
contingent mode of knowing. In turn, contingent knowledge becomes a condition of 
sensation, in that no sensation can occur in isolation from the temporal and ongoing 
reciprocity of situated exploration of the world. Intelligibility, then, can be understood 
not just as a discursive reading of the world, but also as an embodied, contingent mode of 
navigating the world. It is important to recognize, as Haraway has, that knowledge is 
situated and partial. In this, I concur with Boetzkes’ suggestion that the ethics of 
engaging the non-human world must entail acknowledgement of otherness. Nevertheless, 
drawing from Barad, it is also important to acknowledge that intelligibility itself is not 
exclusive to human modes of knowing. In considering intelligibility as a natural/cultural 
phenomenon, I draw from Karen Barad’s idea of agential materialism.  
In traditional humanist accounts, intelligibility requires an intellective 
agent (that to which something is intelligible), and intellection is framed as 
a specifically human capacity. But in my agential realist account, 
intelligibility is an ontological performance of the world in its ongoing 
articulation. It is not a human-dependent characteristic but a feature of the 
world in its differential becoming.51 
 
In Barad’s radical formulation she did not hesitate to ascribe agency, or even modes of 
knowing, to non-human creatures and she extended her ontology to include non-living 
entities. Yet, she would most certainly agree with Boetzkes that the earth is irreducible to 
human experience – while non-humans entities share the capacity for intelligibility, that 
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does not mean that their modes of knowing are always open or accessible to human 
points of view. Barad assumed a situated subject, drawn from Haraway, whose 
knowledge is never omniscient and detached, but always partial, fluidly co-constituted in 
ongoing entanglements of difference in intra-actions with others.  
 If knowing and intelligibility are not the exclusive purview of humans, then other 
entities can also be understood as both natural and cultural, or as Barad would say, to be 
engaged in “naturalcultural practices.”52 While humans are not physiologically equipped 
to perceive the world as other species perceive it, they are nevertheless actively engaged 
as creatures of the world, where various forms of “naturalcultural practice” intersect and 
overlap. The artists that Boetzkes takes up, she argues, maintain a respectful distance 
from the other that is nature even as they make their marks in and on the earth. 
FASTWÜRMS, however, do not presume that other species are unintelligible. Rather, 
their address to alterity embraces nature, activated through heterogeneous webs of 
lexical, iconic, logocentric, atmospheric, affective, frightening, funny and audacious 
interconnections. The forms of knowledge associated with both witchcraft and with 
Barad’s feminist scientific epistemology, derive from observations of nature and 
epistemological investment in the complex and contingent interactions of matter. 
FASTWÜRMS’ artworks manifest matter as cultural and culture as material. 
Furthermore, they position other species, such as cats and spiders, as collaborators and 
colleagues who make active contributions to the socio-cultural networks that they invoke. 
Finally, in one section of Donky@Ninja@Witch they also used written language to 
invoke particular powers attributed to non-human species.  
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 While interconnecting webs in the brightly-lit first sections of the gallery invited 
open-ended interaction through embodied interaction, the spells that FASTWÜRMS’ cast 
in the second, darker space foregrounded associative cognition using written words. Here, 
some of the associations provoked were more directive, delivered through eerie 
incantation, and the atmosphere proved too frightening for some young audience 
members. On opening night I witnessed several students flee the back room for the more 
brightly lit sense of communal fun in the front galleries. I admit that I felt some 
trepidation myself, yet, as with all the best comedy-horror movies, FASTWÜRMS’ camp 
presented fear as an optional indulgence, rather than an imposition. 
A grid of banners were installed near two hanging cauldrons. Each banner bore a 
phrase of spell casting such as “coil of snake,” “stab of heron,” “dive of loon,” and “fix of 
frog.” The scenario was reminiscent of the three witches in Macbeth who incant around 
their cauldron, “Eye of newt and toe of frog, wool of bat and tongue of dog...”53 Like the 
Macbeth witches, FASTWÜRMS’ installation conveyed something half-way between 
slap-stick humour and awe. The artists’ incantations, however, differed from 
Shakespeare’s in a significant way. The animal attributes that FASTWÜRMS invoked 
didn’t refer to bodily objects such as eyes, toes, and tongues that could be severed and 
boiled, but to actions – behaviours that could be emulated but never possessed. 
Nevertheless, FASTWÜRMS’ methodology differed dramatically from the earth artists 
examined by Boetzkes in that the witches did not withdraw respectfully from the alterity 
of nature, but actively, audaciously, enlisted non-human entities into their sphere of 
influence.  
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 Boetzkes’ feminist rehabilitation of phenomenology is very helpful to situate 
sensory experience of the world as partial and provisional rather than deterministic. 
Irigaray, Boetzkes explained, objected to the solipsism of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. 
While Irigaray was willing to accept Merleau-Ponty’s argument that tactility informs 
sensations to create coherent perceptions, she argued that much of the world eludes 
perception altogether.54 In this, then, Irigaray’s influence can also be felt in Haraway and 
Barad, who argue that situated knowledges are always limited and all-encompassing 
points of view are impossible propositions. In Irigaray’s 1985 essay, “Is the Subject of 
Science Sexed?” she referred to science as a “ universe of fiction,”55 and worried about 
who was not being heard and what as left unsaid by formalized, discipline-specific 
languages.  
 Boetzkes, in writing about the artist Hamish Fulton – who conducted walks in 
nature and documented them with terse and factual wall texts – claimed that the 
“...earth’s excess registers in the textual document as an obstacle to meaning...”56 For 
Boetzkes, the artist Fulton held back, adopting an ethical stance regarding the earth 
“...that for Irigaray is a retraction from the mistaken presumption that one knows the 
other, in order to let the other present itself in its own terms.” 57 The ethics of making art 
about nature, for Boetzkes, lay in artists’ decisions to present the natural world as 
something unknowable. By contrast, FASTWÜRMS, might have seemed to suggest that 
the non-human world is knowable by audaciously displaying banners bearing 
incantations of animal attributes in the English language. I aim to demonstrate, however 
that FASTWÜRMS’ mode of knowing nature retains the ethical acknowledgment of 
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otherness so important to Boetzkes and Irigaray, while retaining a relational sense of 
shared community between species that they activate as human accountability for their 
behaviour towards non-human animals.  
 The texts on FASTWÜRMS’ banners were reminiscent of wording in the Orbis 
Sensualium Pictus, a picture book for children, published in 1657, which announced itself 
as “A Picture and Nomenclature of all the chief things in the world, and of men’s actions 
in their way of living.”58 An animal alphabet alliteratively lists certain natural entities and 
their behaviours, such as, “àà: the Crow crieth,” “lu ulu: the Wolf howleth” and “fi fi fi: 
the Wind bloweth.” 59 The book falls laughably short of living up to its claims of 
comprehensive classification, as many creatures, elements, and processes are left out. 
And yet, what is to be made of an inventory that includes both the wind and the wolf as 
agents? In Orbis Sensualium Pictus the poetics of the inclusions invoked the exclusions, a 
sphere of relations that was unknown but not unknowable. Similarly, the metaphoric 
nature of FASTWÜRMS’ spells implied a larger, potent semantic system, pregnant with 
possibilities. As with any scientific system of classification, boundaries remain 
contestable and any acknowledgement of alterity can foster change.  
 While the black cauldrons in the installation dangled as if in reference to a 
fictional potion, the actual concocting happened in the moment, in the gallery, as viewers 
were invited to internalize a potent mixture of animal powers that just might linger and 
empower beyond the experience of the exhibition. Not only did the animal powers 
invoked by FASTWÜRMS emerge through verbal naming, but the installation also 
imparted knowledge of how to cast such a spell. The piece included no “logos of human” 
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banner, but one could hypothetically be added to the grid of incantations. 
FASTWÜRMS’ address revealed an excessive dimension of logos itself; a capacity for 
meaning making that exceeds the limits of intelligibility. In this way, FASTWÜRMS 
didn’t mistakenly assume to speak for others in Irigaray’s sense, but rather hailed non-
human confederate by naming their capacities – “coil of snake,” “ dive of loon” – as a 
way of performing interspecies affinities through identification of observed physical 
behaviours. “For Irigaray,” wrote Boetzkes, “the ethical relation is negotiated through a 
mode of corporeal interaction. This relation caresses and embraces but never grasps or 
envelops, the other.”60 While FASTWÜRMS situate themselves as cultural/natural 
interspecies mediators, they never coerce their collaborators nor their audiences by 
imposing subjectivities on them, but rather pay them homage as participating entities, 
powerful in their own right. Speaking of their cats, FASTWÜRMS explained their 
interspecies relationship as a familial connection. 
The idea of a familiar is literally that they’re your family, which means 
you break down any emotional or psychological barriers that should 
supposedly exist between self and Other. You think of them as part of you, 
an extension of you. Their sensory information reaches you. For example, 
with cats, they know the world differently. If you observe them long 
enough and you’re that linked, then you can actually see through their 
eyes or hear the way that they hear.61 
 
Magic, at least in this instance, may be a matter of paying attention at the edges of 
perception, of listening perceptively and calling out to others on their own terms, refusing 
to accept that there can be no possibility of communication across difference. 
  In their manifesto, published in the Donky@Ninja@Witch exhibition catalogue 
produced by Contemporary Art Gallery, FASTWÜRMS explained, “In Witch culture 
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personal freedom is a participation and positivity economy, enhance the liberty of Others 
and you prosper, constrain free will and you suffer.”62 In contrast to Shakespeare’s 
witches, FASTWÜRMS would never cast a narrative spell that involved the 
dismemberment of animals. Their cats are not possessed as pets, but respected as family 
members, and the artists thoroughly reject the notion that one being could own another. 
At the very back of the second gallery, their Donky installation bore a poster with a quote 
from Alice Walker: 
The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made 
for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women 
created for men. 
 
FASTWÜRMS have actively resisted instrumentalizations of non-human and human 
animals alike. By making their philosophies of mutual respect and free will explicit, 
FASTWÜRMS created a frame of reference that conferred as much importance on the 
knowledge and agency of the viewer (also, technically, an animal) as on the knowledge 
and agency of the artist (another animal).  
 FASTWÜRMS’ installation Pink Donky, presented in a screening room shaped 
like a small barn, operated, in part, as an homage to the Donkey Sanctuary of Canada, 
where the animals are given space to wander and the freedom to conduct their lives 
according to their own volition. Pink Donky was a new work produced for the exhibition. 
One side of the hut bore a large colour photograph of a donkey at the sanctuary, on the 
other side hung the Alice Walker quote, cited above, linking human ownership of animals 
with slavery. FASTWÜRMS explained their use of Alice Walker’s quotation, and their 
frustration with people who do not recognize animals’ rights to self-determination.  
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There is an impossibility of seeing beyond a construct that benefits you. 
People will say, “sure, your nature stuff is all very well but I am going to 
continue eating chickens because that’s just the way it is.” They don’t stop 
to realize that years ago people would’ve said the same thing about 
keeping slaves.63  
 
And, true to form, FASTWÜRMS used the technology of language to interrupt social 
constructs, jarring preconceptions by spelling Donky without an “e.” In their glossary, 
they presented their own definitions for both terms: 
Donkey: to consider interspecies exchange as an aesthetic object in and of 
itself. 
 
Donky: to perversely celebrate the transcendent value of the lowest form 
of unrewarded labour.64 
 
As with the animal banners, FASTWÜRMS again mobilized nouns as verbs. “In 
witchcraft,” they asserted, “language is powerful enough that by speaking with intent you 
can manifest the symbolic order.”65 Here, the witches transformed the conventional 
symbolic construction of donkey, as an object for human use, into a process of aesthetic 
engagement and accountability. As FASTWÜRMS explained about their potent 
manipulations of English, “if you don’t know the reference, it’s a hidden language.”66 By 
sharing their terminology in a glossary, they let audiences in on the performative power 
of their words.  
  The artworks may have been magical in that they facilitated the power of 
transformation from one mode of being to another, but they were not supernatural 
because all of the processes that took place were apparent and embodied in the contexts 
and constructs of the physical world. By enacting knowledge of their witch’s creeds 
FASTWÜRMS embodied magic without deceit. While the exhibition literally contained 
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both smoke and mirrors, it remained devoid of chicanery or coercion. As with scientific 
research conducted in a lab, the gallery installation made the knowledge produced and the 
means of its production openly available for communal public use and scrutiny. 
Percipients were invited to engage their critical faculties in choosing for themselves how 
deeply they wanted to enter FASTWÜRMS cosmology. By explicitly inviting 
experiences of agency, they created a safe environment for neuroaesthetic exploration. In 
contrast to the coercive conditions and constraints of the MRI scanner, FASTWÜRMS’ 
installation empowered an “awareness of awareness” within embodied processes of 
cognitive association.   
 
Donky@Ninja@Witch as a Neuroaesthetic Research Site 
The gallery conditions of the neuroaesthetic experience of Donky@Ninja@Witch could 
never be comprehensively reproduced for quantification in a labratory-based neuro-
imaging experiment. As discussed in the previous chapter, fMRI requires the 
identification and isolation of specific neural activity in predetermined regions of the 
brain. In contrast, FASTWÜRMS’ retrospective gallery installation manifested as a 
different kind of model, one more aligned with developments in neuro- and cognitive 
science that focus on abduction, or association, and consider the brain as a organism co-
constituted the world through ongoing feedback and engagement. Significantly, while an 
fMRI experiment can only account for linear relations of active stimulus and passive 
respsonse, FASTWÜRMS’ formulation embraced multiple entities in the assemblage –
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 brains, bodies, cats, spiders, images and objects alike – as agents in collective co-
constructions of embodied art experience.  
 In experiencing Donky@Ninja@Witch, the brains of multiple percipients 
performed physically in association with other socio-cultural agents in the web. 
Furthermore, the exhibition transparently staged these cognitive processes of association 
as aesthetic modes of engagement. FASTWÜRMS’ installation differed from a scientific 
model in that the results it produced cannot be reliably repeated, and depend entirely on 
the subjective experience of participants. Nevertheless, Donky@Ninja@Witch did offer a 
material instantiation of associative cognition as a mode of interaction within extensive 
networks of, in Fodor’s terms, “epistemic commitments.”67 Art in art contexts cannot 
quantify the open-ended variables and potentially infinite spheres of influence on 
consciousness, yet, when considered qualitatively as situated, neuroaesthetic 
engagements of audiences, FASTWÜRMS’ installations did encourage embodied 
knowledge of cognitive association into awareness. Thus, while the installation did not 
scientifically model the networked nature of the brain, in fact it operated very much like a 
brain through its sheer complexity as it activated cognitive processes entailing social and 
material networks unbounded by the physical limits of the installation.   
 
Conclusion 
In a time of ecological disaster, humans ought not to underestimate their power. Humans 
are not the only ones acting, knowing and creating meanings, but they are accountable for 
the natural/cultural manifestations they help to bring about. In this chapter I have 
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demonstrated how, by activating the human capacity for embodied association through 
art and language, FASTWÜRMS revealed that nature and culture operate as co-
constitutive spheres, entangling audience agencies with those of animals, images and 
objects. As Boetzkes insisted, nature cannot be fully expressed by human forms of 
knowledge. At the same time, Barad, Latour and Haraway have all suggested that human 
forms of knowledge are in themselves natural phenomena. Like these theorists, in their 
exhibition Donky@Ninja@Witch, FASTWÜRMS embraced accountability to other 
human and non-human entities by fully acting in and of the world. They did not feign 
objective detachment, instead they exercised their capacity for power, extending 
empowerment to others by welcoming them to collaborate in the production of aesthetic 
incantations that revealed multiple associations between various social and interspecies 
networks. In FASTWÜRMS’ formulation, other humans (including their audiences) and 
non-human entities were enlisted, solicited and seduced to contribute their own 
knowledge-producing capacities to the witches’ aesthetic nature/culture matrix. In this 
collaborative process, they exemplify Boetzkes call for artists who work with nature to 
respect the differences between humans and non human entities. FASTWÜRMS’ 
interspecies collective included themselves, the animals they invoked, the objects and 
images they engaged and the audiences they addressed.  
 The key stakes of my neuroaesthetic analysis of Donky@Ninja@Witch, pertain to 
my analogy between the installation and a living brain. As percipients were invited to 
actively navigate the overlapping complexities of the exhibition, they were further 
welcomed to become aware of their own processes of cognitive association as embodied 
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modes of knowing. In the gallery, the intersecting webs of association across multi-
dimensional networks could not be mapped nor charted, just as the complex parallel 
networks of consciousness evade inventory and defy models. Furthermore, like a 
cogitating brain, FASTWÜRMS’ installation utilized associative cognition to entail 
subjective webs of knowledge derived from the situated life experiences of individual 
gallery goers. As these art engagements unfolded in the gallery, they offered non-
linguistic, neuroaesthetic awareness of cognitive processes of abuction. Important for the 
neuroaesthetic proposition is that the experience of certain artworks emerges as a 
physiological form of social engagement. The gallery installation Donky@Ninja@Witch 
was itself a networked, natural/cultural environment providing context within which to 
consider the brain as a social organ.  
 I shall carry this notion of the social brain forward into the next chapter, where I 
examine works by Olafur Eliasson that operate within gallery contexts to activate 
audience awareness of vision as an embodied, culturally inflected and critical mode of 
knowing. •  
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Olafur Eliasson: Visual Cognition as a Critical Capacity 
 
 
Imagine entering a room lit thoroughly with an even, lemon yellow light. The 
colour yellow saturates the space so thoroughly that every other colour in the 
spectrum has disappeared. Given the lack of colour differentiation, light and dark 
provide the only contrast, so that the objects in the room, including other people, 
become strangely monotone – like seeing in black and white, only in this case 
yellow replaces white. The human visual system has not evolved to comfortably 
contend with an environment like Olafur Eliasson’s installation Room for One 
Colour. Eliasson’s colour installations staged the human sense of vision as the 
object of the art work itself, bringing normally nonconscious dimensions of visual 
cognition into conscious awareness. 
 In the previous chapter I examined how FASTWÜRMS’ installation 
Donky@Ninja@Witch, provided a model for neuroaesthetic knowledge by 
encouraging awareness of cognitive processes of association. In this chapter, I 
will explore how two of Eliasson’s immersive installations – Room for One 
Colour (2003) and 360° room for all colours (2002) – activate neuroaesthetic 
understandings of contemporary, techno-mediated environments by facilitating 
percipients’ reflexive awareness of “seeing themselves seeing.”1  
 Eliasson is a Danish artist working out of Berlin. His studio been 
mounting large-scale museum and gallery installations internationally since the 
mid 1990s. In 2003, Eliasson received wide spread media attention for his 
installation in Turbine Hall at the Tate Museum in London. For this piece, titled 
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The Weather Project, Eliasson installed a sun-like disc emitting a warm, orange 
light. Mists filled the space, creating a sense of atmosphere. The ceiling was 
mirrored, so that visitors could look up and see their own reflections in this 
otherworldly environment. The light-emitting disc in The Weather Project was 
comprised of mono-frequency lamps, which Eliasson had used previously in 
Room for One Colour - first installed at the Venice Biennale in 2003 - in which he 
saturated a room with yellow light. I have chosen to focus on Room for One 
Colour, because, in contrast to The Weather Project, it made no representational 
references. While The Weather Project presented an illusion of landscape, Room 
for One Colour more specifically focused attention on the physiology of colour 
perception itself. I will also consider another of Eliasson's colour installations, 
360° room for all colours (2002) which similarly cast visual cognition as the 
subject of the work. Both Room for One Colour and 360° room for all colours 
were mounted, among other installations, in a North American survey of 
Eliassion’s installations titled Take Your Time. The exhibition travelled between 
the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art (September - February 2008) and The 
Museum of Modern Art and P.S.1. Contemporary Art Centre in New York (April 
- June 2008).  
 Staged within the public context of the art museum Eliasson’s colour 
installations used projected light to create immersive environments that had 
direct, physiological impact on the visual systems of percipients. By producing 
after-images, and other optical effects, these works revealed limits and 
  177 
vulnerabilities in the human visual system.  
 In her book on neuroaesthetics, Stafford examined Eliasson (among many 
other artists), suggesting that his work “belongs to the ever-widening horizons of 
the eye in the age of physiologically expanded and technologically extended 
human faculties.”2 Stafford identified a “new conceptualism” emerging in 
contemporary art practice that “deterritorializes and reterritorializes the findings 
of the neurosciences into an artistic practice that is embodied both mentally and 
experientially.”3 While I would hesitate to separate the mental from the 
experiential, Stafford emphasized both explicitly in order to counteract the 
neuroaesthetic tendency to focus primarily on nonconscious processes.  
While Room for One Colour and 360° room for all colours addressed 
nonconscious and involuntary aspects of colour perception, I shall extend 
Stafford’s brief analysis of Eliassion to demonstrate in detail how, in the reflexive 
and collective context of the msuesum, these works produced different modes of 
neuroaesthetic knowledge from those that emerge in neuroscience labs. In 
particular, while subjects in fMRI scanners provide information about the brain to 
the scientists who observe them, Eliassion’s installations provided embodied 
knowledge to the percipients who were subject to their effects. Furthermore, 
encouraging critical consideration of how the physiological engagements of 
vision unfolding within the context of the museum might inform the perceptual 
impacts of pervasive technoscientific conditions encountered in broader cultural 
contexts.  
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 I will begin by considering the neuroaesthetics of embodied vision raised 
by Room for One Colour and 360° room for all colours in light of feminist 
thinkers from science studies, affect theory and art history who reclaim vision 
from its modernist formulation as a detached, omniscient mode of knowing to 
resituate it within the sensorial matrices of situated, corporeal bodies. Within this 
feminist framework of embodied vision, I will proceed to describe the works, and 
consider how they addressed audiences in both physiological and social 
dimensions. I will then aim to demonstrate in detail how Eliasson’s particular 
form of neuroaesthetic engagement formulated three interrelated subjectivities: 
affirmation, catharsis, and criticality. Turning specifically to the neuroaesthetics 
of color perception as an active and contingent process of engagement with the 
world, I will compare understandings of colour as a construct of the nervous 
system posited by Eliasson’s art installations and by Zeki in his neuroaesthetic 
writings. Finally, I will assess how these analyses inform phenomenological 
readings of Eliasson’s work. My objective here is to interrogate how vision and 
thought entangle within neuroaesthetics as capacities of situated bodies. Room for 
One Colour and 360° room for all colours facilitated embodied awareness of 
vision as a critical capacity for knowing the world. The gallery context thereby 
stands with the scientific laboratory as a neuroaesthetic research site.  
  
Embodied Vision 
While Eliasson does not present himself or his work within an explicitly feminist 
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context, I aim to demonstrate that his installations Room for One Colour and 360° 
room for all colours recall feminist theories of embodied vision. I will examine 
how these works reveal social dimensions within the physiology of visual 
cognition. Before discussing the installations in detail, however, I wish to address 
feminist theories of vision that inform my analysis.  
 Since the Enlightenment, seeing and thinking have been associated and 
celebrated as interrelated faculties of reason. Scientific imaging technologies – the 
microscope, the telescope, the x-ray, the MRI scanner – reinforce notions of 
vision as a linear beam, travelling between the observer and the observed to 
produce a detached, objective stance. As Haraway described it, “vision is the 
sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and 
into a conquering gaze from nowhere.”4 Meanwhile, modernist art history 
construed vision as transcendent and timeless – “an abstract condition,” as 
Rosalind Krauss described the formulation, “with no before and no after.”5 If, as 
Susan Buck-Morss suggested, modernity has conflated vision with reason and 
separated both from the feminine excess of the body,6 there is a feminist case to 
be made for reclaiming both vision and the intellect as embodied human 
capacities. Drawing from Haraway, Krauss and Buck-Morss, I will position the 
sense of sight as part of a synthesis of biological functions of specific living 
organisms. While seeing occurs, the pulse quickens and slows, lungs expand and 
contract, oxygen circulates and hormones ebb and flow. Furthermore, I propose 
that the intellect may also be reclaimed within a feminist formulation of embodied 
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experience. After all, even abstract concepts have material, biological dimensions 
as temporal, organic processes of embodied brains.  
 The neuroaesthetic analysis I am proposing here takes up third wave 
feminist reconsiderations of vision as a sense entangled with the other senses, as 
well as with conscious cognition. As Jennifer Fisher explained vision has 
traditionally been characterized as a distal sense, subjectively situated as external 
to the body.  
Where the visual sense permits a transcendent, distant and 
arguably disconnected, point-of-view, the haptic sense functions 
by contiguity, contact and resonance. The haptic sense renders the 
surfaces of the body porous, being perceived at once inside, on the 
skin's surface, and in external space.7 
 
Fisher challenged the primacy of vision by devoting attention to haptics as an 
aesthetic mode, opening up a theoretical space for consideration of the ways that 
artists, artworks and audiences interact affectively through touch, proprioception 
and kinaesthetics. In doing so, however, she proposed that vision and haptics are 
not binary opposites, but are rather mutually implicated in aesthetic experience. “I 
am not concerned in posing a binary of touch and vision,” she explained, “but in 
examining how art works pose interminglings of these sense modalities.”8 I take 
up Fisher’s notion of haptics as it intersects with and challenges neuroaesthetic 
considerations of vision as an organic process performed by the cells, tissues and 
fibres of the body. In this sense, I will explore the haptic implications of 
Eliasson’s immersive colour installations, examining how they provoke 
perceptual effects that reveal the material limitations of vision as an evolved, 
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biological capacity, developed through active engagement with the environment.  
 While the visual sense has been overly privileged and reified, it remains 
important to theories of embodied perception. Writing in 1991, Haraway made a 
call for a feminist reconstitution of vision.  
I want a feminist writing of the body that metaphorically 
emphasizes vision again, because we need to reclaim that sense to 
find our way through all the visualizing tricks and powers of 
modern sciences and technologies that have transformed the 
objectivity debates. We need to learn in our bodies, endowed with 
primate color and stereoscopic vision, how to attach the objective 
to our theoretical and political scanners in order to name where we 
are and are not, in dimensions of mental and physical space we 
hardly know how to name.9 
 
It was not enough for feminists to celebrate the body; Haraway demanded a 
hybrid conception of embodiment in which all the senses, including vision, 
emerge in co-constitution with shifting cultural conditions. Feminists, she put 
forward, should be able to access “the objective” as scientists do. But Haraway’s 
objectivity (even as she extended it to science) by no means implied a detached, 
omniscient stance; rather, she advocated a situated, partial point of view, located 
in the contingent flux of life experience. This formulation endowed vision itself 
with limiting biological properties and conditions. Haraway’s feminist vision 
offered clarity, not through transcendent all-encompassing views, but through an 
acknowledgement of the limits on seeing, an awareness of the not-seen. I aim to 
advance Haraway’s formulation by theoretically sustaining the collective 
dimension of cultural engagement as an active aspect of vision that entails the 
acknowledgement of other possible visual standpoints besides one’s own. 
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Eliasson’s works, I propose, inhabit this zone of contingent visuality. As distinct 
from neuro-imaging experiments, where visual neural processes are isolated, 
triggered, traced and quantified by detached observers, artworks by Eliasson 
simultaneously invoke and confound vision as an embodied and culturally 
entangled object of neuroaesthetic inquiry conducted by situated participants.  
 
Situating Subjectivities 
Eliasson’s bringing into conscious awareness aspects of vision that usually occur 
nonconsciously in everyday life, has contributed to neuroaesthetics by providing 
explicit embodied knowledge about physiological conditions of visual cognition. 
In many of his installations, the artworks themselves actually manifested only in 
the nervous systems of their viewers. One example is the installation Room For 
One Colour, which has been installed in various locations including the Danish 
Pavilion at the Venice Biennale (2003), the Malmö Konsthall in Sweden (2005) 
and the Museum of Modern Art in New York (2008). The piece contains no 
objects nor images, consisting only of an empty room saturated with yellow light. 
At the MoMA in New York, the piece was installed in the hallway outside the 
galleries on the second floor. Museum visitors ascended the escalator, emerging 
into a thoroughly yellow environment. (Fig.11) The light was produced with 
mono-frequency bulbs emitting a narrow frequency of light only in the yellow 
spectrum, so that no other colours were visible within the environment. This 
unusual light created several optical effects. Afterimage images appeared to 
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audiences because the yellow-perceiving receptors in their eyes got worn out; 
eventually, the white walls outside of the yellow room appeared purple.10 In 
addition, because the pervasive yellow light excluded other colours everything 
appeared in monotone. For some people, the dampening of colour processing 
meant that other visual processes, such as the perception of edges, became more 
acute. As Eliasson explained, the monochrome environment produced “the feeling 
of having a particularly sharp detection of the space and people around us.”11 The 
unusual visual effects themselves became the focus of attention because there 
were no objects nor images on display, only an empty hallway with museum 
visitors passing through. In Eliasson’s terms, there was nothing to see except 
seeing itself.12 While the piece has been installed in various contexts, in New 
York it served as an entry point, or introduction to Eliasson’s survey exhibition 
Take Your Time.  
 Within the galleries there were many installations of Eliasson’s works. 
One in particular, 360° room for all colours, also presented an empty space filled 
with saturated colour that stimulated visual after images. (Fig. 12) While Room 
For One Colour was installed as a transitional space filled with ambient light, 
360° room for all colours had a more sculptural presence. Museum visitors 
approached and entered a circular chamber, 10.5 feet high and almost 27 feet in 
diameter, standing in the middle of a room. Apart from the gap for the entrance, 
the inside of the chamber presented a continuous panoramic wall comprised of a 
blank projection foil. Behind the foil, banks of flourescent lights projected a 
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sequence of bright colours that saturated the circular space with a rich glow. Over 
time, the projected light shifted through a series of colour frequencies, timed 
perfectly so that an after image for each could get established in eyes of beholders 
before the colour would fade into the next. As Eliasson described it,  
With the blue space you have the orange afterimage and, after 
fifteen or twenty seconds, the orange afterimage is so strong that 
this idea of the blue starts to fade to pastel, then slowly working its 
way toward white. After another ten seconds, the blue doesn’t 
really seem blue to us, it is a mixture of both our afterimage and 
what we know about what we are looking at. But then, the piece 
starts to fade into another color, so we are then with “orange eyes” 
so to speak, and then the piece decides to fade from blue to 
yellow.13 
 
Within the installation, staged within the context of the museum, the nervous 
systems of percipients underwent physiological shifts, producing vivid colours 
that manifested only in their perception. By manipulating the physiology of 
beholders’ visual systems, these works conditioned audiences to see colours and 
images that did not exist outside their own perceptual experience.   
 While MoMA visitors had freedom of choice about whether or not to enter 
Eliasson’s exhibition, they had to pass through Room For One Colour in order to 
access the other installations in the show. Thus, it was difficult to avoid the 
physiological manipulations that the piece imposed, and if one found the 
experience discomforting one could only try to pass through it as quickly as 
possible. People reacted to these conditions in various ways. One online reviewer, 
Laura Mott, reported that at Eliasson’s SFMOMA (San Francisco Museum of Art) 
exhibition, people walked through Room For One Colour quickly in order to 
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“escape its severity.”14 Another reviewer, Katherine Whitney, described her 
experience in the same piece, 
The light was pure yellow – monochromatic – and it distorted our 
color perception. We looked at our hands – they look weird and 
dirty. My dad’s face was all blotchy. My daughter’s blue shirt 
looked grey. I looked at a total stranger. He looked back at me. It 
was our first clue that this will be a different kind of museum 
experience.15 
 
Indeed Eliasson provided an unusual art experience. There were no objects to 
look at except other people, no artworks to consider except the aesthetics of one’s 
own vision as one’s nervous system struggled to contend with odd environments 
for which it had not evolved. The installation situated the individual bodies/brains 
of subjects as the material sites where the artwork unfolded. Thus, somewhat like 
an fMRI experiment in which areas of subjects’s brains are activated by external 
stimuli, Room for One Colour physically triggered the visual systems of beholders 
in ways that were beyond their control.16 In contrast to the neuroscience lab, 
however, the subject under observation in Eliasson’s installations simultaneously 
performed as the observer conducting the investigation. Furthermore, this subject 
did not operate in isolation, but in the company of others, as audiences came into 
simultaneous contact with the artwork and with one another in a public sphere.  
 Claire Bishop proposed that installation art makes a specific form of 
subjective address. “Rather than imagining the viewer as a pair of disembodied 
eyes that survey the work from a distance,” she suggested, “installation art 
presupposes an embodied viewer whose senses of touch, smell and sound are as 
heightened as their sense of vision.”17 The conditions of installation art, as Bishop 
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explained, formulate a hypothetical, ideal viewer, alert to their own perceptual 
processes. This percipient must be physically present to experience the work, and 
thus for installation art the ideal viewer is also “a literal viewer,” in Bishop’s 
terminology. Indeed, Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours would 
not function as artworks without the presence of the viewer because the intended 
visual objects were afterimages produced in the viewers’ own bodies. Each 
installation was engineered to trigger viewers’ bodies to produce specific visual 
effects.  Of course, the same may be said of any work of visual art – when a 
sighted person stands before Barnett Newman’s Voice of Fire, for example, his or 
her brain will assess relationships between the varying wavelengths of light to 
produce a perception of colour. The difference I want to pinpoint here is that 
rather than externalizing vision as a set of attributes in the artwork, Room For 
One Colour and 360° room for all colours internalized vision as a capacity of the 
body. Furthermore, viewers standing in front of two dimensional artworks are free 
to turn their heads and look at something else; the body has been visually engaged 
but its functionality has not been tampered with. By contrast, Eliasson’s three 
dimensional installations encompassed the percipient in an ambient environment. 
Furthermore, even if museum visitors chose not to linger in these spaces, once the 
after images had been triggered in their perceptual systems they had no choice but 
to see them until the exhausted cones in their retina recovered enough to resume 
their regular activity. For this reason, Eliasson’s colour installations could be 
considered physical in the same sense that a hockey game is physical, meaning 
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that they made contact that left lasting, material effects on the bodies involved. 
Thus, Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours made their address to 
a literal viewer, physically present to experience the work. Yet, at the same time, 
the works directed attention toward visual processes, as such, reinforcing 
Bishop’s notion that installation art presupposes a hypothetical viewer who 
maintains a heightened state of awareness of their own perceptions.  
 For Eliasson, his focus of attention on viewer experience had political 
potential. “I find it crucial,” he said, “that museums focus on the visitor 
experience, rather than only on the artworks, to unfold their socializing potential 
and create an important relation between museums and the society in which they 
take part.”18 As a strategy for priming audiences to take agency, many of his titles 
have included the second person possessive pronoun. Titles like Your utopia and 
Your uncertainty of colour implied that audiences owned the aesthetic experience, 
rather than the artist or the institution. But of course this kind of directive gift has 
not always been accepted. In response to Eliasson’s exhibition title Take your 
time, art critic Peter Schejldahl playfully quipped, “I will do as I please with my 
time, thanks.”19 Also, as noted above, some viewers resisted immersion. Perhaps 
finding themselves uncomfortable with being so physically manipulated in a 
museum context, some hurried through Room for One Colour in order to evade 
the haptics of its insistent visual address. Eliasson’s works made the broadly 
empowering statement that art transpires in audience experience, yet at the same 
time, the mechanisms of his installations directly manipulated the visual systems 
  188 
of viewers. The outcome, however, was that the optical effects of afterimages 
revealed limitations to the visual system, inherently offering a reflexive 
neuroaesthetic awareness of biological constraints on human perceptual 
capabilities. Eliasson’s installations thus revealed that vision operates both more 
automatically and less reliably than one might have previously thought. The 
“most obvious impact of the yellow light,” said Eliasson of Room For One 
Colour, “[was] the realization that perception is acquired: the representational 
filter, or the sudden feeling that our vision simply is not objective, [was] brought 
to our awareness and with that our ability to see ourselves in a different light.”20 
But how exactly does the process of seeing oneself seeing extend into forms of 
political, ethical or critical engagement?  
 Some writers, such as Bishop, and art historians Jonathan Crary and 
Pamela Lee, found it important to locate Eliasson’s work within an ethical 
framework. Crary suggested that for Eliasson “the disruption of habit is one of the 
conditions of individual and collective freedom.”21 Eliasson’s audiences, then, 
were not simply passive subjects, nor raw material for producing artworks, 
because their aesthetic experiences had potentially liberating effects. Bishop took 
up Eliasson’s insistence that his work made institutional critique, suggesting that, 
“by returning to the subjective moment of perception, Eliasson aims less to 
activate viewers than to produce in them a critical attitude.”22 In Bishop’s 
formulation, Eliasson’s works formulate an ideal subject, a hypothetical viewer 
who both experiences the work and reflects on its implications within the context 
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of the institution. For Lee Eliasson’s institutional critique extended beyond to the 
museum to implicate broader social constructs. She contextualized his 
installations within an “ethos of immersion”23 that she identified as a “military-
industrial impetus” also giving rise to VR and computer games. “Perhaps,” she 
suggested, “his work illustrates the terms by which we perceive and accept 
everyday reality – whether nature or the museum or the amusement park – as so 
much techno-mediation.”24 Each of these writers was able to locate audience 
agency in works that determined audience experience to an unusual degree.  
 Bishop drew attention to the fact that art critics often conflate particular 
audience experiences with the subject implied in the artwork’s address. 
“Installation art,” she wrote, “plays on an ambiguity between two types of subject: 
the literal viewer who steps into the work, and an abstract philosophical model of 
the subject that is postulated by the way in which the work structures this 
encounter.”25 Thus, in Bishop’s formulation, installation art posits subjectivities 
available for consideration even by those who have not directly encountered the 
work. As public projects unfolding in the collective space of the museum, Room 
For One Colour and 360° room for all colours invited subjects to consider their 
own experiences of vision in relation to various subject positions invoked by the 
work, whether or not, as literal viewers, they identified with, or physically 
inhabited, those subjectivities themselves. Eliasson explained this self-reflexive 
dimension when he suggested that his audiences were invited to adopt a third-
person point of view.  
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What I look at is ... not only the experiencing of the artwork itself, 
or the artwork and institution as one, but also – and even more 
importantly – the ways in which the visitors may experience 
themselves experiencing the artwork. The audience should, in 
other words, be encouraged to see themselves both from a third-
person perspective, that is, from the outside, and from a first-
person perspective.26 
 
The ideal subject posited by Eliasson’s installation leverages embodied awareness 
of one’s own perceptual capacities into a critical stance from which to consider 
the cultural and biological limitations of vision – an awareness of the not-seen 
emerging through self-reflexive, aesthetic examination of the process of seeing. 
Not every viewer would engage with the work in this way during their experience 
of the installation, but it is enough, for neuroaesthetic theorization, that the 
material conditions of the artworks situated the individual experience of vision as 
a collective, human capacity operating in a social sphere.  
 For the purposes of detailed neuroaesthetic analysis, I will now break 
down the subjective address of Eliasson’s installations into three interrelated 
categories: affirmation, catharsis and criticality. The artworks facilitated each of 
these modes of aesthetic engagement as both first-hand performativities and third-
hand intellectual considerations. I will discuss each subjective proposition in turn: 
affirmation as an experience of self as a material entity; catharsis of anxieties that 
emerge from living as consumers of technoscience; criticality derived from 
contextualizing one’s individual sense of vision within larger social structures.  
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Affirmation of Self as a Material Entity 
The neuroaesthetic awareness of vision induced by Eliasson’s installations 
affirmed sensorial engagement with reality specifically by throwing direct 
connections between human vision and the world into question. This might be 
considered as a Cartesian problem; Descartes mistrusted information from his 
senses, because he knew from his experience of dreaming that such information 
could be wrong.27 Descartes’ scepticism about sensorial information is in some 
ways confirmed by feminist constructs of embodied vision, traditional 
neuroscience of vision and Eliasson’s colour installations, each of which asserts 
that vision does not operate as a transparent medium, providing direct access to 
external objects in the world, but as an evolutionary, species-specific negotiation 
with the world, resulting in provisional information. At the same time, however, 
the Cartesian polemic between an immaterial consciousness and a material world 
breaks down when vision itself manifests as an embodied process. The border 
between internal and external melts away, as does the distinction between subject 
and object. In Eliasson’s installations, the object under observation was the 
corporeal and subjective act of observing itself.  
 Vision is unique among the senses in that many of the components of its 
sensory organ, the eye, are actually comprised of brain cells. As neural anatomist 
David Bainbridge explains, 
[W]hen you are staring lovingly into somebody's eyes, you are 
actually staring at the perforated frontmost extension of his or her 
brain, which I admit does not seem quite so romantic. Yes, the iris 
is brain – the window on the soul after all. Admittedly the iris is an 
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unusual part of the brain. Beautiful pigmentation led to its name, 
which means “rainbow.” Also, it forms its own intrinsic muscles to 
open and close the pupil, and so it is the only part of the brain that 
can move itself.28 
 
Not to overly press the point, but the eyes and the brain are physically connected 
organs – what touches the eye, such as a wavelength of light, also touches the 
brain, in a very literal sense. Furthermore, the process of perception is itself a 
physical process, as neurons fire in various sections of the visual cortex, feeding 
information forward and back through neural networks, formulating decisions 
about what that information means. Just as perceptions of smell, taste and touch 
have effects on and in the body, colour also manifests as a physiological process.  
 Eliasson’s Room For One Colour tired out the cones in the eyes that signal 
to the brain to produce the colour yellow. These cones contain pigments that, like 
all pigments, absorb certain wavelengths of light, but they then do something 
more. As neuroscientist David H. Hubel explained, the physiology of vision also 
entails morphological and chemical changes at the cellular level.  
[A] visual pigment has the special property that when it absorbs a 
photon of light, it changes its molecular shape and at the same time 
releases energy. The release sets off a chain of chemical events in 
the cell ... leading ultimately to an electrical signal and secretion of 
chemical transmitter at the synapse.29  
 
As the human stomach has evolved to turn food into nutrients, parts of the human 
brain have evolved to turn light into colour. Vision, like digestion, is a biological 
process in which the body makes a series of material transformations. It is critical 
to keep in mind, however, that while the capacity for vision is shared by most 
people, vision manifests as highly subjective and individual experience. Colour 
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for example, is not a quality as much as it is a qualia, meaning that it is a 
sensation (or, more accurately, a relative set of sensations) negotiated and 
produced by the eyes and brain rather than a fixed feature of the object perceived. 
By pushing components of this physical human system past its usual capabilities, 
Eliasson induced colourful afterimages in the nervous systems of the viewers, 
thus drawing attention to the biological limitations of vision and affirming the 
reality of human perception itself as a material engagement with the world.  
 Calling for a feminist formulation of vision as embodied, situated and 
partial, Haraway described the human body as “endowed with primate colour.” 
What did she mean to invoke by that phrase? In her essay Situated Knowledges 
she suggested that “the eyes of any ordinary primate like us can be endlessly 
enhanced by sonography systems, magnetic resonance imaging...” and continues 
to cite an impressive list of optical devices that serve to “distance the knowing 
subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered power.”30 
Haraway situated the human animal, in this instance, as an ordinary primate, a 
biological creature with limited vision, especially when stripped of the prosthetic 
imaging systems of technoscience.  
 The ordinary primates visiting Eliasson’s installations were not equipped 
with special goggles or VR helmets to enhance or mitigate optical effects; the 
spectacles produced were pure “primate colour,” as viewers’ nervous systems 
adapted to novel environmental conditions. Haraway’s “primate colour,” 
however, classified humans within the biological order of primate, rather than the 
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species of human, emphasizing human affinity with other animals. All creatures 
have evolved their own particular sensorial modes. Most primates have better 
colour vision than other mammals,31 but many birds have the capacity to see more 
colours than primates.32 Of course there are animals, such bats, who don’t use 
vision at all, or dogs, who do see, but smell much better. One of the 
neuroaesthetic finding posited by Eliasson’s art, then, may be an awareness of self 
as an animal with a particular kind of nervous system, evolved to navigate well 
under certain environmental conditions, but not others (such as a rooms filled 
with only yellow light).  
 The evolution of human vision is not a progressive achievement by which 
humans have gained control over their environment, but an ongoing, fluid process 
of interaction and adaptation to specific sets of environmental conditions. Room 
For One Colour and 360° room for all colours revealed the limits of the human 
visual system by immersing beholders in a visual environment for which they 
were not evolutionarily adapted. Within the explicitly human context of the art 
museum, these works did not celebrate human powers of vision through dazzling 
spectacle, but rather created a contemplative space that drew attention to 
imperfections in the human visual system. Evolution has never been a  
teleological process with the goal of producing humans, but an unmotivated 
engine of diversity in which humans have emerged as just one of many diverse 
species, each configured to interact with particular environmental conditions 
through specific sensorial systems. This post-humanist standpoint can be 
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humbling because it highlights human vulnerability, not only as mortal 
individuals, but as an entire species constrained by the physical conditions of 
biological life on this planet. At the same time, an embodied understanding of 
vision’s limitations can be critically empowering because it problematizes 
humanist ideologies that privilege human vision by conflating it with Western 
norms, including technological determinism. Eliasson’s colour installations 
invoke post-humanist criticality by “touching” percipients’ visual systems, 
bringing the physiological limits of vision to the fore while simultaneously 
encouraging reflexive awareness of the process as it unfolds within the 
technologically and socially mediated environment of the museum installation. In 
order to collectively access the knowledge derived from “seeing oneself seeing,” 
the subjective experience of audiences must be valued and taken into account, 
even (or especially) as it evades empirical measure and determination.   
  While Haraway used the term “primate” to invoke the notion of humans 
as a species of animal, biologically conditioned like any other, she also raised the 
fraught power relations between humans and other primates in experimental 
science. Post-humanist affirmation of self as animal entails a socio-political 
power structure in which the techno-science of observation calls for subjective 
accountability between species. Neuroscience, in particular, has a complex 
dependence on non-human primate subjects. Most major universities have a 
monkey lab for performing neuroscience experiments. These labs generally keep 
a low profile, in order to stay under the radar of animal rights activists, but 
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monkey testing plays an essential role in neuroscience. As John Capitanio and 
Marina Emborg of the US National Primate Research Centre explained,  
This animal model is especially valuable because of the many 
similarities between human and non-human primates that derive 
from their common ancestry, such as complex cognitive 
capabilities, great social complexity, details of reproductive 
biology, and intricacy of brain organisation.33 
  
While monkeys are useful test subjects because of their close kinship with 
humans, differences in ethical protocol between the two species mean that, as test 
subjects, non-human primates undergo much more invasive procedures than 
humans do. Electrode implants can be placed directly into monkey’s brains. This 
technology can produce very high resolution data, right down to the level of a 
single neuron, thus, neuroscientists surmise much of their knowledge about the 
workings of the human brain through a process of correlation between high 
resolution data on monkeys (implants) and lower resolution data on humans (MRI 
and fMRI).  
 Zeki has spent the bulk of his career in neuroscience studying vision in 
humans and non-human primates. In 1973 he published a paper describing his 
experimental procedure for establishing which areas within the visual cortex of 
rhesus monkeys respond to certain colour stimuli.  
The animals were anaesthetized with sodium pentobarbital and 
paralyzed with gallamine triethiodide (5 mg/kg/h). A hole was 
drilled in the skull over the appropriate region and an agar filled 
chamber was placed over the defect, thus providing a closed, 
transparent system through which microelectrode penetrations 
could be made. The animals' eyes were dilated with atropine (0.5 
7oo) and covered with neutral contact lenses; supplementary lenses 
were employed to bring images on a screen 114 cm away, to a 
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focus on the retina, the stimuli originating from a projector 
equipped with a variable rectangular diaphragm, thereby allowing 
the presentation of different shapes.34 
 
This research, representing an early stage in the cartographic knowledge about the 
vision areas of the brain, also serves as a distressing reminder of the kind of 
suffering that non-human primates endure as a matter of course when they are put 
to human use as subjects of science.  
 Haraway, well aware of ways that non-human primates have been 
objectified by scientific practice, invoke the phrase “primate color” in part to 
acknowledge a relation of complicity between a human individual’s situated 
experience of colour perception, the science of colour perception and power 
structures of dominance and submission woven into social assemblages of 
knowledge formation. Eliasson’s installations similarly raise awareness of the 
extent to which technoscientific environments condition Western colour 
perception. Within the reflexive context of the art installation percipients took 
notice of the ways that Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours 
manipulated the workings of the visual system, this subjective address could then 
be extended to the technologically constructed visual environments of daily life. 
On the one hand, Eliasson’s installations gave viewers a raw experience of their 
own embodied vision without screens or lenses, affirming vision as a biologically 
evolved human capacity, developed to help the animal human body contend with 
particular environmental conditions and not others. At the same time, the 
environments that he engineered were highly technical, and the embodied 
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knowledge about vision that they manifested derived, in large part, from science. 
Furthermore, like Haraway, Eliasson resisted romantic constructions of vision as a 
pure, biological experience centred in the individual. Rather, the subjective forms 
of knowledge about vision that his works provoked entailed an awareness of 
technoscientific cultural conditions as they impact aesthetic experience. In this 
way, his works made an affirmation of self as a material entity, while 
simultaneously situating that material self as a vulnerable, yet accountable, 
participant in the material word. 
  
Catharsis of Technoscientific Anxieties 
Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours offered audiences insight 
into their own material existence by staging technoscientifically engineered 
environments with different light conditions from those to which humans have 
become habituated. Within the context of the museum, these installations offered 
an exotic and playful space to process anxieties about how culturally ubiquitous 
techno-mediated environments such as the medical system, mobile computing and 
pervasive surveillance condition embodied experience. Lee addressed Eliasson’s 
use of technology, tracing his historical relationship to the Light and Space 
movement, in which artists such as Robert Irwin and James Turrell studied the 
science of perception through the lens of experimental psychology. She suggested 
that Eliasson, in a similar fashion, also adopted a “highly mediated and 
thoroughly technical approach to problems of human perception specific to its 
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era’s technological desideratum.”35 Eliasson, in Lee’s formulation positioned his 
audiences as creatures whose aesthetic desires were in part determined by the 
aesthetic conditions of life in techno-scientific environments. Art historians John 
Crary and Caroline A. Jones also supported the notion that Eliasson’s works have 
invoked a subject mediated through technological systems particular to the 
conditions of contemporary Western culture.  
 Lee’s term desideratum means “something lacked and wanted,”36 raising 
the question of what might comprise the collective lack that could potentially be 
satisfied for some audiences in Room For One Colour? As proposed above, 
Eliasson’s installations fulfilled a Western desire for affirmation of one’s 
capacities as a biological animal. In doing so, I suggest, they also provided a 
catharsis of anxiety about how the contemporary biological human animal has 
been conditioned and constrained by technoscientific constructs.  
 As humans acquire and interact with commodities of technomedia, they 
also produce and consume the technoscientific services of Western medicine. The 
social convergence of scientific authority with potentially life-saving medical 
procedures produces a state of cultural anxiety in which collective knowledge 
about bodies has been societally ascribed to a set of technologically enhanced 
scientific practices rather than to the embodied subjects themselves. 
Neuroscience, in particular, situates the corporeal body as an object of study and 
technological manipulation rather than a subjective, knowledge-producing entity. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, fMRI scanners in the lab have been cast as mind-
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reading machines in the popular media, and lay persons may come to feel as if 
their own brains are mysterious alien organisms about which they, as non-
scientists, can produce no valid forms of knowledge.37 By contrast Eliasson’s 
museum installations allowed viewers to experience some of the strangeness of 
their own neurological functions first-hand. Here, the kinds of information that 
scientists produce about how vision operates could be manifested by lay persons 
as embodied forms of knowledge. In the various art institutions where Room For 
One Colour and 360° room for all colours have been installed, Eliasson created 
safe environments for exploring one’s own body as an organism potentially 
vulnerable to scientific manipulation without the personal stakes of illness and 
treatment that attend drug trials, diagnostic testing or surgery. As he suggested, 
“...the viewer becomes the experiment itself and also experiences being the 
experiment. It is like being operated on without anaesthesia.”38 While a patient 
anaesthetized on an operating table is denied experiential knowledge of the 
process, Eliasson’s manipulations of the body unfolded in a state of perceptual 
awareness. Eliasson did not hide the technical apparatus that produced his visual 
effects; rather, he made his use of technology transparent, inviting viewers to 
engage with the technoscience as willing participants in full knowledge of what 
was being done to them. While popular media provides plenty of opportunity to 
look at very powerful optical illusions that demonstrate neurological principles in 
the comfort of one’s own home, Eliasson’s museum installations offered 
something more than just information; an extra power dynamic comes into play. 
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Percipients entered the institutional, social space of the museum and submitted 
themselves to physiological processes that unfolded in three-dimensional, 
immersive environments, opting to make themselves vulnerable to optical effects 
that the artworks imposed. These experiences played out in a public, institutional 
context, as a collective, social process. Eliasson manipulated the institutional 
context of the museum so that, in contrast to the neuroscience lab, the subjects 
undergoing procedures were the intended recipients of the knowledge produced 
by the process.   
 The optical effects of after images triggered by Eliasson’s works usually 
occur automatically and nonconsciously in daily life. While there are sure to be 
nuanced differences between people, the basic neural architecture of vision 
adheres to standard patterns whether they take place while looking at art, looking 
at a sunset, or looking at a screen in an fMRI scanner. Eliasson’s work made a 
collective address within the public space of the museum, triggering visual 
phenomena that would be shared by most sighted people. The colour installations 
at SFMoMA and MoMA in New York thus provided collective, social 
experiences of lack of control. It can be thrilling to cast one’s body into an 
unknown process, and, like the massive slides presented by Carsten Höller, 
Eliasson’s installations have been compared with mid-way rides at a fair. But 
Eliasson has contextualized his installations within the hybrid realm of art and 
science. Museum visitors were given the active choice to consensually and 
playfully perform the usually passive role of scientific subjects. In this way, 
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similar to Höller’s slides, Eliasson’s installations leveraged the thrill of 
submission to lack of control. In contrast to Höller, however, the aesthetic 
experiences offered by Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours 
teased at collective cultural anxiety about the subjective alienation of the body as 
a universalised and abstracted object of scientific investigation. 
  
Art Producing Critical Awareness of Social Conditions of Vision  
Eliasson’s viewers, in seeing themselves seeing, were invited to consider the 
subjectivity of humans as biological creatures conditioned by technoscientific 
environments. By offering aesthetic experiences of vision as a physiological 
capacity vulnerable to environmental conditions, his installations invited critical 
reflection on the social power structures that confer technoscience with authority 
over the human body. Celebrations of human materiality cannot exclude human 
reason, culture and responsibility. In her book Modest−Witness@Second− 
Millennium. FemaleMan©−Meets−OncoMouse™, Haraway claimed kinship with 
lab mice who have been biologically engineered to carry the gene for breast 
cancer. “OncoMouse™ is my sibling,” she asserted, “and more properly, male or 
female, s/he is my sister."39 Haraway implied that humans and lab animals share 
some hybrid traits as biological creatures of technoscience, but in doing so, she 
foregrounded human power relations with other species. OncoMouse™ exists as a 
commodified technology, and yet, as Haraway made clear, it also comprises 
particular living entities.40 Haraway refused to turn a blind eye to the human 
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objectification of other animals, but neither has she stormed any laboratories to 
rescue lab mice. Her postulations offered neither comfort nor resolution, rather, 
Haraway invoked inter-species accountability to highlight the ethically conflicted 
and impure position of humans-as-animals emerging in technoscientific culture.  
 Deploying the technology of mono-frequency lamps to manipulate human 
vision, Eliasson situated humans as biological organisms vulnerable to 
technoscientific conditions. At the same time, by staging his works in the 
reflexive context of museum installations, he encouraged percipients to adopt a 
third-person perspective, thus raising questions of human accountability for the 
ubiquitous cultural conditions of technoscience that they both inhabit and produce 
on an ongoing basis. In this sense, Eliasson’s relationship to science is similar to 
Haraway’s, in that he acknowledges collective accountability for science as a 
cultural practice. His strategy for raising awareness has been to recontextualize 
the science of colour perception within the institution of the museum.  
 Eliasson’s critical relationship to colour perception has been analysed by 
Crary, who has written extensively about historical relationships between 
developments in imaging technology and cultural shifts in the understanding of 
vision. Crary was one of the first people Eliasson solicited to write about his work 
in 1997.41 Writing in 2004 for an exhibition catalogue produced by the Aarhus 
Kunstmuseum in Denmark, Crary reminded his readers that, “up to the 1800s, 
color was inseparable from a direct embeddedness in the natural world.”42 
Humans did not create colours, but found them in the environment, and even 
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pigments used for dyes remained culturally connected with their “sources in 
shellfish, insects, roots and shrubs.”43 It wasn’t until the introduction of 
chemically produced colours in the nineteenth century Crary explained, that 
colour became “standardized, fully quantifiable and controllable.”44 Crary did not 
mean to suggest that Eliasson embraced any kind of primitivist yearning for 
natural colour. As Crary clarified, Eliasson has dismissed Romantic notions of 
culturally uninflected colour perception; rather, “[a]ll his work begins with the 
neutral45 assumption of a biosphere that is irreducibly consolidated with 
technological objects and processes.”46 With Room For One Colour and 360° 
room for all colours Eliasson deployed technoscience to create installations in 
which mechanistic processes of vision manifested for audiences, suggesting that 
the human subject is a culturally situated animal implicated in contemporary 
technoscientific power dynamics. Eliasson has even spoken of his audiences in 
technological terms, referring to them as either “users” in discussion with Robert 
Irwin,47 or as “projectors” in a public talk about his after image works.48 In 
referring to percipients as “projectors, he cast them as components in the technical 
apparatus of the installation, while the term “users” implies that visitors to the 
museum were already culturally complicit as consumers of technoscientific 
media.  
 Caroline A. Jones has similarly situated Eliasson within a technoscientific, 
networked environment of servers and users, inflected, at the same time by a 20th 
century history of the artist’s studio (and the science lab) as factories for 
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knowledge production. She characterised knowledge as integral to perception, 
notably citing ratiocination as a knowledge form along with speech, vision, 
proprioception, memory, and “the multiple flows on which the body surfs to 
constitute a constantly morphing subjectivity.”49 For Jones, the subjective 
experience of perceptual knowledge that Eliasson afforded his audiences had to 
be considered in the context of his corporate mode of production. “His 
increasingly adamant insistence on the studio is one clue,” she suggested, “that his 
physical work needs to be seen in the context of research and other relations. The 
works’ fabrication, the embodied experience they require, and Eliasson’s efforts 
to shape his own discourse are all part of production.”50 The critical subjective 
mode that Eliasson has posited, according to Jones, extends beyond the direct, 
first-hand experience of his work to encompass his practice as a contemporary 
cultural phenomenon. 
 In Jones’ formulation, Eliasson managed to both embroil his studio in the 
art market and remain at a safe distance from commodification. “Eliasson’s 
evocation of the laboratory is aimed at the art world – an attempt to buffer the 
machinic phylum’s association with commerce and trickery.”51 If I understand 
Jones correctly, she was suggesting that Eliasson performed his practice as 
science rather than, for example, architecture or design, in order to cast his 
mechanistic inductions of aesthetic experience as objects of research rather than  
commodities. But the works do have monetary value for Eliasson and for the art 
institutions that host him. The invitation to see from a third person perspective, 
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then, might be considered as yet another coercive form of technomedia marketed 
as art. And yet, when positioned as scientific research sites, Eliasson’s 
installations were not exploitive because of their circular structure, facilitating 
neuroaesthetic knowledge produced by and for the very subjects under 
observation. For example, as Room For One Colour manipulated the visual 
systems of percipients to perceive the world in shades of grey and yellow, it made 
an address that merged the perspectives of observed and observer into an 
entangled point of view. Encouraging both first and third-person perspectives, the 
work positioned its beholders as both subjects of vision research and researchers 
gaining knowledge about how vision works. While Eliasson’s practice may be 
complicit with hegemonic art world hierarchies (indeed, it would be disingenuous 
for a such an institutionally successful artist to claim otherwise), Room For One 
Colour did not lull subjects into the role of complacent consumers but rather 
destabilized subjectivity at the very level of visual cognition. 
 Eliasson transposed the science of vision out of the lab and into the 
museum, allowing participating audiences to gain first-hand, embodied 
knowledge about their own visual processes by immersing themselves in visually 
manipulative environments. Jones cast the ongoing Eliasson project as a strategic 
corporate effort with an affinity of both relational aesthetics and the social flows 
of networked media. Indeed, visitors to the MoMa exhibition Take Your Time 
were offered the opportunity to see themselves seeing in the company of other 
human bodies, each of whom had opted to take a trip to the museum on that 
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particular day, at that particular time. As Haraway insisted, “situated knowledges 
are about communities not about isolated individuals. The only way to find a 
larger vision is to be somewhere in particular.”52 The audiences who experienced 
Eliasson’s installations experienced them as part of a particular social body: the 
museum-going public. As, Raphael Tiffany noted in a Rhizome review of the 
2003 exhibition of Take your Time in New York, “the perceptive bodies present in 
the same confined spaces make the show largely about an imposed 
togetherness.”53 Not only were audiences offered the opportunity to reflexively 
see themselves seeing from a third-person perspective, but also to see others 
seeing, and to compare experiences. Foregrounding vision as a limited biological 
capacity for whole groups of people together at the same time, Eliasson’s colour 
installations didn’t just affirm the biology of self on an individual level, but also 
the physiological presence of others in community. Thus the pervasive yellow 
light of Room For One Colour and the shifting after images of colour produced 
360° room for all colours afforded the opportunity for a critical awareness about 
the ways that visually mediated environments can condition the perceptual 
experience of entire populations. Importantly, for neuroaesthetics, is that the 
embodied knowledge of one’s own perception presented by Eliasson’s works 
manifested simultaneously as an awareness of both individual physiology and 
social relations.  
 Thus far, I have delineated three possible neuroaesthetic subjectivities 
addressed by Eliasson’s colour installations. First, I suggested that reflexive 
  208 
awareness about the biological limits of vision could lead to an affirmation of self 
as a material entity engaged with the world. Next, I proposed such experience 
might also operate as a performative catharsis of collective anxieties about the 
ways that technoscience physiologically impacts culturally situated bodies. Third, 
I suggest that a third-person awareness of how Eliasson’s technologically 
transparent art installations revealed the limits and vulnerabilities of human vision 
might, for some, lead to a reflective criticality regarding the social structures 
producing the pervasive technomediated environments encountered outside the 
context of the museum. The art installations Room For One Colour and 360° 
room for all colours did not empirically trigger specific modes of knowledge 
beyond inducing visual afterimages for the literal viewer, in Bishop’s sense of the 
term. Nevertheless, the works’ address postulated an ideal viewer, capable of 
reflecting critically on their own subjectivity in relation to collective embodied 
experience. Thus, by entangling physiological experience of vision with social 
conditions of vision, Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours made 
an neuroaesthetic contribution to embodied knowledge about the physiology of 
human visual system as a cultural phenonmenon. In the next section, I shall 
further examine detailed neuroaesthetic propositions about colour raised by 
Eliasson’s writings and gallery installations in comparison with claims about 
colour perception raised by Zeki’s neuroaesthetic research in the lab.   
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Neuroaesthetics of Colour 
In this section, I aim to bring Eliasson’s work and Zeki’s research into 
conversation with one another.54 While Eliasson has invited physicists to write 
about his art,55 invited a neuroscientist to present research in his studio,56 and 
delivered an artist talk on the contingency of colour perception at a 
neuroaesthetics conference,57 to my knowledge his work has not been explicitly 
addressed by a neuroscientist to date. In particular, I find it notable that Zeki – as 
a neuroscientific vision expert who has analyzed the optical effects of paintings 
by Bridget Riley for an exhibition catalogue produced by the Museum of Modern 
Art in Paris58 – has not, to date, written about Eliasson’s work. Perhaps this lack is 
understandable. Zeki’s neuroscientific methodology is more relevant to analysis 
of two-dimensional works, while Eliasson creates three-dimensional installations. 
Furthermore, if Eliasson wanted at least some of his viewers to critically consider 
their subjective experience in context of dominant cultural conditions, it would be 
counter-productive for him to allow the effects of his work to be reduced to 
neuroscientific principles. Likewise, within this neuroaesthetic analysis, I have no 
desire to deterministically deploy neuroscience to underwrite art exhibitions, nor 
to position Eliasson’s artworks as illustrations of neuroscientific theory. Thus, I 
proceed with caution in considering Eliasson’s and Zeki’s colour research projects 
in relation to one another, and remind the reader that the neuroscientist and the 
artist are producing different, yet equally viable, forms of knowledge about 
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perception. In this section, I will compare how Zeki’s neuroscience and Eliasson’s 
artworks formulate colour perception within neuroaesthetic terms.  
 While the visual afterimages in Room For One Colour and 360° room for 
all colours resulted from the exhaustion of cones in the eyes responsible for 
absorbing certain wavelengths, colour perception exceeds the calculation and 
translation of light frequencies. In his writing about colour, Eliasson has 
suggested that complexity of colour becomes evident in the neurological principle 
of colour constancy. Likewise, Zeki explained colour constancy as the cognitive 
faculty by which a green leaf continues to appear green even under dramatically 
different lighting conditions. Green remains green to the observer even when the 
frequency of the wavelength is closer to red than green, because the brain always 
assesses each colour in relation to the other colours around it.59 Colour perception 
is always relative in this way, so that the same mathematical frequency that 
produces a perception of red under certain conditions will produce a perception of 
green under others, always depending on the ratio of reflecting pigments to one 
another, rather than on one-one translations of each frequency.60 Thus, Zeki 
asserted that colour itself is “a construction of the brain,” rather than “a property 
of the physical world.”61 Eliasson has made a similar observation.  
Color has in its abstraction an enormous psychological and associative 
potential, and even though it has been cultivated to the extreme, the 
amount of individuality in experiencing colors is equally extreme. This 
points to the fact that color doesn’t exist in itself but only when looked 
at.62  
 
Both, in this instance, affirm the subjective dimension of colour perception as an 
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process of neuroaesthetic engagement, located in the active engagement of the 
viewer with the world, rather than in the passive reception of external stimuli. 
 Nevertheless, while the brain constructs colours in relative association to 
one another, it does not do so randomly but as a response to the relative 
reflectance of objects. Both Room For One Colour and 360° room for all colours 
use projected light to produce after-image colours that manifested only in the 
brains of percipients, but the human capacity for seeing colour has evolved as a 
perceptual strategy for engaging with objects in the environment. As Zeki 
explained, “A red surface will always reflect red light more efficiently than green 
or blue light, compared to its surrounds.”63 The physical world, then, does have 
properties that play a role in colour perception. Furthermore, at the risk of 
overstating the obvious, brains are physical organs, and therefore even the 
relational dimension of colour constancy itself can be considered a property of the 
physical world. Given these conditions, colour perception produces liminal states 
where knowledge and visual stimuli manifest as material sensation. The fact that 
the brain produces colour reveals its own embedded entanglement with other 
objects in the physical world. Furthermore, colour constancy depends on active 
forms of knowledge, meaning that the brain does not passively receive signals 
from the material world “outside” but rather generates percepts actively in 
ongoing interaction with other objects, entities and events.   
 Zeki’s neuroaesthetic research has taken him into speculative, 
philosophical territory. In his book, Splendours and Miseries of the Brain, he 
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proposed a relationship between inherited and acquired concepts. Inherited 
concepts, he explained, are genetically programmed, fixed for a lifetime, while 
acquired concepts develop through experience and are subject to change. Two 
features of inherited concepts, as Zeki defined them, are that the neural systems 
responsible for them are fairly autonomous, and that their activation occurs 
nonconsciously. Zeki positioned the relative nature of colour as an example of an 
inherited concept. As Zeki explains, neuroscientists studying vision have located 
the ratio-taking capacity for generating colour in the V4 section of the visual 
cortex,64 thus pinning this capacity for relative assessment to a specified region in 
the brain. 
 Whereas Zeki construed colour constancy as an inherited – and therefore, 
in his paradigm, fixed and universal – neural capacity, for Eliasson colour 
constancy revealed the perception of colour as a “construction, dependent on the 
individual.”65 Indeed, the universal aspect of automatic, nonconscious aspects of 
colour perception has enabled Eliasson to reliably trigger after images of certain 
colours in the visual systems of visitors to his installation 360° room for all 
colours. In a written statement, however, Eliasson has construed colour constancy 
as an indication of indeterminacy, stating “...objects always shift or mutate over 
time, and, if we become aware of this constant movement, we may be able to 
understand the world as a much more open, negotiable space than we usually 
think it is.”66 Thus, for Eliasson, the contingent, relative nature of colour 
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perception was more important than its universal applicability, opening up 
possibilities, rather than closing them down. 
 Zeki also noted an aspect of indeterminacy in colour perception, but, in 
contrast to Eliasson, he did not locate it in colour constancy. Zeki explained 
colour constancy – the capacity of the brain to consistently identify colours 
despite their changing frequencies – as an inherited concept, fixed and 
predetermined through biological evolution. In Zeki’s formulation, the capacity to 
see the colour red, for example would be inherited, but the idea of “red” itself 
would be a different kind of concept – an acquired concept - that changes 
throughout one’s lifetime. Each new perceptual experience of the colour red 
would add to, challenge, extend and otherwise inform the ever evolving accquired 
concept of red. Zeki used the idea of a house as an example, suggesting that over 
time the brain generates an acquired concept of house so that it does not have to 
go through the process of determining what a house is every time it encounters 
one.  
The brain does not know in advance what kind of experience it will 
have, but merely modifies its concepts in the light of new 
experience, which is why the acquired concept has to be 
modifiable throughout life.67  
 
Cultural contingency then becomes an inherent aspect of visual perception, even 
within the comparatively deterministic paradigm of neuroscientific knowledge. In 
this regard, that Eliasson’s proposal that, “relation to color is closely derived from 
our cultural habitat,”68 derives from his material investigations as an artist 
provoking embodied forms of neuroaesthetic knowledge. His findings support 
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Zeki’s neurological principle that acquired concepts are contingent on individual 
life experience.  
 Colour perception has functioned as a site of neuroaesthetic research for 
both Zeki and Eliasson in that it reveals the active nature of visual cognition as a 
process for understanding the world. Zeki has asserted that, in colour perception, 
“the brain creates, according to its own rules, the knowledge that we have.”69 
Whereas, in Eliasson’s construction, “[t]he unique fact that color only 
materializes when light bounces off a surface onto our retinas shows us that the 
analysis of colors is, in fact, about the ability to analyze ourselves.”70 Eliasson’s 
installations are steeped in neuroscientific colour theory. In his research, he has 
drawn on neuroscientific principles, not to fix art experience to a scientific 
paradigm, but to demonstrate the relational character of colour perception as an 
active process of engagement. By stimulating colours that exist only in the 
perceptual systems of beholders 360° room for all colours produced 
neuroaesthetic knowledge about the brain’s active role in making colour through 
an embodied address. Likewise by immersing museum goers in pure yellow light 
that made the world seem both grayer and more sharply distinct, the installation 
Room For One Colour conducted a non-linguistic, neuroaesthetic demonstration 
of the relative properties of vision. These embodied, neuroaesthetic revelations 
unfolded in the shared public space of the museum, contextualizing the 
physiology of vision within a social sphere. 
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Social Dimensions of Phenomenology 
Writers such as Bishop,71 Lee,72 Daniel Birnbaum73 and Amanda Boetzkes74 have 
positioned Eliasson’s work in relation to phenomenology because he has 
explicitly staged direct, perceptual experience as a mode of knowing. While I 
have speculated that Eliasson may have been hesitant to conflate his work with 
neuroscience, he has explicitly articulated his discomfort with phenomenological 
readings of his work, outlining this reluctance as a concern that his work might be 
“ justified as an isolated event, not having anything to do with anything else.”75 It 
has clearly been important to Eliasson that his aesthetics extend beyond the 
individual to entail a collective, social dimension, while phenomenology has 
traditionally been associated with positioning individual experience as the 
primary source of knowledge. Lee acknowledged such concerns in her essay for 
the Take Your Time exhibition catalogue and explained the postmodern turn 
against phenomenological thought.  
Indeed, critiques of phenomenology hold that its putative subject is 
timeless and universal, unmarked by any number of influences that 
shape one’s experience of the world, whether economic, social, 
ethnic, national or gendered.76 
 
In the same catalogue, Birnbaum similarly suggested that Eliasson’s work 
surpassed phenomenology. In his estimation, Eliasson’s installations surpassed 
phenomenology’s first-person perspective because they conflated subject and 
object, positioning the observer as, simultaneously, that which was being 
observed.77 Others, such as Bishop and Boetzkes, have theorized 
phenomenological aspects of Eliasson’s work as part of a contemporary 
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rehabilitation of phenomenology itself. Bishop, for example, situated Eliasson 
among a group of “phenomenological” artists emerging in 1990s, whose works, 
she suggested, called for new readings of Merleau-Ponty. In recent years, 
thinkers, including Boetzkes and philosopher Eric Matthews, have revisited 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to entail the collective, cultural 
dimensions of embodied subjective experience.  
 Boetzkes made a complex phenomenological reading of Eliasson’s work 
in her book on earth artists. She revisited Maurice Merleau-Ponty through Luce 
Irigaray’s feminist critique of his work, suggesting that traditional 
phenomenology “denies the importance of striving to communicate with the other 
and simply assimilates all phenomena into a solipsistic legibility...”78 As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Boetzkes construed the natural world as 
“other” in relation to human subjects. Eliasson, she suggested, “acknowledge[d] 
this attentiveness to the external boundaries of experience by propelling attention 
to the periphery of the perceptual field.”79 In my formulation, rather than 
approaching the boundaries of vision to emphasise human separateness from 
nature, Eliasson emphasised human experience, culture included, as a 
physiological and thereby natural phenomenon. At the same time, however, 
Boetzkes re-reading of phenomenology is helpful, because she pointed to the fact 
that humans are not equipped with omniscient perceptual capacities, and 
phenomenological experiences entail as much not-knowing as knowing.  
 While Eliasson expressed wariness about phenomenological readings of 
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his work, his own phenomenological analysis allows for the possibility that 
perceptual experience might entail collective, cultural contingency and the critical 
potential for change.   
I’m sometimes afraid when someone comes up with a 
“phenomenological solution” to my work, because it’s a 
contradiction that phenomenology would actually come up with a 
solution. Quite the contrary, I think the potential of 
phenomenology is that it introduces a kind of relativity to our 
experience. There’s a social aspect to actually allowing you to 
change your own surroundings by means of your actions.80 
 
Here, Eliasson expressed a contemporary reconfiguration of phenomenology that 
parallels contemporary shifts in neuroscience away from bottom-up models 
toward considerations of the brain as an embodied organ, socially networked and 
reciprocally engaged with others. New readings of Merleau-Ponty have suggested 
that phenomenologists need not bracket out cultural contingency in order to 
validate the knowledge of embodied subjectivity. As philosopher Eric Matthews 
explained Merleau-Ponty was himself invested in the social dimensions of 
perception.  
[A]lthough [Merleau-Ponty] stressed the importance of the subject, 
he was not a defender of the Enlightenment conception of a human 
subjectivity that is independent of the physical, social and 
historical situation of the human being concerned.81  
 
As mentioned above, Bishop also took up Merleau-Ponty, contextualising 
Eliasson’s installations within a contemporary trend to reconfigure 
phenomenology. She noted how Merleau-Ponty himself situated the subject as a 
historically inflected entity rather than a neutral observer.  
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As Merleau-Ponty observed, the self is not simply an embodied 
presence in the present tense, but a psychological entity that extists 
“through confusion, narcissism…a self, therefore, that is caught up 
in things, that has a front and a back, a past and a future.”82  
 
Such contemporary formulations of phenomenology as a mode of theorizing both 
the physiological and social dimensions of perception resonate with Haraway’s 
call for subjectivities that are situated, partial and embodied. In Matthews’ 
reading of Merleau-Ponty, he explained,  
...we are not isolated from other subjects in the way that Cartesian 
dualism seems inevitably to imply; our being-in-the-world is being 
in the social and cultural world as well as in the world of physical 
nature. (Indeed, being the kinds of creatures we are, we cannot 
ultimately separate our inherence in nature from our inherence in 
society.) [...] Social and political involvement is in this way for 
Merleau-Ponty not an optional addition to individual life, but a 
necessary part of our being-in-the-world...83 
 
Like Haraway, and like Eliasson, Merleau-Ponty refused to settle for a material 
reality without cultural conditions. Humans are social animals, after all. Nature 
and culture entwine, so that in considering oneself as an animal subject, one also 
considers oneself as a cultural being. The cognitive constructions that produce 
meanings may be relative, contingent and indeterminate, but they are not random 
and indiscriminate. Rather, they emerge from ongoing, collective interactions, 
allowing humans to live in groups, communicate across difference and activate 
social change.  
 Situated in the context of large museum installations, Room For One 
Colour and 360° room for all colours have likewise had an empowering influence 
in that they encouraged neuroaesthetic connections between individual and 
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collective subjecvities. Eliasson has been rightly reluctant to explain his works 
according to the philosophical principles of phenomenology, or the biological 
laws of neuroscience, because art comprises a different sort of knowledge system, 
one in which perceptual processes that are normally non-conscious can emerge in 
conscious awareness – seeing oneself seeing – thus shifting subjectivity from the 
first person to the third person and back again, threading one’s experience into the 
collective fabric.  
 Eliasson’s museum installations were contextualized within the larger 
culture of technoscience in which myriad imaging systems, from computer 
screens to fMRI scanners have fostered the fiction that vision itself operates as a 
transparent and virtual process. The human primates who have experienced 
Eliasson’s installations, for the most part, belong to a social demographic who 
share their lives with computers, game consoles and mobile phones. Western art 
audiences are largely comprised of human animals who wield a great deal of 
power in relation to other animals, and to others within their species. 
Technologized notions of collective experience, such as the network and the hive 
mind, depend on disassociations of mind and body – vision takes on the character 
of a wireless signal, linking disembodied entities through the interface of screens. 
But such constructs of disembodied cyberspace belong strictly in the realm of 
science fiction. Vision is not a neutral carrier, but a cognitive, corporeal process 
and Eliasson’s installations have functioned as reminders that even the most 
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dazzling, spectacular visions comprise active processes of negotiation between 
perceiving bodies and the things that they perceive. 
 Even taken intellectually as conceptual propositions, Eliasson’s 
installations have aesthetic impact at the level of perceptual experience. As I write 
about colour perception, I spend daylight hours at a desk bathed in the fleeting, 
weak grey light of the winter solstice. Nevertheless, the soft colours around me, 
reflecting off book jackets, empty plates and coffee cups present themselves 
vividly as manifestations of my own material existence. Then I turn back to the 
screen on my laptop, my eyes flooded with its flat white light, and I am reminded 
that this, too, is a perception generated in my body, that my brain and the brains 
of my colleagues are physiologically adapting in daily interaction with the screen. 
Eliasson produces installation contexts that heighten awareness of visual 
cognition. The meta-level consciousness of these neuroaesthetic artworks in the 
museum can make audiences alert to the aesthetic conditions of nonconscious 
perceptual processes as they also play out in daily life.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the installations Room For One Colour and 
360° room for all colours in the travelling museum exhibition Take Your Time 
positioned vision as an embodied, social process, facilitating capacities for 
cultural critique. In order to frame this neuroaesthetic analysis, I drew from 
feminist theories of vision that have challenged notions of vision as an objective 
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and reified view on the world by sustaining the collective dimension of cultural 
engagement as integral to situated points of view. I then delineated three 
neuroaesthetic subject positions emerging from the awareness of “seeing oneself 
seeing” facilitated by Eliasson’s colour installations. Each comprised an 
embodied mode of knowledge that entailed the sense of vision in the gallery as an 
active process of engagement with the world at large. First, I drew from 
Haraway’s notion of primate colour vision, or the specific biological capacities 
for colour perception with which humans have evolved, to explore how the 
awareness of seeing oneself seeing in Eliasson’s installations could affirm a sense 
of self as a material entity engaged in interaction with others. Next, I considered 
how these works have offered audiences a cathartic opportunity to playfully 
perform in the museum as subjects of technoscience in a lab, with the important 
distinction that the knowledge produced in this gallery context belongs not to the 
designers of the experiment, but to the subjects under observation. I then 
examined how Eliasson’s installations, produced and presented by corporate art 
institutions, fostered a reflective criticality about culturally ubiquitous 
technoscientific superstructures that condition embodied perception. Eliasson’s 
immersive, three dimensional installations emphasised the active, participatory 
role of audiences in the co-construction of the work. His installations have 
foregrounded the dimensionality of colour, not as an two-dimensional surface 
covering an external world, but as an active creation produced by the nervous 
systems of his audiences. In his writing, Eliasson has invoked the neuroscientific 
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concept of colour constancy, situating this human capacity as a site of contingent 
knowledge production. In comparing Eliasson’s propositions about colour with 
those of neuroscientist Semir Zeki, I have shown how each thinker located 
indeterminacy within different aspects of colour perception. Yet in the end, both 
positioned colour as an active process of cognitive engagement, inflected by 
knowledge accrued from life experience. Finally, because Eliasson’s works place 
so much emphasis on vision as a site of cultural knowledge, I examined how his 
insistence on the social dimension of vision has provoked contemporary 
phenomenological analyses of his work. I have argued that the emphasis on 
embodied vision in Eliasson’s colour installations fostered empowered relations 
to the world and its social structures by simultaneously facilitating personal and 
collective knowledges about the material conditions of life in technoscientific 
environments.  
 While this chapter explored how Eliasson’s Room For One Colour and 
360° room for all colours facilitated neuroaesthetic research on the perception of 
colour in culturally specific visual cognition, in the next chapter I will examine 
the material dimensions of conceptual thought by analysing how a conceptual art 
performance by Kristin Lucas can serve as neuroaesthetic research beyond the lab 
to produce embodied, effects despite the fact that audiences largely encountered 
the work through written description and word of mouth. • 
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Kristin Lucas: Embodied Neuroaesthetics in Conceptual Modes of Address 
 
 
Kristin Lucas’ performance Refresh has been disseminated to her art audiences as a story 
of an event that took place over a two-week period in the fall of 2007. The story was 
conveyed through performance documentation in the form of written texts, digital 
images, and re-enactments. The event itself took place as follows: a few months after her 
39th birthday, Lucas, who was living in Oakland at the time, put in a formal request to 
have her name legally changed at the Superior Court of California in Alameda County. 
This name change was unusual, however, because there was, in fact, no change - her 
legal name was Kristin Sue Lucas, and she wanted it legally changed to Kristin Sue 
Lucas. The process unfolded in stages. First, Lucas was legally required to take out an 
advertisement in a local newspaper giving public notice of her request.1 Then she was 
required to present the reason for her request at a court hearing. The court proceedings 
were documented in an official transcript, made available for download on the artist’s 
website. The transcript shows that at the first court hearing, on September 21, 2007, 
Lucas verbally provided the presiding judge with the following explanation for her 
request.  
Your honor I am hear for a refresh. 
A renewal of self. 
I consider this act to be a poetic gesture and a birthday gift. 
I am ready for an update. 
An intervention into my life. 
I am here to be born again as myself, or at the very least, the 
most current version of myself. 
I am prepared to let go. 
To empty my cache. 
To refill the screen with the same information. 
To reboot knowing that the new Kristin Lucas may experience a 
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tremendous sense of loss, detachment, or disappointment, or joy. 
Kristin Lucas is ready for change. 
 And Kristin Lucas awaits her replacement.2 
 
The judge declared a two-week recess to consider Lucas’ petition. When she returned to 
court on October 5, 2007, he granted her request. In a 2010 interview with Marisa Jahn, 
Lucas described her experience of renewal at this moment in her second court 
appearance, “[My refresh] instantaneous with the judge's ruling. There was an immediate 
change. Blood rushed through my body, and I experienced a sense of detachment from 
everything that had happened before – it was fun, I loved it. I felt different.”3 While 
Lucas’ description vividly conveys her embodied experience in the courtroom, these 
words were published three years after the original event. During that time, Refresh 
documentation and follow-up performances – which I shall describe in detail later – had 
been widely disseminated through a variety of international exhibitions and artist 
residency projects, as well as the artist’s website. The primary source of information 
about the courtroom proceedings was the transcript itself, in which the artist expressed 
her hopes for the refresh, but did not describe the outcomes, leaving it to audiences to 
imagine the embodied implications of the event.   
 Lucas’ original petition to the judge, excerpted from the court transcript above 
(and maintaining the original formatting of that document), conveys three key concepts 
that call for neuroaesthetic analysis. First, in Lucas’ formulation, this socially enacted 
legal procedure would have direct impact on her own embodied experience – a “renewal 
of self” – raising neuroaesthetic questions about how social conditions can manifest 
through physiological processes. Second, by using computer terminology such as 
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“refresh,” “screen,” “cache,” and “reboot,” the artist reinforced a metaphorical analogy 
between her own embodied experience and that of a digital file. In order to renew a web 
page, one must write over the html file on the server by replacing it with a new file of the 
same name. Once this has been done, one navigates to the file’s url in the browser. If the 
browser has cached the page – which means it has stored the old version of the file to 
memory – the web page will appear unchanged. In order to bring up the new file in place 
of the old one, one must push a specific button on the browser. In the Internet Explorer 
and Safari browsers the button is called “refresh,” hence the title of the performance. 
Thus, the embodied processes of renewal invoked by Refresh took place in a collective 
social context of digital technology, raising a neuroaesthetic question of how mediated 
environments inflect embodied experience. Finally, Lucas’ renewal would take place 
through a process of duplication, a mimetic shift in which the artist would become a 
“version” or “replacement” of her former self. By making the proposition that one could 
simulate oneself, Refresh invoked inquiries arising in cognitive science about how 
imaginative acts of simulation may manifest as physiological experiences. While the 
piece – disseminated through documents such as the transcript excerpted above – made a 
primarily conceptual address, I aim to demonstrate that Refresh encouraged embodied 
experiences on behalf of audiences through active processes of internal simulation. 
 In the previous chapter I investigated how Eliasson’s colour installations have 
facilitated thinking toward a critical neuroaesthetics by staging an embodied awareness of 
seeing oneself seeing. In this chapter, I turn to consideration of the Lucas’ performance 
Refresh, enlisting research from neuro- and cognitive science to examine how a concept 
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can come to manifest aesthetically as an embodied experience. I will begin by situating 
the Refresh performance and documentation within the context of some of Lucas’ other 
significant works, showing how the artist has consistently examined first-hand 
physiological impacts of life in technological environments. I will then introduce 
neuroaesthetic concepts of mimesis to show her distinctly embodied mode of blurring 
fact/fiction boundaries, producing performances that reiterate, rather than imitate, pre-
existing states. Finally, I will situate the mimetic dimensions of Refresh in context of 
neuroscientific investigations into the ways that imagined, or simulated mimetic 
experiences can be considered as physiological actions in their own right with the 
potential to produce neuroaesthetic effects.  
 
Refresh in Context of Lucas’ Oeuvre 
I first heard about Lucas’ Refresh in 2007 through word of mouth, and soon after 
downloaded a digital copy of the court transcript from her website. This document 
consisted of four 8.5 x 11" pages, in 12 point Typewriter font, displaying the 
conversations between Lucas and judge at both of the 2007 court hearings. At this time, I 
also downloaded a jpeg, a scan of a court sketch, drawn in pencil, of the artist as she 
stood before the judge (Fig. 13). While Lucas has created subsequent art objects as part 
of the ongoing Refresh project, these two documents were sufficient to convey all the key 
aspects of the performance and spark my present neuroaesthetic inquiry. In 2011, Lucas 
gave me a small artist’ book – a material souvenir of the performance – organized in a 
simple layout. The booklet was 4" wide by 5.25" tall, black and white, and consisted of 
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14 pages bound with staples along the spine. It included a simple layout of the transcript, 
an image of the court sketch, and image of the public notice in the newspaper (Fig. 14). 
The centre spread of the booklet comprised a photographic diptych with nearly identical 
images of Lucas from before and after the refresh took place (Fig. 15). The photographs 
were staged like mug shots. The artist faced the camera with a blank expression and, as in 
a mug shot, there was a measuring tape running up the wall beside her. In each image she 
held a small chalkboard in front of her chest with the works “Kristin Lucas” written on it. 
The chalk letters were clearly written by the same hand, but they are not identical, 
indicating that they had been written at different times. Other very subtle differences such 
as the angle of the head, the way the hair falls, and small shifts in hand position indicate 
that the two images are not duplicates but two separate images. There is no indication of 
the order in which they were taken, other than the implication that the convention of 
displaying temporal progression from left to right. The image on the cover of the book 
was a circular arrow, the icon used for the refresh button on most web browsers. (Fig. 
16). 
 These three artifacts, the digital transcript, the jpeg of the court sketch, and the 
booklet, served as documents of the performance, not as artworks in and of themselves. 
There has been a great deal written on performance art documentation and ephemera and 
it is neither my intention to add to that literature, nor to delve into it here. Rather, I want 
to consider audience experience of the performance as a cognitive event. While the little 
booklet certainly had an aesthetic presence, more significantly, the work challenged 
audiences to engage on another level, to imagine the performance itself. Refresh informs 
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neuroaesthetic inquiry because, as I aim to demonstrate, the artwork’s most significant 
material manifestation comprised the cognitive activity that took place as embodied 
experience within the nervous systems of audiences.  
 Lucas’ Refresh adhered to the conventions of conceptual art, as described by Sol 
LeWitt in 1967, in two ways: first, “the idea or concept is the most important aspect of 
the work,”4 and second, “all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the 
execution is a perfunctory affair.”5 With regard to the latter, Lucas initially established a 
plan – to request a legal name change in which her name would not, in fact, change – and 
then carried the plan through to its conclusion. The resulting artwork continued to reach 
audiences after the fact, in the form of a concept or idea, rather than as a real-time 
performance in which the audience was present to perceive sensorial effects. Conceptual 
art has been art historically positioned as an anti-aesthetic movement by thinkers such as 
artist Joseph Kosuth and critic Lucy Lippard, both of whom situated conceptual art in 
opposition to Greenbergian formalism in the late 1960s. Kosuth, for example, suggested 
that “ a purely aesthetic object is a decorative object,” and that this lead “directly to 
‘formalist’ art and criticism.”6 While Lippard similarly situated conceptual art as “post-
aesthetic” in relation to Greenbergian analysis, she nevertheless indicated that 
“[d]ematerialized art is post-aesthetic only in its increasingly non-visual emphases,”7 
suggesting that aesthetics apply to conceptual principles of order as well as to sensorial 
qualities. More recently, in 2009, philosopher of aesthetics Diarmuid Costello suggested 
that, while conceptual art was “routinely supposed to reveal the shortcomings of aesthetic 
theory in general,” in fact it revealed the “limits of formalist aesthetics, as mediated by 
 
235 
Greenberg, in coming to terms with the cognitive aspects of art after modernism.”8 In the 
context of neuroaesthetics, the ideas presented in conceptual artworks can be considered 
to have material manifestations, similar to sensory perceptions, in that concepts are 
understood as physiological processes in the brain. While the performance artifacts for 
Refresh made an explicitly conceptual address through their dry and deadpan delivery of 
information the idea of the performance itself strongly evoked an embodied experience of 
renewal. Lucas’ name change was an act of imitation, in which the artist used the court 
system to manufacture a process by which she, like a digital file, could become a mimetic 
version of herself. Here, I aim to demonstrate that Refresh also entailed audiences in 
reciprocal acts of mimetic exchange. I will conduct a neuroaesthetic inquiry into how this 
particular conceptual artwork, with very few material qualities, situated conceptualization 
itself as an embodied mode of knowing.  
 Since the initial event of the name change, Lucas has exhibited her Refresh 
documentation internationally. In 2007, the year of the refresh, she put together a two-
part exhibition that originated at Postmasters Gallery in New York (2007) and toured to 
And/Or Gallery in Dallas (2008) and the Shift Electronic Arts Festival in Basel (2008). In 
the part of the show titled Refresh, Lucas displayed a clipping of the newspaper 
announcement of the hearing along with a copy of the court transcript and the court 
sketch. For the other part of the exhibition, titled Before and After, Lucas invited 25 
artists to create portraits of her from before and after the transformation. Works in this 
section included the black and white diptych by Laura Parnes that Lucas subsequently 
used in her booklet along with digital images by the artist collective eteam, a conceptual 
 
236 
work by Perry Hoberman, and a mixed media sculpture and sound work by Jake Borndal 
and Kate Scherer. Rather than limiting interpretations of her own embodied experience of 
the refresh by explaining her experience, Lucas extended the project to entail aesthetic 
response by other artists.  
 Lucas has continued to extend the Refresh project through a variety of iterations. 
She held a one-year anniversary party during her artist residency at CentralTrak in Dallas 
(2008). Lucas’ original birthday is in July, but as her refresh occurred in October she 
could now adopt a second astrological sign, Libra, for the new version of herself. Thus 
she invited other Libra’s to attend the party at CentralTak and had her photograph taken 
with them resulting in images which she displayed on her website as part of her ongoing 
and digitally disseminated Refresh archive. Her second anniversary celebration took 
place during a residency at Edith-Russ-Haus for Media Art in Oldenburg, Germany. For 
this event, titled Versionhood Party, Lucas expanded on the theme of embodied mimesis 
by inviting an Elvis impersonator to perform and hosting a karaoke party for guests. 
Further spreading the project to entail others’ experiences, she has also staged re-
enactments of the court proceedings as a live performance at the New Museum in New 
York (2010), a skype performance at Living Space Internet Cafe, London, UK (2012),. 
For this series, titled Refresh Cold Reads, Lucas invited people to adopt the roles of 
herself and judge, reading aloud from the court transcripts as a public performance. In 
2010, at the New Museum in New York, she invited a man named Cesar James Alvarez 
to play the part of herself. She chose this individual because he was named after two men, 
Cesar Cauce and Dr. James Waller, who were murdered during a massacre by Klu Klux 
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Klan in 1979. In Lucas’ words, “[Cesar James Alvarez] has lived, together with the 
others, in remembrance of those who died. His name has always signified the loss of a 
close family friend along with the hope for rebirth, healing, and courage to stand up for 
justice.” 9 In this way, her choice of performer broadens the relevance of the Refresh 
performance beyond her own embodied experience to entail those of others. She similarly 
extended the role of the judge, by choosing Bob Edgar to read his part. Edgar was Vice 
President of Donor Relations for a New York community foundation, not a judge, but 
someone in another position of social responsibility. For each iteration of Refresh Cold 
Reads Lucas chose people to adopt the roles based on associations of embodied practice 
and experience extending beyond her own personal transformation.  
  While Lucas exhibits in gallery and museum contexts, she also works with the 
capacities of digital environments disseminating various iterations of her projects 
simultaneously through online media, word of mouth, and community events organized 
through artist residencies. As with her extension of Refresh beyond its original 
instantiation, her works are rarely contained as objects, but operate more as ever-evolving 
concepts that extend rhizomatically through multiple manifestations. The disparate 
structure of her practice reflects the content of her works, which, as in Refresh, have often 
addressed the dissolution of a singular identity. Importantly, Refresh is consistent with 
Lucas’ past works, in that it posits an embodied reciprocity between humans and 
technology.  
 As a performer, Lucas has been inhabiting technological environments since the 
late 1990s. In two early video works, Watch Out For Invisible Ghosts (1996) and Host 
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(1997); and a web project, Involuntary Reception (2000), she performed as ephemeral 
characters who’s very bodies were blended with digital networks and transmissions. In 
Watch Out For Invisible Ghosts, which was structured like a video game, the artist, 
garbed in goggles and helmet, battled a range of foes – kick-punching and joy-stick 
maneuvering with Riot Grrrl-esque vitality – yet at the same time the character inhabited 
the medium of the video itself as a broadcast entity, vulnerable to glitches, infections and 
interference from invasive energy fields. Host, a split-channel video, resembled the 
multiple views of a security camera. The artist seemed to be trying to locate her lost sense 
of self, engaged in a poignant therapy-session with a machine that did not deliver 
answers. Involuntary Reception consisted of a website with audio, video and text 
components through which the character of the artist communicated as a kind of 
technological poltergeist, an ephemeral creature with an enormous electromagnetic field, 
able to “self-broadcast via satellite.” Here, Lucas presented the body itself as a 
technological entity, capable of transmitting itself through digital means. At the time, 
however, she presented this digital dispersal as a precarious mode of embodiment, akin to 
a mental illness that enhances certain capacities while threatening the stability of its host.  
You know, things happen, like computers crashing, screens freezing. I can 
erase chips pretty easily, I mean you can re-record. You can rewrite the 
chip, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be protected.10 
 
When logging onto the Involuntary Reception website, it appeared as if one’s internet 
connection had been involuntarily infiltrated by a fragmented, frightened entity, herself 
receiving and broadcasting embodied signals that she could not control.  
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 In all three works, Lucas expressed an entanglement between the material 
conditions of broadcast technologies and her own physiological processes. Ghosts 
haunted the video signal and human hosts became involuntary carriers for electronic 
interference, their very material existence glitching as a form of dissolution and disease. 
While the characters that Lucas embodied had fictional qualities, they also implied a real-
world, human vulnerability to invisible yet material conditions of life in a 
technoscientific culture such as electrical fields, wireless signals and surveillance.  
 Lucas’ early, multi-layered web and digital video works demonstrated a high level 
of technical proficiency in the mid 1990s when it was still relatively unusual for young 
women to adopt such media. She was embraced as a cyberfeminist pioneer by theorists 
such as Yvonne Volkart11 and her work was curated into international cyberfeminist 
exhibitions. Lucas encouraged other young women to adopt new media tools as a way to 
“influence the direction of our use of technology”12 and while her projects were 
technically sophisticated, she consciously strove to make the technology itself transparent 
and accessible. At the same time, however, Lucas remained ambivalent to the techno-
utopianism of cyberfeminism. Her works often portrayed life in a dystopic culture – 
disease and physical dissimulation permeated her early approach to technological 
embodiment.  
 From 1998 to 2002, Lucas conducted series of Simulcast performances at 
Windows, Brussels (1998), The Wexner Center for the Arts, in Columbus, Ohio (2000), 
Postmaster’s Gallery in New York (2001) and the Pacific Film Archive in Berkeley 
(2002). Through her Simulcast projects, Lucas mitigated the heroic aspects of 
 
240 
cyberfeminism by contextualizing high tech, fragmenting her own role as author by 
inviting other artists to perform with her at these events, often within a conference-style 
framework. Furthermore, at a time when simulcast video conferencing with satellite 
technology was popular for art panels, Lucas, who was by then known for her use of 
cutting edge technology, eschewed such high-tech systems in favour of cardboard, tinfoil, 
and a small, model satellite dish which she wore strapped to her back. Inventing a role for 
herself as a “simulcaster,” Lucas performed in character as a specialist, akin to a cable 
installer or interior designer, hired by these institutions to provide a service. For her 
performance, she would “simulcast” the space, re-arranging the energies that flowed 
through the room.  
 The Simulcast performances exposed what had then become an art-world trope of 
deploying high-tech equipment for its own sake. Lucas replaced remote video and 
satellite links with household materials. In doing so, she also the challenged art-world 
fascination with media networks, so prevalent at the time, by focusing attention instead 
on the interconnected energies among the people in the room. Announcing that her job as 
a simulcaster was to channel frequencies in the air waves, she worked her way slowly 
through the audience and around the room, concentrating intently with a deadpan, 
professional intensity, as she installed cardboard and tinfoil objects here and there, taping 
some to the backs of chairs, putting some in corners, adorning various fixtures. She 
enlisted the audience and other participants by asking them to hold onto cardboard and 
tinfoil antenna, or affixing her strange props to people’s clothing. I attended Lucas’ 
simulcast conferences at Postmasters Gallery and the Wexner Centre. During both events, 
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the audience sat spellbound as she solemnly directed and re-directed the focus of their 
attention. As Lucas worked her version of feng shui – an ancient Chinese practice of 
arranging space to produce positive energy – with tinfoil and cardboard, audience 
members began to join her in perceiving, or pretending to perceive, the multivalent forces 
of energy at play in what became a communal moment of heightened physical awareness. 
Asking audiences to suspend their disbelief and embrace her performative assertion so 
that she could channel invisible frequencies, Lucas shifted awareness of electrical 
connectivity away from the high-tech effects of modern machinery, such as satellite 
connections and remote video links. Instead, she emphasized the affective dynamics 
emerging through the collective experience of a group of people sharing a physical space 
for a particular period of time. 
 Many of Lucas’ ongoing projects and exhibitions continue to tease fact/fiction 
dichotomies. As in the Simulcast performances, Lucas asked audiences to set aside their 
incredulity for Refresh. While all iterations of the Refresh project are worthy of critical 
analysis, in my interrogation of neuroaesthetic embodiment I have chosen to focus on the 
original performance as a stand-alone artwork. Lucas asked audiences to accept her 
proposition that in legally changing her name to the same name, she could activate a 
personal rebirth akin to the digital renewal of a file online. As the court transcript from 
Refresh indicated, Lucas presented herself to a bemused judge who accepted that she was 
acting on good faith, took time to seriously consider the legal ramifications of a name 
change with no actual change, and eventually granted her request. According to the 
premise of the project, the artist “became the most current version of herself”13 on the 
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occasion of her name change. In a neuroaesthetic sense Refresh operated on a number of 
cognitive registers. It transpired as a performance referencing processes of self-
simulation, while at the same time it also emphatically posited simulation as material 
manifestation of imitation in the body of the artist. By conflating fact and fiction, Lucas 
situated herself as both the subject and object of the performance. Paradoxically, the new 
Kristin Sue Lucas was not actually a copy but a replacement – not a representation, nor a 
simulation, but a new iteration of the artist as a subjective and objective entity. Like a 
web page that has been refreshed, the new phsycial manifestation may or may not have 
been identical to the old one, but in either case the old data comprising the subjective 
sense of self has been seamlessly replaced by the new data, positing the possibility of 
physical as well as conceptual transformation. 
 The mechanism by which Lucas’ renewal ostensibly took place was not a 
rebirthing ritual, nor a course of psychotherapy, but a legal procedure – a process that can 
change the status of the subject in the social sphere. In addition, the ramifications of legal 
transformations may have material impacts in the lives of those transformed. People have 
many reasons to go to courts for a name change: divorce, ease of pronunciation in a new 
language, transgendering. Sometimes people opt for a new name because they feel it will 
better reflect the identity they wish to convey. Lucas, however, may be the only person 
who has ever requested a legal name change while keeping all to the words or spelling of 
her name exactly the same. While Lucas was clearly sincere in her desire for embodied 
renewal, the essence of the project manifested as an elegant conceptual paradox: a change 
that is not a change. Recalling LeWitt’s explanation of conceptual art practice that “[t]o 
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work with a plan that is preset is one way of avoiding subjectivity,”14 Lucas deployed the 
legal system as a formal device, a widely recognized, externally imposed process 
operating independently from the artist’s subjective manipulations. The court ruling 
provided a binary structure – like pressing a button or flipping a switch, the judge could 
only accept or deny Lucas’ request – and this way she submitted herself to a procedure 
that reified her own position. If one accepted the premise of the project, once the judge 
agreed to grant the name change the “refresh” occurred instantaneously, triggered by a 
state sanctioned procedure that, once initiated by the artist, unfolded as a process beyond 
the artist’s control.  
 While Lucas’ name was legally changed, it nevertheless also remained the same. 
The conceptual premise of the performance suggested that, like a digital file that had 
been over-written, the legal procedure produced a new, subjective instantiation of Kristin 
Sue Lucas did not imitate the previous version, but replaced it completely. At the 
conceptual level, this subjective transformation also had material implications; suggesting 
that the physical experience of the artist would be impacted by her renewal without 
necessarily producing any evidence of change that could be externally observed. In the 
artist’s formulation, the concept of the “refresh” manifested as a physiological 
experience. Furthermore, in her choice of wording for her petition, Lucas used terms that 
directly referenced contemporary technology. Thus, as in her past works, she performed 
an embodied affinity with digital entities such as the files that comprise online media. 
Lucas extended Refresh into myriad iterations involving other artists and community 
members as performers and participants in the project of embodied renewal. Every 
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instantiation, however, revolved around the premise that one could create a new version 
of oneself, like a copy of a digital file. Lucas performed and disseminated her mimetic 
proposition as a conceptual artwork; not a representational illusion to be consumed by 
passive spectators, but a neuroaesthetic invitation to cognitively simulate similar 
processes of embodied renewal.  
 
Mimetic Blurring of Fact and Fiction 
The fact/fiction ambiguity of the performance in Refresh was typical of Lucas’ practice. 
In an interview with Lucas for the Austrian O.K. Center for Contemporary Art, curator 
Beatrix Ruf proposed, “Your work ... dramatizes the ambiguity of acting as the operator 
of technologies and at the same time being operated by those technologies”15 Lucas 
responded, 
I would like to remain ambivalent to that question. I choose not to define 
the relationship between Kristin the artist and Kristin the actor. This is 
what keeps me coming back to this method of production. This ambiguity 
leaves the work open for multiple readings by an audience. I intentionally 
play with the relationship between producer and actor and I keep in sight 
the connections and ambiguities that surface. As a result my work is full of 
contradictions.16 
 
Lucas’ performances demand a high level of suspension of disbelief from her audiences 
and a tolerance for fact/fiction paradox. Some people have chosen to reject the artist’s 
premise outright. Internet-based art critic Tom Moody dismissed Refresh as a “stunt,” 
feeling sorry for the judge and suggesting, “not everyone has the time or inclination to get 
art.”17 This criticism, however, contrasts with the judge’s point of view. The court 
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transcript indicates that the judge, intellectually intrigued, accepted that Lucas was acting 
on good faith, and took time to seriously consider her request. At one point he mused,  
Can I give you an order that doesn’t change your name at all? That keeps 
your name the same? Is that the same as granting a name change? [...] I’ll 
just try to puzzle out in my mind whether I ought to do it. ... I know that 
the law permits me to say “no,” but does the law permit me to say “yes,” is 
the second question. 
 
The judge openly acknowledged that he did not think Lucas was abusing the system, and, 
unlike Moody, he opted to participate, willfully and thoughtfully suspending his 
disbelief.18 In the end, the judge decided to grant the artist’s request, condoning the 
premise of her project and thereby using the legal authority conferred on him by the state 
to effectively push the refresh button on her embodied browser.  
 Just as the judge, as a representative of the law, had to consciously decide whether 
to accept or reject the sincerity of Lucas’s request, so did her art audiences – had the 
original Kristin Sue Lucas, in some sense, been replaced, or was the artist’s performance 
merely a shallow pretence? While in 2010 Lucas did tell Jahn that she had experienced a 
change in the courtroom, for three years prior she had left that question unanswered. 
Furthermore, consistent with most of her public statements, Lucas conducted the 
interview in character,19 so that the fact/fiction ambiguity of her mimesis remained 
unresolved.   
 While Plato denigrated mimesis as the production of shallow imitation of ideal 
forms,20 more recent mimetic theory has suggested that every copy also manifests as an 
original invention. Art historian E.H. Gombrich, for example, identified the two-sided 
nature of mimesis in his 1960 book Art and Illusion. Gombrich revisited Plato to suggest 
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that a painter depicting a couch doesn’t just match, as Plato claimed, but also makes – not 
just imitating the features of an object, but bringing a whole new object into existence.21 
Similarly, the new Kristin Sue Lucas did not manifest as a depiction, image, nor imitation 
of the old Kristin Sue Lucas, but as a subjective and objective instantiation of the artist 
herself, continuing to develop in her practice and occasionally celebrating her renewal. 
Thus, the mimetic moment of re-naming during her performance produced both a copy 
and an original at once.  
  Such oscillating duality between copy and original in the performance of mimesis 
has been indentified by Michael Taussig. For him, mimesis operated as an interstitial 
mode between copy and contact.22 He applied this paradigm to a description of the 
physiology of optics, explaining, “A ray of light makes contact with the retina and, by 
way of the nervous system, forms a copy of the world.”23 
 Taussig conjoined physical contact of light with the eye, and the representation, or 
copy, of the world produced in the brain, as if they were simply “different moments in the 
one process of seeing.”24 For Taussig, the complexity of the mimetic moment, co-
constituted by both image and the body of the perceiver of the image, was something 
theorists “too easily elide as nonmysterious, with our facile use of terms such as 
identification, representation, expression, and so forth...”25 Mimesis, in his formulation, 
became an interstitial zone, pregnant with possibility for new ways of understanding 
intersubjectivity if one could only forestall resolution and take time to inhabit the 
paradox. This willingness to remain suspended in the mimetic process was what Lucas 
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requested from audiences of Refresh: she didn’t ask them to decide that she had indeed 
duplicated herself, but only to entertain the idea as a possibility.  
 
Internal Simulations as Embodied Actions 
The fact/fiction dichotomy of Lucas’ performance remained ambiguous for the 
percipient. The conceptual nature of Refresh meant that, in this instance, mimetic contact 
was not the result of light rays hitting retina, but of ideas sparking neural activity in the 
brain. My neuroaesthetic assertion that the ideas presented by Refresh have material 
manifestation is supported by several cognitive and neuroscientific theories that entail the 
neuro-physiology of mimetic exchange. In the next chapter I shall discuss mirror neuron 
theory in detail, which emerged from the discovery that certain neurons in the brain 
activate the same way when one is performing an action, or when one is observing 
another perform the action. Of particular relevance to Refresh, neuroscientific research 
has suggested that mirror neurons can activate even in the absence of visual cues. Vittorio 
Gallese, Giacomo Rizzolatti and Leonardo Fogassi explain the experiment,   
[W]e theorized that if mirror neurons are truly involved in understanding 
an action, they should also discharge when the monkey does not actually 
see the action but has sufficient clues to create a mental representation of 
it. Thus, we first showed a monkey an experimenter reaching for and 
grasping a piece of food. Next, a screen was positioned in front of the 
monkey so that it could not see the experimenter’s hand grasping the food 
but could only guess the action’s conclusion. Nevertheless, more than half 
the F5 mirror neurons also discharged when the monkey could just 
imagine what was happening behind the screen.26 
 
This research suggested that a mere suggestion of an action may be enough to trigger 
mirror neuron activity, as long as that action was understood by, and familiar to, the 
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person who contemplated it. It follows, then, that while Refresh was not primarily a 
visual artwork, audiences who had a prior familiarity with the action of clicking the 
refresh button on their internet browsers would not need visual cues in order to internally 
simulate the neural activity associated with finger movement in their own motor systems. 
Thus, intentional, internal simulations on the part of Refresh audiences could be 
considered as actions in their own right, manifest physiological experiences with 
embodied aesthetic effects. 
 The neuroscientific assertions about mirror neurons – suggesting that mimetic 
simulation manifests physiologically in the brain – have supported certain theories from 
cognitive science that also examined the physiology of intersubjective communication. In 
neuro- and cognitive science, the process of assessing another’s mental state is called 
“mindreading.” Two competing theories have emerged to explain what this cognitive 
capacity entails. The traditional approach to mindreading, amusingly called theory-
theory, supposed, according to philosopher of consciousness Emma Borg, that “grasping 
the mental states of others is a matter of applying one’s theory of common-sense, belief-
desire psychology to that other person.”27 In other words, in order to understand someone 
else’s frame of mind, one had to cognitively and computationally reason how they must 
be feeling. The other formulation, simulation theory, both challenged and complemented 
theory-theory by suggesting that in order to understand another person’s feelings one 
could also form an embodied simulation of the other person’s state. Cognitive scientist 
Alvin Goldman explained:  
People often say that they understand others by empathizing with them, by 
putting themselves in others’ shoes: “I feel your pain.” Is there any truth to 
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this expression? Contemporary neuroscience has determined that there is 
much truth to it. When people observe others in pain, part (though not all) 
of their own pain system is activated. This provides an initial piece of 
scientific support for the intuitive idea that understanding others is 
mediated by putting ourselves in their (mental) shoes. In its bare 
essentials, this is what the simulation theory holds.28 
 
In proposing that people may understand one another’s mental states through observation, 
Goldman’s simulation theory intersects with mimetic theories put forward by Merlin 
Donald who suggested that “mimesis happens when a mental model is expressed in 
action,”29 meaning that humans share information about their internal states through 
physical behaviour. Simulation theory also recalls the work of affect theorists. Anna 
Gibbs, for example, has put forward the notion that facial expressions are contagious 
between people, and that in assuming another’s expression, one also, to some degree, 
assumes the emotional state that expression conveys.30 In the next chapter I will discuss 
Donald and Gibbs in more detail. Here, I want to emphasis that similar notions about 
embodied simulation have arisen in several disciplines.   
 According to Goldman, some processes of simulation happen automatically –
 mirror neuron activity occurs involuntarily, as does the neural response to witnessing 
another’s pain – while other processes of simulation can be conducted intentionally. For 
example, Goldman described his theory of enactment imagination, explaining, “[t]o 
enactively imagine seeing something, you must ‘try’ to undergo the seeing – or some 
aspects of the seeing – despite the fact that no appropriate visual stimulus is present.”31 
Neuro-imaging experiments have shown that the neural activity of imaginatively 
visualizing images significantly overlaps with the activity of actually seeing.32 According 
to Goldman, enactment imagination was by no means restricted to vision; for example, 
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when one imagines performing a motor act, such as clenching a certain muscle group, the 
same neural regions may be activated as when one is actually clenching those muscles.33 
Donald made a similar claim, suggesting that mimetic communication can happen in any 
part of the body, ranging “across all the perceptual and motor domains given to the 
actor’s awareness.”34 Goldman’s theory of enactment simulation is further affirmed by 
Donald, who put forward a similar notion of “mimetic imagination,” claiming that 
humans have the capacity to both understand and reenact events that have not happened 
directly to them.35 In Goldman’s enactment simulation, even emotional states can be 
internally induced, “When I imagine feeling elated,” wrote Goldman, “I do not merely 
suppose that I am elated; rather I enact or try to enact, elation itself.”36 The capacity for 
simulation, then, supported the theory that mindreading the mental states of others 
occurs, in part, as a physiological process of imitation. Furthermore, as Goldman 
suggested, intentional acts of simulation could also be applied to describe embodied 
engagements with fiction.37    
 In Refresh, Lucas staged a mimetic simulation of herself, but at the same time she 
also invited audiences into a reciprocal mimetic relationship with the piece. Like readers 
of a novel, people who chose to engage the concepts put forward by Refresh were offered 
an option of whether or not they would further choose to imagine themselves into the 
embodied scenario that Lucas proposed. I suggest, however, that because Refresh 
operated ambiguously as a fact/fiction hybrid, it made a more explicit call for voluntary 
simulation than most works of fiction. Audiences engaged with fictional narratives could, 
as Goldman suggested, simulate states experienced by the protagonist and/or they could 
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simulate states experienced by a hypothetical observer of the fictional events as if those 
events were real.38 In both cases, the consumer engaged physiologically with the fiction, 
and thus the aesthetics of the work manifested as embodied forms of experience. The 
difference between engaging with Refresh and most forms of fiction was that the process 
of voluntary simulation was here brought into awareness; audiences had to consciously 
decide whether or not to play along with the artists’ deadpan proposition that her refresh 
was real. 
 Lucas not only asked her audience to internally simulate a sense of renewal, but to 
embody that process as if it was aesthetically akin to the rewriting of a digital file. If one 
could, as Goldman suggested, “try” to simulate a state of being elated; then one could at 
least try to simulate a state of being digitally refreshed on Lucas’ terms. Anyone who has 
spent many hours a day interacting intimately with their computer’s online processes 
would be familiar with the action of clicking the refresh button in the browser, and may 
have already experienced a sense of satisfaction and release when, in a single action, old 
data was wiped away and new data appeared before their eyes. But could this simulation 
be taken one conceptual step further? Would it be possible to imagine an embodied 
identification with data in a digital file?  
 While a digital file can be seamlessly copied, transmitted and replaced over an 
electronic network, it nevertheless has a physical presence as a configuration of code that 
is inscribed (and re-inscribed) into a piece of hardware. As a material entity, a digital file 
is comprised of discrete components, particulate in its definition, light, crisp and inert – 
an electronic compilation of binary code that stands in contrast to the moisture-laden, 
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hormone-steeped and biodegradable human persons who have given rise to the 
technology. And yet, as people engage more and more with digital technologies, are they 
not increasingly inflected by digital aesthetics? As Gibbs suggested, “[Mimetic 
communication] might ... be conceived as a contagious process that takes place 
transversally across a topology connecting heterogeneous networks of media and 
conversation, statements and images, and bodies and things.”39 Mimesis, as a collective, 
cultural capacity, entangles people with one another, and with the various material agents 
in their environment, including computers and the internet. Lucas, in her plea before the 
judge, made the following implication that technology could deeply impact embodied 
experience.  
I feel that the technology that we have available can make ... change for 
us. It’s like, replacing information. The computer, the technology, the 
system has a way of erasing you, and ...I feel that ...this is a change I have 
seen in my lifetime. And I, I just, I’m really interested, in....just 
reestablishing, uhm...I felt I had laid that out for you but its difficult to 
describe.40 
 
Lucas situated her refresh as a reclamation, a form of rebirth for a technologically 
inflected entity. The processes took place in the linguistic and formal context of the legal 
system, disseminated through the linguistic medium of the transcript, but the artist 
explicitly sought an embodied experience that could not be easily translated into words. 
Staging her own experience as a performance, Lucas implicitly invited audiences to try 
and feel for themselves what such a form of refresh might be like. Whether the simulation 
was accurate or not, is beside the point. As Stafford explained in her chapter on mimesis, 
“In affective ingestion we do not just repeat another’s actions, we grapple with them.”41 
Mimesis, and simulation never produce identical copies, but always new instantiations. 
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Thus, Lucas presented her refresh as a critical intervention into an evolving aesthetics of 
everyday interaction with computer technology, an action that can be made by anyone. 
Digitized modes of embodiment can resonate as positive renewal, dystopic threat, or a 
mixture of both. In any case, the action of Lucas’ performance grappled with 
nonlinguistic forms of knowledge that were felt in the body within techno-scientific 
environments.   
 Lucas disseminated Refresh through several different collective contexts. She did 
not publicize the project as an art performance prior to the original event. Instead, she 
activated the context of the legal system to confer legitimacy on her strange name change 
that was not a change. In adherence with the legal requirements of the process, she took 
out an ad in the local newspaper, duly notifying the general public of her intention to 
change her name. Next she presented her case in court without making any reference to 
the fact that she was an artist. Those who witnessed her refresh in the courtroom, 
including the judge, were situated as participants in a legal procedure, rather than as 
spectators at an art performance. In this way, Lucas made full use of the authority of the 
legal system to accept or reject the sincerity of her proposal that a name change without a 
change would provide her with a form of renewal. It was only after the refresh had been 
enacted that Lucas presented the project as an artwork.  
 Lucas’ presentation of Refresh as an art project also unfolded through several 
different contexts. She mounted an exhibition at Postmaster’s Gallery in New York in 
which she displayed artifacts documenting the completed performance: the court 
transcript, the newspaper clipping and the courtroom sketch. By presenting the piece in a 
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high profile Chelsea gallery, she situated it within the art world conventions of 
conceptual art and performance. At the same time, however, she also disseminated the 
same three artifacts online through her website. In the context of the internet, the digital 
references inherent in the piece folded seamlessly into the process by which the piece was 
consumed. Within the art world, the piece was also disseminated by word of mouth, as 
people who had initially encountered the work in the gallery or online told one another 
the story of Lucas’ Refresh. Each context – the legal system, the art gallery, the internet 
and the community networks of the art world – invoked a shared mode of engagement 
within collective histories and environmental conditions. Once it had been contextualized 
as a conceptual artwork, Refresh infolded all of its contexts as part of the piece. Just as 
Duchamp’s urinal utilized the gallery context for reflection on the cultural implications of 
mass production, Refresh proffered both the authority of the legal system and the 
conditions of digital technology for aesthetic consideration. In this way, Lucas enacted an 
embodied transformation at the intersection of several social contexts. 
  Simulation theory supports the premise of Refresh that imagined fictional states 
could manifest physiologically. In enacting an imitation of herself, the artist suggested 
that others might undertake a similar mimetic performance. The work was generative, in 
the sense that Gombrich suggested, because mimetic imitation always operates as an act 
of invention. Refresh was typical of Lucas’ larger practice to the extent that it demanded 
indulgence and acts of imagination on the part of the audience. The piece did not 
automatically trigger mimetic response, rather it made a neuroaesthetic address by 
inviting audiences to simulate their own embodied refresh, if they so chose. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I proposed that Lucas’ Refresh made a neuroaesthetic contribution by 
raising the notion that concepts themselves manifest as material processes in the nervous 
system. I enlisted theories of simulation emerging in neuro- and cognitive science to 
suggest that some of Lucas’ audiences, those who willingly chose to entertain her 
premise, could generate embodied experience of the performance by trying to internally 
simulate similar transformations for themselves. For some audiences, I suggested, a 
familiarity with computer processes might allow them to simulate a transformation 
imbued with the aesthetic characteristics of digital media. Furthermore, Lucas utilized the 
court as the mechanism to trigger her refresh, and thus the collective context of the legal 
system also inhered in the work’s conceptual address. Thus the neuroaesthetics of 
Refresh entailed not only the embodiment of ideas, but the collective contexts 
conditioning them. In this way, Refresh made another important neuroaesthetic 
contribution, demonstrating a synthesis between physiological and social experience.  
 While Refresh operated neuroaesthetically within the self-reflexive context of the 
art world, the processes by which its conceptual dimensions emerged physiologically 
would be very difficult to observe in the laboratory context of a neuro-imaging 
experiment. In order to gather sufficient data across a range of subjects, the stimuli in 
neuro-imaging experiments have to reliably trigger predictable effects in the brains of 
subjects that will occur at a similarly predictable point in time. While the concept of 
Refresh could be conveyed to subjects in a scanner, the neural activations that it might 
stimulate would vary widely among percipients. Furthermore, it would be impossible to  
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predetermine when the physiological effects of Refresh might emerge in order to measure 
and observe the associated neurological activity. In addition, the neuroaesthetic impact of 
the piece, as I have suggested, solicited the agential capacity engagement. First, 
percipients were asked to willingly suspend their disbelief, and second to intentionally 
imagine themselves enacting a personal refresh in the context of their own physiological 
engagements with technology. The piece invited people to choose whether or not to 
accept the fact/fiction challenges that it proposed and thus there would be no guarantee 
that it would trigger any effect at all in subjects gathered for a neuro-imaging experiment. 
Finally, because neuro-imaging methodology depends on the isolation of specific neural 
processes, the wide ranging social contexts implicated in the piece would be beyond the 
scope of neuroscientific measurement. For these reasons, the full neuroaesthetic 
implications of Refresh only become available for analysis in the epistemological context 
of the art world. For Refresh audiences and theorists, the reward for opting to simulate   
its enactments as embodied experiences was a reflexive neuroaesthetic awareness of the 
deep impact of technological environments on embodied experience. 
 In the next chapter, I will examine the concept of mimesis in more detail, as it 
emerged in a video work by artist Omer Fast, further demonstrating the capacity of 
neuroaesthetic concepts to relate embodied modes of engagement. • 
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Omer Fast: Performative Mimesis and Mirror Neurons 
 
 
In the previous case studies I explored how FASTWÜRMS’ installation facilitated 
neuroaesthetic awareness of associative processes of cognition. Olafur Eliasson’s colour 
installations, I argued, revealed the neuroaesthetics of vision as a culturally implicated 
process, while Kristin Lucas’ ephemeral performance made the neuroaesthetic 
proposition that concepts themselves inhabit a physiological dimension. In this chapter, 
drawing on mimetic theory as implicated by the evolving neuroscience of mirror-neurons, 
I will explore how Omer Fast’s 2009 video, Talk Show, encouraged a self-reflexive, 
neuroaesthetic awareness of mimetic exchange. Furthermore, I will suggest that this 
awareness emerged through an entanglement of physiological and social interaction. In 
the context of the gallery, Talk Show unfolds temporally over a span of 45-minutes, 
producing a range of sensorial intensities derived, in part, through cultural implications 
that would be very difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce in the context of a 
neuroscience lab.  
 Omer Fast’s Talk Show first manifested as a series of three live performances 
programmed by Performa in New York City, 2009. Each performance was recorded, and 
Fast chose one of them to produce as a three-channel video installation exhibited at 
Arratia, Beer gallery in Berlin from April 29 - June 2, 2010. The events referenced the 
genre of day-time television talk shows. A stage was arranged to simulate a television set 
with false walls, floral arrangements and muted ambient lighting designed to invoke a 
corporate media environment. Two white leather chairs were placed on the set. A studio 
audience of approximately 100 people sat facing the stage on a stand of bleachers. As 
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Fast explained in an interview with RoseLee Goldberg (who founded Performa), the 
presence of cameras, lighting cues for the performers, and the signifiers of a television 
studio, mentioned above, made it clear that the event was staged as a “media creation” 
rather than a work of theatre.1 Nevertheless, the performances were recorded in real time, 
with no cuts nor re-takes. The resulting video felt like a hybrid between a television 
production and a video document of a live event. While there were no frontal pans of the 
studio audience – as there would be in a day time talk show such as Oprah – audience 
members were partially visible in some shots, and their sounds of throat-clearing, and 
nervous laughter could be heard on the audio track, establishing the tensions and 
intensities of a live, public event. Both the studio audience for the performance and the 
gallery audience for the video were offered clear indications that the work was not meant 
to pass as an actual television talk show, but was transparently staged as such in order to 
situate the performance within a collective context of mass media extending beyond the 
conventions of video art and gallery display.     
 While the piece referenced the highly controlled and precisely manipulated 
products of television programming, the formal structure of the performance itself 
produced a heady, unsettling sense that anything might happen. For each of the three 
Performa events, Fast invited a different guest to tell a real-life story of personal trauma 
and loss. The first evening featured Bill Ayers, a member of the activist collective 
weathermen underground, whose girlfriend, Diana Oughton, had been killed during an 
accidental explosion while they were preparing bombs for civil disobedience. Lisa 
Ramaci spoke at the second event about the loss of her husband, an American journalist 
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brutally murdered in Iraq, and the fate of the Iraqi translator who had helped him. The 
third guest was David Kaczynski, who had been through the harrowing experience of 
betraying his own brother – the infamous Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski – to the FBI. Fast 
enlisted six professional actors – Rosi Perez, Jill Clayburgh, Tom Noonan, Dave Hill, Lili 
Taylor and David Margulies – to re-tell the guests’ stories. At the beginning of each 
performance, the guest and one actor entered the set and sat themselves in the leather 
chairs. The guest told his or her story and then left the stage. The actor, in turn, relayed 
the story to the next actor, and the process continued until the guest returned to the set to 
receive the final version in front of the audience. Like a game of broken telephone, the 
original stories mutated as the actors struggled to remember details while at the same 
time embellishing with details of their own. Fast has explained that in his opinion the first 
and third performances were the least successful because the actors were previously 
familiar with the high profile stories and the evolving narratives did not stray as far from 
the originals as he’d hoped.2 Ramaci’s story, by contrast, had not received the same 
amount of media attention and so the actors were not aided, nor constrained, by their 
foreknowledge of the events. Fast chose this performance, of the three, to present in his 
three-channel video. 
 The Talk Show video began with Lisa Ramaci telling her gripping, true-life story 
to actor Rosi Perez. As Ramaci related, her husband, Steven, had been investigating the 
American war in Iraq with the help of a beautiful young Iraqi translator named Nour. The 
work placed Nour’s life in danger, so Ramaci and her husband hatched a plan – Steven 
would convert to Islam, marry Nour and bring her safely out of Iraq. But then Nour and 
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Steven were kidnapped. Both were beaten and shot – Steven died and Nour survived. 
After this tragedy, Ramaci worked diligently to get Nour out of Iraq and eventually the 
young woman came to stay with her in New York. When Ramaci finished describing 
these experiences she left the stage, and another actor entered. Now Jill Clayburgh played 
the “host” and Perez assumed the role of the “guest” who attempted to re-tell Ramaci’s 
story from memory, embodying the narrative as if it were her own. After Perez, it was 
Clayburgh’s turn to tell the story, and the process continued with all six actors switching 
roles in sequence, until Ramaci returned to listen as “host” for the final act.  
 I aim to demonstrate that Talk Show produced an awareness of mimetic processes 
operating on manifold neuroaesthetic registers. First, the mimetic illusion of a televised 
talk show served to frame the piece within the collective, social sphere of mass media. 
More importantly, while the narrative evolved in the form of spoken word, the intensities 
of engagement between Perez and Ramaci, and between each subsequent pairing of 
actors, emerged non-linguistically through the reciprocal exchange of physical gesture 
and affective behaviour. In his interview with Greenberg, Fast emphasized the 
physiological dimension of the work, explaining that “the original story would begin to 
mutate and would be passed along from body to body, almost in the way that – we’re in 
swine flu season now – a virus would pass from body to body.”3 Each re-telling of the 
story launched a fresh instantiation of mimetic exchange as the two bodies occupying the 
chairs on stage absorbed one another’s non-verbal performances. Thus, while the ongoing 
narrative was relayed linguistically, each iteration became tangible through the embodied 
performances of the actors.  
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 The physical transference of the mutating narrative was not only available to the 
performers, but was also offered to audiences. As I shall demonstrate, the emerging 
neuroscience of mirror-neuron theory supports the notion that a beholder may, to some 
degree, undergo physiological experiences of enacted behaviours that they observe in 
others. While most mediated narratives – such as cinema and video games - entail 
embodied mimetic exchange, three additional dimensions of Talk Show functioned to 
produce a neuroaesthetic awareness of the mimetic process itself. First, while a film may 
invite embodied response to the actions of the characters it portrays, the transparent 
structure of Talk Show asked beholders to respond to the actors’ performances as such. 
Through meta-level engagement with actors performances, suspension of disbelief in the 
stories they were telling was revealed as an active choice, rather than a passive, a priori 
state of reception. By asking beholders to become actively engaged, Talk Show produced 
a context conducive to conscious reflection on processes of mimetic experiences as they 
took place. Next, for those who saw the video, the audible presence of the studio 
audience offered an additional mimetic register, inviting gallery beholders to respond to 
the expressions of the recorded, live beholders as well as to those of the performers. In 
this way, just as the actors were presented as actors, the video also presented the 
performance of audience as audience. Finally, Fast raised the stakes of self-awareness by 
intentionally choosing guests who would present stories loaded with personal trauma. He 
explained that this dynamic created an ethical dilemma for him personally, as he worried 
he might be responsible for forcing his guests to re-experience their trauma in public.4 
Furthermore, both the live event and the video presented, in Fast’s words, “real stories, 
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and real bodies, and the person who experienced the original stories seeing what’s 
happening to their stories – how they're getting beaten up, and changed, appropriated by 
these actors and whacked out of shape.”5 It was Fast’s hope that the transformation of the 
story would have a beneficial impact on his guests, and Ramaci reported, after the fact, 
that she enjoyed the process.6 Nevertheless, as the performance unfolded her story 
diverged farther and farther from its original form, entailing beholders in a complicit 
relation with the work’s ambiguous ethical stance. The intensity of this tension facilitated 
heightened states of awareness as every new iteration of the story was charged with fresh 
anxiety.  
 I will begin the sections that follow by briefly introducing the concepts of 
mimesis and mirror neurons in their neuroaesthetic significance. Each of these 
interconnected theories emphasizes the physiological nature of intersubjective 
communication in part by troubling distinctions between imitation and invention. I shall 
then situate Talk Show within Fast’s larger body of artwork as he has consistently 
activated stories of trauma to problematize dichotomies between fact and fiction, copies 
and originals. A description of Talk Show’s affective dimensions follows, with a detailed 
examination of the processes by which the artwork produced neuroaesthetic awareness. I 
aim to demonstrate that my neuroaesthetic analysis of Talk Show challenges the reductive 
tendencies evident in some neuroaesthetic literature. In particular, I suggest that Talk 
Show problematizes hierarchical distinctions between conscious and nonconscious neural 
processes and I will draw on theories emerging in neuro- and cognitive science that 
support such challenges to reductive determinism. Within this discursive context, 
 
266 
literature on the neuroscientific discovery of mirror neurons has been particularly fraught. 
While mirror neuron theory tends to support my claims for the physiological dimension 
of Talk Show’s mimetic mode of address, early neuroaesthetic applications of mirror 
neuron theory would seem to refute my emphasis on the concurrent role of conscious 
awareness. Again, however, challenges to such determinism have emerged from within 
the fields of neuro- and cognitive science. I will explore how this recently refigured 
mirror neuron theory informs my neuroaesthetic proposal that Talk Show facilitates 
awareness of embodied, mimetic exchange. 
 
Introducing Mimesis and Mirror Neurons 
While Talk Show used the medium of verbal language to convey its contents, it also made 
an emphatic, non-linguistic address through mimesis, or what affect theorist Anna Gibbs 
would call “mimetic communication,” meaning, “corporeally based forms of imitation, 
both voluntary and involuntary.”7 Mimesis has been thoroughly examined in the 
humanities as a mode of representation, but, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
concept has recently re-emerged in cognitive science,8 affect theory,9 and 
neuroaesthetics10 as a mode of embodied communication. I adopt a definition of mimesis 
advanced by cognitive scientist Merlin Donald, who suggested:  
A mimetic act is basically a motor performance that reflects the perceived 
structure of the world, and its motoric aspect makes its content a public, 
that is, a potentially cultural, expression.11  
 
Donald formulated mimesis as a form of aesthetic performance that entangles 
nonlinguistic embodied actions with collective cultural knowledges. Donald 
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distinguished “mimesis” from “imitation” or “mimicry,” suggesting that mimesis is 
intentionally communicative and must take audience experience into account.12 Mimesis, 
as he defined it, does not operate as a linear process whereby a message is sent and 
passively received, but as a collaborative dynamic in which participants actively engage 
in mutual exchange. Furthermore, in mimetic exchange the participants do not simply 
duplicate one another’s actions, but each performance manifests as an original, unique 
iteration. As Gibbs indicated, the differences between performances are as important to 
the communicative aspect of mimesis as their similarities.13 Mimesis, then, informs 
neuroaesthetic analysis of embodied experience because, in the context of art, it 
formulates beholders as participants who physiologically perform communicative acts as 
they actively engage with artworks.  
 Current mimetic theory has been informed by developments in neuro- and 
cognitive science. As I shall explain in detail later in the chapter, mirror neuron theory 
emerged from the neuroscientific discovery of small groups of neurons that fire the same 
way when a subject performs an action as when the subject observes another performing 
the action. Simulation theory, from cognitive science, also intersects with mimesis 
because it suggested that people internally simulate the physiological states of others in 
order to understand those others’ states of mind.14 These internal simulations have been 
understood to take place both consciously and nonconsciously. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Alvin Goldman’s simulation theory posits that some forms of internal 
simulation happen automatically, such as the neural response to witnessing another’s 
pain, while in others, such as “enactment imagination” percipients interacting with fiction 
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may actively choose to physiologically simulate, to some degree, embodied states that the 
fiction portrays. The most significant neuroaesthetic implications of simulation theory 
are, first, that concepts can manifest physiologically in the bodies of conceivers, and 
second, that such simulations may, in some cases, be triggered by active choice. In Talk 
Show, the option to engage in fictions was an integral step in the production of 
neuroaesthetic awareness. 
 The discovery of mirror neurons supported simulation theory by demonstrating 
that physiological processes of imitation are triggered in the brains of observers. Early 
mirror neuron research was delivered with strong causal claims for mirror neurons as the 
determining agents of inter-subjective communication, reinforcing the automatic and 
non-conscious dimensions of mimetic exchange. Thus, mirror neuron theory initially left 
no room for discussion of the kinds of self-reflexive neuroaesthetic awareness posited by 
artworks such as Talk Show. As I shall explain later in the chapter, however, 
interdisciplinary developments in mirror neuron theory have shifted away from such 
models of linear causation, positing mirror neurons increasingly as elements integrated 
into broader, nonhierarchical neural networks that entail all aspects of cognition. Thus, I 
aim to demonstrate that current mirror-neuron theory supports an analysis of Talk Show’s 
embodied mimetic exchange as a physiological phenomenon, while retaining the element 
of conscious choice that leverages neuroaesthetic engagement with the work.  
 The mimetic synthesis of physiological response and active performance emerges 
through inventive behaviour, and Talk Show explicitly staged each of the actor’s 
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performances as a unique enactment. Mirror-neuron theory suggests that a given 
behaviour can be effectively passed from body to body, but in each percipient the action 
must be embodied anew. My neuroaesthetic analysis of performative mimesis suggests 
that imitations manifest as original acts, and Gombrich’s work on mimesis also supports 
this claim. For example, in Art and Illusion he discussed the inventive dimension of 
mimesis, describing a child at play who uses an upturned table for a spaceship and a 
basin for a crash helmet: “The basin does not represent a crash helmet, it is a kind of 
improvised helmet, and it might even prove useful.”15 One doesn’t assume that 
Gombrich’s child was deluded – he or she knew that the helmet was still a basin – and the 
human nervous system seems perfectly capable of allowing the real basin and the 
fictional helmet to comfortably co-exist. Fast’s Talk Show also brought this kind of 
tolerance for fact/fiction paradox to the fore, but in this case the situation was far from 
comfortable. There is little at stake in pretending that a basin is a helmet, whereas in the 
case of Talk Show, the actors were pretending to be a specific person – a person in 
intimate proximity, performing on the same stage. Because of the loaded content of 
Ramaci’s story, the actors’ struggles to duplicate it created emotional tension. Yet, even 
as their stories diverged from the original, they generated compelling new ones. The 
potent physiological dimension of the performances, which I shall presently describe in 
more detail, conferred a form of credibility on each actor’s invention, revealing the 
synthesis of fact and fiction inherent to mimetic exchange.  
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Copies as Originals in the Work of Omer Fast 
Fast is not strictly speaking a digital artist, yet his works suggest a contemporary digital 
art discourse in which questions about imitation, copies and originals prevail. Art theorist 
Boris Groys recognized that in the context of curated gallery exhibitions, where site-
specific decisions are made about how to present digital images, “each presentation of a 
digitalized image becomes a recreation of that image.”16 Different display conditions, 
different monitors, lighting, sound equipment all contribute to specific aesthetic 
experiences. As Groys further explained, “there is no such thing as a copy. In the world 
of digitalized images, we are dealing only with originals – only with original presentation 
of the absent, invisible digital original.”17 Turning his attention to the situated, temporal 
and material presence of the digital image itself, Groys reassessed the ontology of the 
copy in a contemporary context. While digital images can be easily reproduced, someone 
must initiate each instantiation, and people experience these copies as a unique events. 
Groys was specifically assessing curatorial practice, but in the digital culture of sampling 
and remix, artists and audiences also operate in the interstitial zone between imitation and 
invention.  
 Indeed, Fast has addressed the originality of the copy as a central theme in many 
of his works, deploying loaded, political content as a catalyst for charged fact/fiction 
ambiguities. In his video installations he has located the material presence of copies in 
the temporal, lived experiences of his actors and audiences. Working with collectively 
charged content such as the American war in Iraq, the Holocaust, a suicide bombing in 
Israel, and drone warfare, Fast has constructed video and performance re-enactments of 
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first hand accounts of traumatic events. While Fast’s videos have made critical 
commentary on broadcast media tropes, critic Gideon Lewis-Krauss has suggested that 
reading “banalizes” his work18 and Fast himself has expressed a disinterest in this line of 
inquiry suggesting that gallery goers are already very well versed in the ways that media 
frame narratives.19 He stated that rather than passing ironic critique on contemporary 
media, he wanted his works to have an “emotional or perceptual” effect.20 In his video 
installation The Casting, for example, actors staged tableaux of scenes from the war in 
Iraq, based on a narrative told by an American soldier. As the shots sustained, and the 
actors tried to hold their poses, they made tiny involuntary movements. Tension mounted 
as the physical strain on the actors became apparent and the tableaux became volatile 
with unexpressed kinetic energy. While there are multiple levels of content that can be 
read into the work, it is the physicality of the actors’ performances that Fast seems to 
value most highly. As he indicated, he had originally wanted the tableaux to be perfectly 
still, but he couldn’t control the slight movements of the actors’ bodies or the blowing of 
the wind. “These minute tics and signs of life, the body’s gestures of rebellion really, 
drove me crazy during the shooting,” Fast explained, “The beauty in all these miniature 
movements is something I only discovered while looking at the footage much later, alone 
in the studio. I really think it’s what makes the work worth looking at.”21 In Casting, the 
tension between the soldier’s story and the strange performances of the actors – poised 
and fixed in creative re-enactments of traumatic events – staged a mimetic engagement 
similar to that of Talk Show in that beholders were invited to simulate for themselves the 
embodied states of the actors as actors, thus re-enacting their own version of the original 
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story and further troubling the fact/fiction dichotomy.   
 While Fast has often used actors to re-enact stories generated by traumatic life 
events, Talk Show stands out in his oeuvre in that its first manifestation was a live 
performance. In his interview with Greenberg, Fast shared his anxiety about letting go of 
the directorial and editorial control that he usually has over his productions.  
The hardest thing for me was standing alongside and thinking “Oh no, the 
story! Someone is taking a wrong turn with this, what’s going to happen?” 
At the same time it’s a structure that could guarantee regeneration. 
Someone could come along ... and kind of upend the material and breathe 
some new life into it.22 
 
Just as the actors’ small involuntary movements in Casting turned out to be key aspects 
of the piece, in Talk Show, the element of the unexpected produced tensions that gave life 
to the stories that were being told. In this work, the fact/fiction paradox unfolded in real-
time, and the anxiety that Fast expressed about his lack of control was also palpable as an 
inherent aspect of the work’s mimetic processes of invention.  
 
Talk Show’s Affective Address 
Perez was the first actor to re-tell Ramaci’s story. As she spoke, halting occasionally, 
sometimes letting her words flow, the tension oscillated dramatically. As she struggled 
for words, it became clear that part of her apparent distress was a means of buying time 
while she reconstructed the narrative she was tasked to relate. And yet, for two reasons, 
her reconstruction did not feel false. Firstly, the emotions that she now tried to evoke 
were some of the emotions that the audience had just experienced through Ramaci. 
Secondly, Perez is an excellent actor. As Ramaci previously commanded audience 
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attention with her dignified presence, now Perez captured the gaze as she attempted to 
embody key aspects of what had suddenly become her story. The emotional nuance did 
not lessen in intensity, but Perez weighted her version differently. While Ramaci 
conveyed calm composure, dignified grief and a sense of accomplishment in her success 
in bringing her late husband’s translator to America, Perez inhabited elements of anger, 
jealously and guilt evoked by the story. While Ramaci was calm, Perez was fierce; 
moving around a lot, waving her hands, raising and lowering her voice with inflection. It 
was as if she was fully portraying certain emotions that Ramaci had been trying hard to 
suppress. Perez created a fiction, but her body language, tone of voice and facial 
expressions manifested that fiction as a very present, sensorial reality.  
 Later in the sequence, when comedian Dave Hill took on the narrative, he 
radically shifted the tone from sincerity to humour by performing exaggerated, mawkish 
gestures and gratuitously throwing anachronistic, humorous details into the plot. His glib 
approach bordered on offensive as he seemed more interested in getting laughs than in 
staying true to the story. The moment was telling as it became apparent that a kind of 
ethical code of conduct had been emerging all along. None of the actors had stayed true 
to Ramaci’s story, but by at least appearing to try to faithfully internalize and replicate 
what they had heard, they had shown Ramaci a form of respect. As Hill made fun of the 
story, he came across as rude, and created an atmosphere of panic, as even more elements 
of Ramaci’s version slipped away. When Lili Taylor retold Hill’s version, however, she 
rejected his comedic mode and, in doing so, she delivered the most affectively 
convincing performance of the entire show. She faced “host” David Margulies with a 
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clear-eyed expression of emotional pain. Head in one hand, she spoke candidly, “I don’t 
know anymore. I don’t know anything. I know that I loved this woman, and she’s gone.” 
(When the first male actor in the sequence, Tom Noonan, had taken the stage, he’d 
changed gender of the spouse in the story to female. In Taylor’s version, she presented 
her own character and that of the now female spouse as a same-sex couple.) Taylor 
continued, “It’s like an MIA and I don’t have any closure...” – her voice became husky, 
and the rims of her eyes reddened in a seeming effort to hold back tears – “...no resolve. 
And I’m...” – she paused, shaking her head slightly, and heaved a pained sigh, looked at 
Margulies with stark vulnerability, sighed again – “... so I’m just trying to figure it out.” 
Taylor’s words were ambiguous. While she was improvising a character, she was 
simultaneously describing her present predicament as an actor; trying to tell a believable 
story about which she knew almost nothing. In her raw, emotional performance, fact and 
fiction completely collapsed into one another.  
 At the end of the performance chain, Ramaci returned to the stage to assume the 
role of “host” and David Margulies related to her a final version of her by now 
unrecognizable story. The scene was uncomfortable to witness because the audience 
knew that the story had lost elements of nobility and generosity that had earlier seemed to 
give Ramaci strength and comfort. The political details had been dropped, the selfless 
dignity had evapourated, and the sense of closure had completely disappeared. The story 
had changed from one in which a loving, politically engaged couple conspire to save a 
young Iraqi woman, to a sordid tale of adultery and shame. Story elements had been lost 
and new ones added; even the genders of the protagonists had been switched around. 
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Ramaci settled into her chair, with a somewhat terrified smile, and bravely asked, “So, 
tell me about the first time you saw her.”  
 Margulies was warm and chivalrous. He leaned forward in his chair and looked 
directly into Ramaci’s eyes, rarely glancing at the audience. He began sardonically, 
emphasizing the gender-bending absurdity of the situation. “Well,” he said, picking up 
the narrative handed to him by Lili Taylor, “I’ve always been attracted to straight women, 
and I’ve always tried to convert them.” Ramaci laughed, providing a much needed 
release for everyone. Margulies continued with gentle confidence, but the affective 
tension mounted again. Ramaci began to show physical signs of discomfort as it seemed 
to dawn on her that her story had been effectively erased. If she had entertained any 
narcissistic hopes of hearing her heroic story magnified, those hopes were now dashed. In 
the previous segments, it was the speaker who commanded the viewer’s attention, but in 
these final minutes, Ramaci’s listening face, the affective focus of the “reaction shot,” 
became the focal point. She relaxed her posture more now than she did when she was 
performing, but her expression slowly becomes sad, and she plucked at her hands. Here 
and there familiar details emerged. “She was a journalist,” said Margulies, “and she was 
used to going to dangerous parts of the world, dangerous theatres of war.” At this Ramaci 
sighed and placed her chin in her hand, and it was as if some ephemeral, half-grasped 
presence of her husband wafted momentarily in the air between them, despite the fact that 
his gender had been changed. Next, however, the story turned to adultery and betrayal, 
punctuated with a host of comedic details that raised nervous laughs from the audience. 
Ramaci laughed along, but she seemed to draw back from the procedure. She leaned 
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away from Margulies, and her face took on a polite, unchanging smile. Once he had 
finished, Margulies reached for her hand and apologized. “I’m sorry if I have violated 
your story in any way.” The final words of the performance were Ramaci’s enigmatic, 
laughing reply, “You don’t even know my story ...you did a terrible job.” With that the 
video ended, Ramaci seeing nothing of her noble story in the final sordid version and 
effectively laughing off the process as a pointless exercise.  
 Throughout, the audience rode an affective roller coaster, oscillating between the 
states of appreciation for the actor’s performative abilities and states of empathetic 
anxiety for Ramaci as those performative fictions called her personal story into question. 
Many of the actors’ performances, for example, were delivered with more affective 
exaggeration than Ramaci’s version, generating emotional intensities that felt genuine 
even when the words did not. Furthermore, the collapse of fact and fiction raised a 
question: how rehearsed was Ramaci’s performance? How many times had she told her 
story and how much narrative spin had she put on it? Just as a fictional mimetic 
performance manifests as a new invention, so Ramaci’s non-fictional performance now 
existed as a narrative interpretation of past events.  
 Talk Show presented a perceptual paradox inviting audiences to respond 
simultaneously to the actors’ own real time processes of improvisation, as well as to the 
invented narratives that the actors inhabited. The dual address repeatedly demanded an 
active choice between indulging in the affective veracity of the actors’ fictions or 
maintaining an allegiance to some sense of the original story. By repeatedly raising the 
option of whether or not to embrace each new story, Talk Show positioned the audience 
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as potentially complicit in the dubious ethics of transforming a story of trauma. Thus, just 
as the actors were presented as actors, the performance of the audience as such was 
similarly revealed. The intensity of the address to the audience would have been higher 
during the live event, where, in Fast’s words, “people [were] sort of captive in a way. … 
They [couldn’t] really leave…it's too small a theatre, the seats [were] too tight.”23 For 
viewers of the video, however, sounds from the studio audience raised the stakes of self-
reflexive awareness, as the tension of the live event became palpable not only through the 
actors’ gestures but through the sounds of the audience shifting, clearing their throats, 
individuals breaking out into occasional bursts of isolated nervous laughter. The studio 
audience did not sound relaxed and this atmosphere of tension translated through the 
video as well. The tension escalated each time the story diverged from the original and 
the question of whether or not to suspend disbelief was raised anew. As the piece 
consistently refused to resolve into either a factual or a fictive mode of address it 
sustained awareness of the paradoxical relation between the two. 
 By addressing the beholder as an active, complicit participant, Talk Show 
produced a context for self-reflexive awareness of embodied mimetic response. Mimesis, 
as formulated here, entails mutual exchange of physical states. Gibbs has explained that 
facial expressions, for example, can be especially contagious between subjects. 
Of particular interest is facial expression’s activation of mimetic impulse 
in response to the facial expression of observers, tending then to elicit the 
same affect in them. It is very difficult not to respond to a spontaneous 
smile with a spontaneous smile of one’s own, and one’s own smile 
provides sufficient feedback to our own bodies to activate the 
physiological and neurological aspects of joy.24  
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Taylor’s facial expressions of distress, confusion and pain; Ramaci’s full-bodied 
expression of controlled calm; Perez’s look of intent concentration, simultaneously 
invoking empathy for Ramaci and the cognitive effort of committing Ramaci’s story to 
memory; were all potentially contagious affects heightened, even in the video, by the 
palpable tension of the live studio audience. To some degree, and in some circumstances, 
the actors’ strongly moving performances of confusion, frustration, grief and resignation 
might have compelled reciprocal, empathetic responses in the nervous systems of 
beholders. 
 
Problems of Privileging the Nonconscious  
The neuroscientific discovery of mirror neurons, which activate involuntarily and 
nonconsciously, strongly reinforces my claim that Talk Show’s mimetic exchange 
invovled physiological activity on the part of both performers and beholders. I shall 
explore the neuroaesthetic implications of mirror neuron theory in the section that follows 
this one. Before I embark on that analysis, however, I want to insert a note of caution. As 
I discussed in Chapter One, a neuroaesthetic emphasis on nonconscious processing may 
run the risk of activating deterministic ideologies that seek to position human experience 
as empirically driven by nonconscious neural activity, thus eliding the importance of 
conscious awareness in the art experience. Indeed, mimesis has surfaced in 
neuroaesthetic discourse, in part because the discovery of mirror neurons has cast 
mimesis as a mechanical, nonconscious process supporting deterministic, bottom-up 
models of mind. Some neuroaesthetic scholars, such as art historian John Onians, have 
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positioned the physiology of neuroscience in opposition to the supposedly non-
physiological realm of culture.  
 As mentioned in Chapter One, Onians suggested that “[m]ore habitual terms [than 
‘brain’], such as ‘mind’ and ‘intelligence,’ with their lofty, even godlike, associations, 
distort our view of the people to whom they are credited ... by overemphasizing the active 
character of their relation to the world.”25 In other words, for Onians, human hubris had 
mistakenly privileged conscious thought processes over nonconscious neural activations 
and neuroscience could provide a corrective theory by reconfiguring the hierarchy in 
reverse. As Onians embraced the brain, he implicitly reinforced a nature/culture 
dichotomy, drawing from an ideological position that human behaviour was driven by 
nonconscious, and therefore natural, impulses. While my analysis of Talk Show demands 
an account of the role of nonconscious neural processing, I consider how such processes 
are infused with conscious awareness, and thus my formulation is distinct from that of 
Onians who positions the nonconscious and the conscious in opposition to one another. In 
this section, I will examine theories of mimesis and physiological engagement that 
trouble such determinisitc dichotomies.  
 The experimental practice of neuroscience has been traditionally based on a 
bottom-up model of the brain, which assumes that small components of brain anatomy – 
localized networks of neurons assigned with particular tasks – transfer signals upward 
through the complex system, from the nonconscious zones of perception low in the 
network toward the higher cognitive areas where conscious thought occurs. A common 
interpretation of the bottom-up model is that nonconscious processes are spatio-
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temporally situated early in the chain and therefore they drive and determine conscious 
thought and behaviour. In 1985, for example, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet famously 
questioned the existence of free will in his deterministic essay “Unconscious Cerebral 
Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action.”26 Massumi took up Libet 
in 2002 in his formulation of affect as an autonomous process, suggesting that “... what 
we think of as ‘free,’ ‘higher’ functions, such as volition are apparently being performed 
by autonomic, bodily reactions occurring in the brain but outside consciousness...”27 
Conscious agency came into question because such bottom-up models of the brain rely 
on a temporal hierarchy that positions nonconscious processes prior to conscious 
processes. I challenge this linear temporal formulation because it only inheres under the 
staged conditions of laboratory experiment where specific processes of perception are 
intentionally triggered in passive subjects and observed in isolation from other concurrent 
neural processes. Instead, within everyday contexts, I suggest that neural processes are 
ongoing throughout the entire, networked matrix of the brain, they are not isolated from 
one another, nor do they have temporally discrete beginnings.  
 Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has tried to provide empirical 
formulations of mind that could account for the co-evolution of the brain with the body as 
they interact in feedback relations with the natural/cultural environment. Jerry Fodor, for 
example, worried about the limitations of anatomical neuroscience to account for the 
infinite variability of inputs that constitute consciousness,28 while the collaborative duo of 
Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, emphasized the non-hierarchical structure of the 
brain as a dynamic system in ongoing feedback with the environment.29 These 
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formulations of mind, which posited the brain as a dynamic system embedded in larger 
dynamic systems, lacked for experimental models because the shifting and complex 
conditions that give rise to consciousness are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify and 
replicate in a lab. Talk Show, however, succeeds in situating the embodied cognitive 
processes of audiences within a collective, social context that unfolds over an extended 
period of time. Thus, while the artwork does not by any means operate as a science 
experiment, it can provide material instantiations of embodied mind as a social, 
integrated system. 
  I do not intend to argue for the primacy of conscious thought processes over 
nonconscious neural activations, but to position the two as mutually entangled. I disagree 
for example, with Gombrich, whose mimetic paradigm privileged making over matching. 
He rightly argued against the idea that an artist could ever produce a direct, unmediated 
representation of his or her sense impressions. As soon as pencil touches paper, he 
explained, decisions must be made about what to depict and how. Thus, invention, for 
Gombrich always preceded imitation and, like many who explore the physiological 
processes of perception, he assumed a temporal hierarchy of importance in the system. 
Yet, in order to assert that one mode precedes another, the measurement of time has to 
begin at some determined moment. Imagine the artist sitting down to draw. The paper is 
blank, and common sense might dictate that the art making begins with the first mark. 
But the artist is not blank, nor empty. He or she is a digesting, respirating, remembering, 
cogitating, culturally embedded, temporally situated, living, breathing person who comes 
to the blank paper with a nervous system that is processing the content of his or her world 
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on an ongoing basis. As Murphy and Brown have argued, the nervous system operates as 
an impossibly complex and continuous network of feedback loops between the individual 
and the environment. In their neurological exploration of agency they explain, 
The picture we are prone to have in mind is an organism whose ‘default 
position’ is inactivity. When it acts, the question arises as to what caused it 
to act and whether the action was ‘up to it’ or not ‘up to it” [...] A more 
accurate picture is of an organism that is constantly active (to some degree 
or another). Thus, the question is not what initiated any part of the 
behavior, but rather, what the factors are that modify ongoing behaviour.30  
 
In this way, they rejected the deterministic temporal hierarchy assumed by many 
neuroscientists, such as Libet, and instead positioned the nervous system as an interactive 
co-constitution of conscious and nonconscious processing. Drawing from Murphy and 
Brown, I wish to trouble hard formulations of precognitive states for neuroaesthetic 
theory, because, in art contexts, there is no way to ascertain a discrete beginning. In 
relative terms it is certainly possible to consider the temporal duration of art experiences, 
particularly in the case of time-based work, such as Talk Show. Nevertheless, it is also 
important to remember that a viewer who comes to an artwork is never a tabula rasa, but 
always an active, agential participant whose cumulated history of lived experiences 
inflects and informs their perceptions in the present. Likewise, an artist who comes to 
create an artwork is already actively engaged in imitative and inventive relation to the 
world before the physical act of art making begins. In both instances, the oscillating 
mimetic processes of imitation and invention are always and ever ongoing.  
 Another problem with Gombrich’s assertion that invention precedes imitation is 
that such a formulation is born out of a romantic and teleological attitude toward time. 
Even if, as in a science experiment, a provisional beginning point were to be established 
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for the art process, and even if it were to be shown that, within the framework of this 
model, invention comes before imitation, there is no reason to thereby assume that 
invention is more important to the process. To privilege earlier states as more important 
betrays a kind of teleological primitivism, by which I mean a progressivist attitude 
toward human evolution as the development of civilizations, with the attendant corollary 
that conditions in the present can be explained and naturalized according to the perceived 
conditions of earlier times. The Western tendency to apply goal-oriented progress to the 
passage of time is a central problem for art history, as well as for neuroscience. The 
danger for neuroaesthetics of ascribing primacy – in the sense of “having chief 
importance” – to neurological processes which are considered primary – in the sense of  
“coming first” – is that it inscribes an essentialist, evolutionary31 paradigm on human 
experience, implying that human physiology prefigured human cultural interaction, and 
thus eliding the fact that humans have always been social animals.  
 My argument with Gombrich is not that I would privilege matching over making, 
but that privileging either masks the co-constitutive relation of the two. As previously 
discussed, Talk Show explicitly refused to privilege invention over imitation and vice 
versa; rather, the piece stands as a neuroaesthetic model that makes transparent the very 
circular entwinement of these mimetic dimensions.  
 Donald’s formulation of mimetic performance as a communicative, cultural motor 
act is useful for thinking through the implications of Talk Show because, like Taussig, he 
emphasized the entangled nature of imitation and invention rather than taking the 
ideological step of demonstrating allegiance for one process over the other. Donald 
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reminded his readers that much of the experimentation on consciousness takes place in 
laboratory conditions, on very small time scales, and focuses on isolated areas of the 
brain, whereas the consciousness that humans commonly experience involves many areas 
of the brain and takes place over much longer stretches of time.32 Instead of opting to 
privilege invention or imitation, voluntary or involuntary behaviour, conscious or 
nonconscious neural processes, Donald’s mimetic theory insists on entangling such 
dichotomies. In this way, both Donald’s mimetic theory and neuroaesthetic operations in 
Fast’s Talk Show answer Taussig’s urgent call that theorists of mimesis “be a little more 
malleable, ready to entertain unexpected moves of mimesis and alterity across quivering 
terrain, even if they lead to the outermost horizon to an all-consuming nothingness.”33 
For Taussig, the interstitial zone of mimesis could be destabilizing, but also afforded an 
entry point to embodied knowledge about the paradoxical and reciprocal nature by which 
participants engaged in intersubjective interaction may simultaneously simulate one 
another’s embodied states. In Talk Show, one actor speaks while the other listens, but at 
the same time the fact and fiction synthesize as they affectively absorb one another’s non-
linguistic gestures and expressions.   
 While I have criticized Gombrich for implying a temporal hierarchy of invention 
over imitation, his larger aim was to blur the philosophical boundaries that Plato drew 
between the two.34 In this – as in other sections of Art and Illusion35 – Gombrich 
formulated human perceptual interaction with the world as an active and relational 
process. Onians, by contrast, directly appropriated the findings of science as authoritative 
evidence to validate or invalidate art historical claims. He relied heavily on the normative 
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authority of neuroscience without delving critically into the disciplinary conditions and 
constraints on how neuroscientific knowledge is negotiated. For Onians, an investigation 
of human nature was needed as a corrective to postmodern relativity. But he fell into the 
Romantic trap of essentializing and universalizing human nature as an innate and 
deterministic alternative to cultural contingency. 
 Onians complains about a humanist “uncertainty”36 in Gombrich, his former 
teacher, but Gombrich’s reluctance to assign absolute authority to science reveals that he 
had a deeper understanding than Onians about how scientific knowledge evolves 
critically as an ongoing process of negotiation. By showing respect for the differences 
between art history and science, Gombrich established an unfixed and provisional space 
between them, a dialectic in which synthesis was forestalled in favour of heterogeneous 
potential. In this way, Gombrich’s work foreshadowed contemporary neuroaesthetic 
debates because his epistemological approach was born out in his refusal to 
deterministically reduce human experience to either nature or culture.  
The dignity of man [sic] ... lies precisely in his Protean capacity for 
change. We are not simple slot machines which begin to tick when coins 
are dropped into us, for ... we have what psychoanalysts call an “ego” 
which tests reality and shapes the impulses from the id. And so we can 
remain in control while we half-surrender to counterfeit coins, to symbols 
and substitutes. Our twin nature, poised between animality and rationality, 
finds expression in the twin world of symbolism with its willing 
suspension of disbelief.37  
 
Gombrich cast mimesis as a process that collapsed the distinction between a 
representation and its referent because the mimetic imitation is always also an invention. 
A mark on a paper or a physical gesture can be both symbol and material at the same 
time. In this way, “The world of man [sic],” said Gombrich, “is not only a world of 
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things, it is a world of symbols where the distinction between reality and make-believe is 
itself unreal.”38 While Gombrich’s take on mimesis may strike some readers as overly 
humanist, it is useful to remember that his ardent advocacy on behalf of human agency 
may have been influenced in part by his experiences of the Nazi reification of humans in 
World War II. As discussed in Chapter One, Onians dismissed Gombrich’s suspicion of 
biological determinism yet, by taking on science without ascribing it absolute authority, 
Gombrich was able to make deeper insights into embodied perception than Onians, who 
uncritically appropriated neuroscientific findings as a means of validating art historical 
propositions.   
 In contrast to Onians, Stafford retained an allegiance to the entanglement of 
conscious and nonconscious processing in her neuroaesthetic investigations. Examining 
connections between mimesis and mirror neurons, Stafford challenged neuroaesthetic 
researchers to consider conscious agential acts as integral aspects of art experience.   
The venerable problem of mimesis – that is, the fabrication of faithful 
representations – can be restated as just this tension between first-person 
experience or individual witnessing and coming to know another through a 
double process of internalization: by intuitive copying and willed 
repetition.39 
 
For Stafford, mimetic oscillation occurred not just between imitation and invention, but 
also between conscious and nonconscious performances of simulation. Like Onians, she 
celebrated that postmodernism’s logo-centric hold on art analysis has loosened to the 
extent that the material affects of artworks could once again be seriously considered. 
Nevertheless, Stafford was wary of neuroaesthetic theories – specifically those of 
Ramachandran and Zeki – that privileged nonconscious processes of perception in the art 
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experience. It was particularly important to her that neuroaesthetic scholars begin to 
value volitional attention alongside automatic neural processes, because the 
contemporary, Western, technological environment tends toward the mechanization of 
intelligence and the fragmentation of subjects into component parts. A particular function 
of art, she argued, is to “snap us to attention,”40 making viewers aware of their sense 
perceptions and also aware of themselves as agents directing attention to the cognitive 
task of combining diverse elements into meaningful synthesis.  
 Stafford’s concept of mimesis as a combination of “intuitive copying” as 
observers automatically simulate another’s performance and “willed repetition” as 
observers consciously reproduce behaviour as a self-reflexive process informs my claim 
that Talk Show’s mode of address entangled conscious and nonconscious processing. The 
point when Clayburgh exchanged places with and Perez took over Ramaci’s story was 
the first of a series of moments that served, in Stafford’s terms, to snap the beholder to 
attention as the narrative shifted instantaneously from a factual to a fictive mode. As the 
event continued, mimetic behaviours such Perez’s agitation or Taylor’s sincere 
expressions of emotion, returned the narrative to the factual dimension through the 
compelling veracity of the performance. In this way, the fact/fiction dynamic fluctuated 
throughout, each mode imbued with the other so that the narrative could not resolve to 
either dimension. Neither did the piece resolve into linguistic legibility, but remained a 
paradoxical experience in which the audience was asked to actively participate in 
conscious acknowledgement of their own physiological responses. Mimetic processes 
that might normally happen nonconsciously, such as empathic responses to facial 
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expressions, here came into cognitive consciousness because they would not settle as 
either real effects or fictitious representations. Fast thus deployed the fact/fiction duality 
inherent in mimetic performance as a catalyst to activate awareness of the physiology 
mimetic engagement that so often unfolds as a nonconscious process.  
 
 
Interdisciplinarity and the Changing Discourse of Mirror Neuron Theory 
Mirror neuron theory has been activated to support the notion of physiological 
engagement between artworks and their audiences in the gallery context, but can it also 
support my assertion that the neuroaesthetic properties of Talk Show emerge through 
awareness of such embodied processes? In this section, I will outline some of the shifts 
that have taken place in the discourse around mirror neurons and mimesis that bear 
relevance on Talk Show’s neuroaesthetic mode of address. 
 Mirror neurons are small groups of brain cells that fire the same way when a 
subject performs an action as when the subject observes another performing the action. 
They were discovered by neuroscientist Giacomo Rizzolatti and his team when they were 
recording the synapses in a monkey’s brain while it performed a simple grasping action.41 
By inserting electrodes directly into the animal’s brain, the scientists observed neuronal 
activity when the monkey picked up a piece of food. During the experiment, one of the 
humans happened to pick up the food while the monkey was watching. To everyone’s 
surprise, the monkey’s neurons fired in exactly the same way as they had when it was 
grasping the food itself.42 Working in collaboration with an fMRI lab, Rizzolatti and his 
team concluded that humans also have a mirror neuron system.43 The discovery of mirror 
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neurons provided empirical, neuroscientific evidence of a physiological dimension to 
inter-subjective communication. Furthermore, this physiological process seemed to be 
automatically triggered by external stimulus. As cognitive scientist Alvin Goldman 
explained, “Mirroring activity is an involuntary response to perceptual stimuli, whereas 
motor imagination is subject to voluntary control and not normally driven by any 
distinctive class of perceptual stimuli.”44 Mirror neuron theory suggests that Talk Show 
audiences, to some degree, may not have been able to avoid experiencing aspects of the 
actors’ actions in their own bodies. Does this mean, then that such audiences are simply 
passive subjects, whose nervous systems are mechanistically triggered by the artworks 
they observe? I have suggested that, in Talk Show, conscious choice about suspension of 
disbelief activated a neuroaesthetic awareness of mimetic response. It would seem, 
initially, that mirror neuron theory works against this claim.  
  Early work on mirror neurons was delivered with strong claims suggesting that 
the nonconscious activity in the motor neural nets was the driving force underlying 
human communication and empathy. In a 2004 research paper, mirror neuron scientists 
Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero made the following assertion. 
Mirror neurons represent the neural basis of a mechanism that creates a 
direct link between the sender of a message and its receiver. Thanks to this 
mechanism, actions done by other individuals become messages that are 
understood by an observer without any cognitive mediation.45 
 
For some, neuroscience seemed to hold out the promise of unmediated communication as 
a kind of Holy Grail, an empirical proof of nature over nurture that would release 
Western culture from the seemingly miasmic cultural relativism of postmodern theory. If 
senders could reach receivers without passing through cognition then, by extension, 
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culture and history would not need to be taken into account as factors in the construction 
of collective knowledge. Rizzolatti and Craighero implied here that nature wins out over 
culture, positioning physiological mechanisms as if they were independent of cognitive 
mediation, and by extension, independent of cultural conditions. By suggesting that 
communication can occur in the absence of cognitive mediation, they portray a world in 
which social contingencies are rendered superfluous to intersubjective engagement.
 In 2007, art historian David Freedberg and neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese teamed 
up to apply mirror neuron theory to aesthetic experience, making similar claims to those 
of Rizzolatti and Craighero. In suggesting that mirror neuron activation provided an 
“embodied simulation” of another’s experience, they explicitly argued against the 
“primacy of cognition in responses to art.”46 Freedberg and Gallese situated their theory 
in opposition to the “new art history of the 1970s” which, in their words, insisted on 
“purely historical, cultural and social factors in responses to art.”47 Framing a polemic 
dichotomy between biological and cultural response, they proposed that viewers were 
able to grasp the meaning of artworks as their mirror neurons responded physiologically 
to the poses represented in figurative works (such as Michelangelo’s Atlas) or to the 
movements indexed in gestural abstractions (like Jackson Pollock’s Lavender Mist). 
Freedberg and Gallese suggested that mirror neuron response occurs “precognitively,” by 
which they interpret the fact that visual stimuli trigger mirror neurons automatically and 
nonconsciously to imply a deterministic, temporal distinction between perception and 
cognition.48  
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 Thus far, mirror neuron theory supports my claim that aspects of the 
performances in Talk Show could have manifest as physiological processes in the bodies 
of beholders. As Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia have claimed, mirror neuron activations, or  
“internal action representations” can be considered as “actions in their own right.”49 
While mirror neurons usually activate offline – inhibited in the motor system so that 
observers don’t automatically perform the actions they see in others – the neural activity 
nevertheless registers in the body as a form of activity. Because Talk Show presented 
mimetic performances that conveyed affective states through gesture and facial 
expression, it had the potential to draw beholders (those who were paying attention and 
were themselves already familiar with the gestures they observed) into physiological 
alignment with the embodied fictive states that the actors portrayed. And yet, while 
mirror neurons do trigger automatic neural response, does it necessarily follow that the 
audiences for Talk Show were therefore passive subjects whose aesthetic experiences 
were driven by purely nonconscious processes? How would this impact on my assertion 
that Talk Show’s mode of address was to facilitate conscious awareness of embodied 
mimesis? The early rhetoric around mirror neurons as involuntary, nonconscious causal 
mechanisms would seem to preclude discussion of conscious involvement. The discourse 
has been changing, however, and in the next few pages I shall trace some recent shifts in 
mirror neuron discourse as it has moved away from strident assertions that mirror 
neurons have a deterministic, causal role in communication, toward formulations that 
position them as co-constitutive agents working in synthesis with other cognitive 
processes. 
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 Changes in mirror neuron theory have come about, in part, as a response to 
critiques from within the fields of neuro- and cognitive science. Donald for example, 
suggested that the causal claims for mirror neurons had become too overblown to deploy 
in a critical neuroaesthetic analysis of mimetic communication. 
Mirror neuron circuits are found in large numbers in species, such as 
monkeys, that are very poor at imitation and gesture. It follows that the 
mere presence of a mirror neuron system in the brain is not sufficient for 
the emergence of mimetic skills or even of imitation. Mirror neuron 
systems, taken alone, lack some of the key cognitive components required 
for high-level mimetic action.50 
 
For him the atomistic examination of cellular activity could not provide an adequate 
explanation of mimetic behaviour. Donald was invested in the notion that mimesis entails 
a meta-level awareness of audience as well as a self-reflexive “third-person perspective 
on the actor’s own behaviour.”51 Mirror neuron theory, in his estimation, could only tell 
part of the story, because it could not account for these conscious dimensions of mimetic 
exchange. 
 In 2007, philosopher Emma Borg also queried the strong causal claims made for 
mirror neurons in an essay in the Journal of Consciousness Studies titled, “If mirror 
neurons are the answer what was the question?” Doubting that mirror neurons could 
provide any meaningful understanding of the intentions implicated by others’ actions, 
Borg suggested, “I want to be able to work out that you grasped the cup because you 
were thirsty, not merely that you grasped the cup because you intended to grasp the 
cup.”52 She raised an alarm that deterministic accounts of the role of mirror neurons were 
bordering on behaviourism. 
 The following year, philosopher of science Corrado Sinigaglia published a 
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response to Borg in the same journal, arguing that she had failed to understand the full 
range of implications suggested by mirror neuron research. 
Far from constituting a ‘lure of behaviorism’, which cognitive science 
should resist, MNs [mirror neurons] would enable us to go beyond the 
dichotomy of behaviour- and mind-reading, avoiding both the over-
simplification of relegating action understanding to a mere identification 
of motor sequences and the abstraction of reducing action understanding 
to pure mentalizing.53 
 
Sinigaglia’s clarification was welcome, as he insisted that mirror neuron theory could 
problematize mind/body duality rather than privilege body over mind. Here, mirror 
neuron theory was coming more in line with neuroaesthetic theories of mimesis put 
forward by Donald and Stafford. Given the extent to which mirror neuron scientists had 
previously relied on a linear, causal formulation of nonconscious processing and inter-
subjective communication, both Borg’s concerns and Sinigaglia’s response have made 
vital contributions to the discourse.  
 In recent years, mirror neuron research has tended to become less polemic and 
more interdisciplinary. Michael Arbib, a computational cognitive neuroscientist who was 
part of the team with Rizzolatti that originally discovered mirror neurons, situated his 
own interdisciplinarity, explaining that computational neuroscientists generally model the 
brain as if it were a computer and look at isolated systems, such as mirror neurons, with 
the aim of compiling a functional network out of discrete component parts. By contrast, 
he continued, the cognitive neuroscientists tend to focus on more global questions such as 
“how do we know the world?”54 In his interdisciplinary field of computational cognitive 
neuroscience, Arbib worked with scientists from a range of disciplines in order to 
understand neural micro-systems, such as mirror neurons, not as the primary agents of 
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conscious processes, but as integrated elements of larger complex systems. In a paper he 
co-authored with Erhan Oztop and Mitsuo Kawato, Arbib suggested that far too little was 
understood about the myriad neural networks at play in acts of communication to justify 
causal claims for the role of mirror neurons in acts of communication.55  
 In an apparent response to Arbib, neuroscientist Rizzolatti teamed up with 
Sinigaglia56 to reframe the mirror neuron discourse in terms that were less reductive and 
deterministic.  
Of course, claiming that mirror neurons are critical for understanding the 
motor acts done by others does not imply that these neurons magically 
bear such an understanding per se; rather, this means that their output 
triggers a complex network of neurons, some of which are involved in the 
execution of those motor acts.57  
 
While Rizzolatti had originally asserted that mirror neurons provided material evidence 
of precognitive – and thus, in his formulation, unmediated –communication, he now 
construed them as elements in multi-dimensional systems of interaction. Significantly, 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia implied that the firing of mirror neurons, while a physiological 
process, revealed human communication as a co-constitutive mode of social interaction. 
They explained: 
Mirror mechanisms tell us is that the self and the other are so strictly 
intertwined that, even at the most basic level, self- and other-attribution 
processes are mutually related to each other, being both intimately rooted 
in a common motor ground.58  
 
This claim was significant because, while mirror neurons were originally cast as the 
instigators in a linear chain of neural events, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia now situated them 
as participating elements in a vastly complex network of interrelated and ongoing neural 
processes of dynamic social interaction.  
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 Presently, mirror neuron discourse acknowledges that the isolation and 
observation of nonconscious neural processes in the lab, such as mirror neurons, does not 
mean that those processes in themselves are sufficient to determine human behaviour and 
experience. The neuroaesthetic implication, for my analysis of Talk Show is that one can 
embrace the physiological impacts of mirror neuron activation without having to sacrifice 
or elide the role of conscious awareness as a concurrent mode of engagement. At no 
point, for example, did Talk Show ask audiences to feel as if they had fully become the 
actors they observed. In Stafford’s neuroaesthetic formulation of mimesis, which draws 
on mirror neuron theory, she identified just such a combination of intentional action and 
automatic response. 
Mimesis recognizes the contagious effects of mimicry, and the fact that 
empathy begins with reciprocal seeing and involuntary duplicating of 
another person’s behavior. But it also requires emotional control, the 
executive decision to resist drowning in another person’s pain so as to 
formulate an appropriate course of action.59 
 
The neuroaesthetic implication is that percipients have the capacity to operate on several 
cognitive registers at once, entangling conscious and nonconscious modes of response. 
Talk Show audiences were invited to empathize with the actors as such, rather than 
seamlessly eliding their roles into illusionary, fictional characters, and to consider their 
own roles in performing as audience. This mode of active, self-reflexive engagement was 
reinforced by the problematic ethics of manipulating a real-life story of trauma, raising 
the stakes so that beholders would have to be convinced, rather than lulled into 
suspension of disbelief, as that story changed. The most convincing aspects of the work, 
however, were not the verbal stories, but the embodied gestures of the actors. This 
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veracity that so troubled distinctions between fact and fiction, imitation and invention, 
came about, in part, through mirror neuron activations in the nervous systems of the 
beholders. In daily life, people commonly form embodied engagements through mimetic 
performance but usually without self-reflexive, conscious awareness of the process. Talk 
Show’s neuroaesthetic operations brought that human capacity for mimetic 
communication into awareness and held it in suspension so that its manifold dimensions 
could be explored.  
 
Conclusion 
The Talk Show video stands as a site of neuroaesthetic research offering alternative forms 
of knowledge to those that can be produced in a neuroscience lab. While neuro-imaging 
experiments typically isolate and reify nonconscious processes, as an artwork Talk Show 
facilitated conscious awareness of normally nonconscious processes. In my 
neuroaesthetic analysis of this artwork, I drew on interconnected theories of mimesis and 
mirror neurons as each draws attention to the physiology of intersubjective 
communication. Talk Show addressed percipients through mimetic engagements enacted 
between performers, and between performers and audience. By stimulating mirror neuron 
activations through embodied gestures, the piece invited beholders to simulate in their 
own bodies the affective states that were being performed by the actors they observed.  
 In contrast to other forms of media that stimulate embodied response 
nonconsciously, Talk Show brought the process of mimetic exchange into awareness 
through several mechanisms that encouraged self-reflexivity. First, the structure of the 
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piece was transparent in that it framed each performance as an embodiement of the 
process of acting, rather than as an illusion of character portrayal. At the same time, 
however, the actors physically inhabited their fictive roles with compelling veracity. By 
drawing attention to the mimetic synthesis of invention and imitation, the piece 
foregrounded suspension of disbelief itself as an optional, performative mode of 
engagement.  
 Fast has often produced works that draw attention to blurry boundaries between 
fact and fiction. However, because Talk Show was orginially performed live, its dynamics 
of invention and imitation unfolded in a context of heightened intensity. The story that 
was being manipulated was heavily charged with personal loss and trauma, and the story 
teller was present at the event, raising the stakes on suspension of disbelief by posing 
each shift away from the original narrative as a fresh ethical threshold that beholders 
were invited to cross. Through its audio track, the video conveyed the tension of the 
studio audience at the live event, offering another mimetic register that, in the context of 
the gallery, positioned the role of audience itself as one of the key components referenced 
in the work. Thus, while Talk Show impacted on a physiological register, it activated 
meta-level states of awareness to contextualize the nonlinguistic dimensions of its 
address within a collective social sphere. Finally, Fast’s decision to create the 
(transparent) illusion of a public television talk show enhanced all the tensions around 
suspension of disbelief by connecting the role of audience to the public sphere of mass 
media. Talk Show mobilized the collective contexts of television (through its set) and 
global politics (through Ramaci’s story) to fully charge and activate its embodied 
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engagements. All of these mechanisms combined to foreground physiological processes 
of mimetic exchange as the primary subject of the work. While Talk Show was indeed 
full of talk, it made a neuroaesthetic address by raising awareness of social interaction on 
a non-linguistic register, demonstrating, through embodied means, the co-constitutive 
entanglement of conscious awareness with nonconscious neural processes. • 
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Conclusion: Moving Forward with an Interdisciplinary Neuroaesthetic Paradigm 
 
The dissertation emphasizes the co-constitution of the senses and conscious cognition in 
contemporary art experience. I have conducted a series of neuroaesthetic inquiries to 
theorize how certain artworks have facilitated embodied awareness of perceptual 
cognition. In placing the neuroaesthetic operations of artworks in gallery contexts on an 
equal footing with neuroaesthetic research conducted in the neuroscience lab, my aim has 
been to reposition neuroaesthetics as a thoroughly interdisciplinary field of inquiry, 
calling on the research contributions of art historians and art theorists who operate from 
their own epistemological standpoints rather than privileging neuroscientific knowledge 
with authority over other modes of knowing.  
 Drawing connections to ongoing investigations into embodied experience 
emerging in other disciplines, Chapter One raised the stakes of neuroaesthetic 
interdisciplinarity by situating neuroaesthetics within a broader discourse. While 
neuroscientific considerations of the brain as a biological organ support the notion that 
engagement with art is a physiological process, a range of scholars have suggested that an 
exclusive focus on physiology cannot sufficiently explain the workings of the body. 
Thinkers such as Barbara Maria Stafford, Susan Buck-Morss, Donna Haraway and Karen 
Barad have each invested in material experience, yet simultaneously refused to isolate 
physiology from discourse. Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown have similarly 
formulated the body as a contingent process of interaction with the environment. I 
suggest that, moving forward, neuroaesthetic researchers will produce more robust 
theorizations about art when they refrain from bracketing out environmental and cultural 
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conditions as zones of inquiry separated from examinations of the brain. The 
neuroaesthetic paradigm that I have advanced provides a starting point for consideration 
of how the physiological dimensions of social engagements with art constitute embodied 
perceptual processes in and of themselves.  
 Adopting a standpoint of critical embodiment within neuroscientific technology, 
Chapter Two introduced a critical assessment of fMRI as both a mode of knowing and an 
object of knowledge. Considering neuroeasthetics from my embodied standpoint as a test 
subject in neuro-imaging studies, I demonstrated how the disciplinary constraints of 
fMRI experiments on art experience are such that they rightly produce passive subjects, 
isolate nonconscious neural processes and eliminate variables. By contrast, the research 
context of the gallery positions active subjects, self-reflexive and aware, operating in 
open-ended networks of social and physiological engagement. At stake in an 
interdisciplinary neuroaesthetics is the inclusion of embodied forms of knowledge arising 
in the gallery context that are typically occluded by neuroscientific methodologies. 
 In extending the neuroaesthetic discourse to consider research conducted in non-
neuroscientific contexts, the first two chapters established a theoretical framework within 
which to challenge a deterministic tendency in the existing neuroaesthetic literature to 
ascribe nonconscious neural processes with causal priority in art experience. My aim has 
not been to privilege conscious over nonconcious processing, but rather to reconfigure 
the neuroaesthetic paradigm so that both can be examined as entangled components of art 
experience. The remaining subsequent case studies detailed how certain artworks 
contribute to neuroaesthetic knowledge production by facilitating conscious awareness of 
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normally non-conscious processes of perceptual cognition. FASTWÜRMS’ installation, 
for example, brought cognitive processes of abduction, or association, to the fore, while 
Olafur Eliasson made visual cognition the subject of his colour installations. Artworks by 
Kristin Lucas and Omer Fast revealed physiological dimensions of conceptual art. Lucas’ 
performance raised awareness of a cognitive process of internal simulation by inviting the 
imaginative enactment of a conceptual proposition. Fast’s video revealed intersections 
between art and mirror neuron theory in consideration of mimetic performance as an 
embodied mode of intersubjective communication.  
 Together, the case studies have provided new perspectives on the issues of 
abduction, vision, simulation and mirror neuron activation raised in neuro- and cognitive 
science. In each instance, however, the research context of the gallery allowed for 
considerations of how the neurological experience of art impacts within subjective modes 
of social engagement that would be epistemologically inaccessible in the context of a 
neuroscience lab. The processes of abduction revealed by FASTWÜRMS emerged 
through associations within a vast network of agents, including nonhuman participants, 
that raised questions of human accountability to nonhuman species. Eliasson invited 
audiences into an awareness of how technologically mediated environments impact and 
condition human visual capacities. Likewise, Lucas’ performance invoked the context of 
digital and online media, offering sensorial appreciation for how the conditions of 
computerized society can affect embodied subjectivities. Fast’s processes of mimetic 
exchange were framed and intensified through the production of politically loaded 
narratives about the American war in Iraq. These social dimensions were not illustrated 
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representationally by the artworks, but rather embodied neuroaesthetically within the 
gallery context, in that they emphasize the co-constitution of the social and the 
physiological in the art experience.  
 This dissertation has only scratched the surface of potential for how art experience 
may be formulated within an interdisciplinary neuroaesthetic paradigm. Myriad possible 
avenues of research remain unexplored. The case studies demonstrated, to some extent, 
how the embodied forms of knowledge produced by certain artworks could be taken as 
critical interventions into the aesthetic hegemony of techno-scientific culture. These 
efforts represent the beginnings of a neuroaesthetic analysis of technoscientific culture 
that have yet to be fully developed. As younger generations evolve collectively in the 
highly social spheres of mobile technology and internet-based media, the need for critical 
exploration of the embodied affects of online aesthetics becomes more and more urgent. 
There is a need to expand critical discussion problematizing the mind/body dualities that 
new media tends to reinforce. As the case studies demonstrated, the self-reflexive context 
of the art gallery offers an ideal space for activating neuroaesthetic awareness of the 
embodied impacts of technological environments. Neuroaesthetic knowledges produced 
in art contexts may provide a useful theoretical tool for problematizing the Cartesian 
notion that the products of digital media somehow operate in a non-physical, 
disembodied dimension when, in fact, they make deep, physiological impacts on the 
perceptual and cognitive capacities of those who engage with them.  
 While I have argued in this dissertation for research in art world contexts to be 
considered as a viable alternative to the neuroscience lab, I have by no means dismissed 
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the valuable contributions of neuroscientific experimental research. Within the field of 
neuroaesthetics, there is more collaborative work to be done in experiment design. In 
particular, as I suggested in Chapter Two, the aesthetic properties of the environment 
inside the MRI scanner itself remain largely unexplored. Furthermore, the character of 
the aesthetic stimuli could also be improved through collaborative research. For example, 
in their experiment on the importance of context to aesthetic judgment, Kirk, et al, 
showed their subjects a series of jpegs of canonical paintings from art history, all of them 
cropped to fit within the same square format. Any art history student knows that there is a 
fundamental difference between looking at digital documentation and engaging with 
artworks themselves, and cropping the images removes them one step even further away 
from being able to convey the aesthetic effects intended by the artists. Ideally, for a fully 
embodied aesthetic experience, one would be in the actual presence of the works.  
 As a curator who has spent a fair amount of time inside MRI scanners, I would 
like to commission artists to produce art works designed specifically to be experienced in 
that environment. Throughout this dissertation I have contrasted the context of the gallery 
with the context of the neuro-imaging lab in order to show how the the self-reflexivity of 
the gallery context promotes reflexive neuroaesthetic awareness. Certain artists like 
FASTWÜRMS, Eliasson, Lucas and Fast have produced artworks that welcome visitors 
as participants in the co-construction of embodied experience. Furthermore, artworks 
such as Donky@Ninja@Witch, Room for One Colour, Refresh and Talk Show also 
leveraged the reflexive character of art world contexts to extend an invitation to reflect on 
embodied experience as a social phenomenon. In contrast, a neuro-imaging lab positions 
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subjects as passive entities whose brains are activated by external stimuli. In the lab, non-
conscious neural processes are recorded and measured, but the self-reflexive awareness 
of participants rarely comes under observation. What if, rather than showing neuro-
imaging subjects documentation of artworks, subjects were instead invited to experience 
an actual art exhibition inside the scanner? A context such as this would provide first-
hand embodied engagement with artworks rather than with jpegs of artworks. My future 
research will include commissioning multi-media artists working with sound and video to 
create several site-specific installations designed to be experienced by subjects inside the 
scanner. The project will contextualize the scanner as the frame for an art exhibition to 
explore the potential for the kinds of meta-level self-reflection that gallery viewing 
provides. Each piece could be designed to produce a different neuroaesthetic effect. If 
such a project were to function as a valid scientific experiment, clear goals would need to 
be negotiated, controls established, and variables quantified. Artists would work in close 
collaboration with scientists to design neuroaesthetic stimulations that could address 
pertinent neuroscientific questions. Whether or not I secure the funding and collaborators 
needed to realise this project, I intend to continue to conduct field research in both the 
gallery and the neuroscience lab to frame projects which engage critically in open-ended 
discussion across disciplines, and explore avenues for possible future collaboration 
between art and science. 
 I have faced, along with my art and art history colleagues, a contemporary, 
widespread challenge that the humanities justify their value to the post-secondary 
educational institutions that house them. In a political climate of fiscal cutbacks for 
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education, university faculties are being pitted in competition against one another. Yet, 
the material engagements of artists, curators and art historians can critically inform 
scientific conversations about embodied art experience and conversely, neuroaesthetic 
research can empower artists and art historians to consider the physiological dimensions 
of their practice from new perspectives.1 A neuroaesthetics paradigm that acknowledges  
the value of placing art and art history students on equal footing with students in the 
sciences affords both groups with access to interdisciplinary discourses that they might 
not otherwise entertain. 
 While artists, curators, art historians and art theorists may rarely access the full 
critical complexity of neuroscientific debates, the problem is not that the negotiations that 
comprise neuroscientific collective knowledge are incomprehensible, but rather that they 
are rarely articulated in forums intended for interdisciplinary readership. As 
neuroaesthetic research moves forward, the onus is on the humanities to refrain from 
over-simplifying and sensationalizing neuroscientific findings. Of course, contemporary 
art discourse can be as rarefied as neuroscience. It is not that the discourse of 
contemporary art can only be comprehended by certain people, but that it is seldom 
articulated in broadly public forums. Each of the artworks discussed in the case studies 
opened up art discourse to entail neuroscience, suggesting neuroaesthetic curatorial 
frameworks to provide additional new entry points for gallery goers to undertake active 
exploration of embodied engagements with contemporary art.   
 Because artworks produce perceptual cognition, it is fitting that some 
neuroscientists have placed art at the centre of their inquiries into the workings of human 
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consciousness. While the field of neuroaesthetics is only about fifteen years old, art 
historians have been investigating art and consciousness for centuries and their 
contributions are vital to neuroaesthetic research. Neuroscientists can access neuro-
imaging tools in the lab to study neural anatomy in fine detail. Yet art historians and 
theorists are praticed in the self-reflexive, meta-level awareness of perception in art 
contexts. But the lab and gallery are by no means mutually exclusive. One challenge for 
neuroaesthetic researchers is to initiate an open acknowledgement that different 
epistemological frameworks will produce different modes of knowing and that one form 
of knowledge need not be reduced to claims made by the other.   
 Perhaps the most important neuroaesthetic challenge that this dissertation has 
tried to address is the ongoing need to overcome Cartesian dualisms separating body and 
mind. Yes, neuroaesthetics address the sensorial capacities of artworks, but it can also 
reveal that humans interact within their environments as social bodies steeped in  
thought. • 
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End Notes to Conclusion 
                                                
1 In my seminars in neuroaesthetics for senior undergraduate classes in both studio and art history, students 
felt empowered by their capacities to critically engage with the findings of science from their standpoint of 
arts practitioners. In a written evaluation one art history student stated, “I was able to better understand how 
I experience an art work, and became more involved in my research,” [Course Evaluations, ART_HIST 
4AA3 (McMaster University, Term 2, 2012)] while a studio student reported, “The topic of neuroaesthetics 
is not only fascinating as an artist but opens many new areas of study and gives artists a completely new 
way of looking at their work.” [Course Evaluations, SART 4870 01 (University of Guelph, Winter, 2011)] 
 
Figures
Fig. 1) The author, just prior to a 2-hour volunteer session inside an MRI scanner at Sunnybrook Hospital, 
Toronto, ON (2008).
Fig. 3) Functional MRI (fMRI) images that I gener-
ated using the software package FSL from a pre-
recorded data set provided for a class assignment in 
the course: BIOL 5148: Introduction to functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, York University 
(2010).
Fig. 2)  Anatomical MRI scan of my brain, taken 
during class assignment for audited course: BIOL 
5148: Introduction to functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, York University (2010).
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Fig 4) FASTWÜRMS, Blood and Swash, part of the multi-media intallation Donky@Ninja@Witch, 2007. 
Courtesy of Art Gallery of York University. Photo: Cheryl O’Brien
Fig 6) FASTWÜRMS, part of the multi-media 
intallation Donky@Ninja@Witch, 2007. Courtesy 
of Art Gallery of York University. Photo: Cheryl 
O’Brien
Fig 5) FASTWÜRMS, House of Bangs, part of 
the multi-media intallation Donky@Ninja@Witch, 
2007. Courtesy of Art Gallery of York University. 
Photo: Cheryl O’Brien
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Fig 7) FASTWÜRMS, Gusset Nation, part of 
the multi-media intallation Donky@Ninja@
Witch, 2007. Details and installation view.
Courtesy of Art Gallery of York University. 
Photos: Cheryl O’Brien
314
Fig 8) FASTWÜRMS, Blood Clock, part of the multi-media intallation Donky@Ninja@Witch, 2007. Cour-
tesy of Art Gallery of York University. Photo: Cheryl O’Brien
Fig 10) FASTWÜRMS, Pink Donky, part of the 
multi-media intallation Donky@Ninja@Witch, 
2007. Courtesy of Art Gallery of York University. 
Photo: Cheryl O’Brien
Fig 9) FASTWÜRMS, Pink Donky, part of the 
multi-media intallation Donky@Ninja@Witch, 
2007. Courtesy of Art Gallery of York University. 
Photo: Cheryl O’Brien
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Fig. 11) Olafur Eliasson, Room For One Colour, 1997. Courtesy of Studio Olafur Eliasson. 
Fig. 12) Olafur Eliasson, 360° room for all colours, 2002. Courtesy of Studio Olafur Eliasson. 
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Fig. 13) Kristin Lucas, Courtroom Drawing for Refresh (2007). 
Courtesy of the artist.
Fig. 14) Kristin Lucas, Refresh booklet, outside back cover, 2011. 
Courtesy of the artist. 317
Fig. 14) Kristin Lucas, Refresh booklet, centre spread, 2011. Courtesy of the artist.
Fig. 15) Kristin Lucas, Refresh booklet, 
front cover, 2011. Courtesy of the artist.
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Fig. 16) Omer Fast, Talk Show, 2009. Video installation with three synchronized screens (detail). Courtesy 
of Postmasters Gallery, New York
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